

*After Action Review (AAR) Rollup
Lessons Learned Center*

Incident Name and Type: Barry Point / Wildland **Dates of Assignment:** 8/8-8/14/2012

Unit or Jurisdiction(s): Fremont Winema and Modoc National Forests **Geographic Area:** OR-FWF-120680

Report Submitted by: Oregon IMT 4, Portland NIMO IMT

Executive Summary

The following summarizes the After Action Review (AAR) that Oregon IMT 4 and the Portland National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) team completed for the Barry Point Fire. The Transfer of Command schedule for this incident was particularly accelerated and time compressed. This document reflects the information that was submitted in the timeframes available.

The purpose of the AAR is to capture and share some of the successes, challenges and recommendations that can be incorporated into lessons learned. These lessons learned will also be posted on the Lessons Learned web site. The team has highlighted several of the lessons learned that we feel will help provide for continuous improvements in our business model of fire and land management. It is the team's hope that those who have the responsibility for fire management, land management or public safety review the comments and consider the appropriate actions.

Incident Commander

Most Notable Successes:

- Coordination and communication between the Team and the Agency Administrators for Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), Fremont-Winema National Forest (FWF) and the Modoc National Forest was excellent. The joint delegation worked well due to the support and engagement of all parties.
- Integration of NIMO and Oregon IIMT4 when fire complexity increased to Type 1 was seamless and extremely positive.
- Forming a landowner liaison group with representation from IIMT4, ODF and FWF personnel to address landowner and permittee issues worked well to alleviate the anxiety of these stakeholders. This group met with them on both their own turf and in an open meeting format at a local school.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- We missed communicating with all affected landowners and permittees as the fire moved into new areas. This caused considerable angst, confusion, mixed messages and angry reactions.
- The Team lacked strategic focus as the fire progressed during the first two or three days. We were more tactical than strategic which caused us to react rather than anticipate and get ahead of events.
- Local fire management liaisons were directing requests through Line Operations the first two days, rather than through the Team's command structure.
- We had difficulty implementing the Deliberate Risk Assessment process to guide decision making on this incident.

Recommendations:

- Consider implementing a landowner liaison group on future incidents that have affected private property. Have a dialogue at the in-briefing to assess the need, recruit team members and implement in the first day or two of the incident
- Insure that liaisons to the Team who represent the local unit work through the Team's command structure to allow Operations to focus on managing assigned resources.
- Contingency planning needs to occur from the first day of arrival on the incident. Utilize the Deliberate Risk assessment process to inform strategic decision making.

Liaison Officer

Most Notable Successes:

- Cooperation with the Lake County Sheriff Dept and the Modoc County Sheriff Dept. during numerous evacuations throughout the incident.
- Development of the evacuation plan signed by the Lake County Sheriff along with the coordination with Operations and the Sheriff in the development of the management action points.
- The cooperation with Modoc County Sheriffs Dept. during extreme fire movement.
- The assignment of a Liaison Trainee during complex fires.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Trying to keep out in front of the curve due to the fast moving fire with four different geographical areas of concern.
- Trying to keep ahead of the rumors. Local citizen would have information (true or not) almost immediately and were calling information with questions and their concerns.
- Communications between team members and cooperators

Recommendations:

- Assign an individual to check frequently with operations so that real time information can be given to both Public Information Officer and Liaison Officer.
- In complex fires, order at least one additional Liaison Officer.

Safety Officer

Most Notable Successes:

- Very minimal vehicle mishaps (1 minor), considering the number of person hours to date (66,120) and person years (7.55) worked on this incident. These numbers reflect Team 4's tour 8/09 to 8/13/12 only.
- Evacuations of Drew's Reservoir residences and the Westside of Goose Lake. Cooperation between Law Enforcement and Incident in planning ahead on voluntary evacuation and structure mitigation.
- Mitigation of fire/smoke hazards to the public and responders by electronic signing with Oregon DOT.
- Safety Officers were assigned to all Divisions and Groups.
- Ensured radio communications to fire personnel; Weather Alert on 8/13/12 (Roll calls required).
- Escorted Mike Cuff (Fremont-Winema Safety Manager) for orientation of Incident operations.
- Escorted Mr. Billy Gatlin of Ruby Pipeline LLC. To survey incident operations and advised incident management of their high pressure gas pipeline and any associated hazards.

- Agency administrator's comments and challenge to our team, and his passion for our team to succeed, was the most difficult to hear, but the most noticeable success for our team.
- Angela ORDM, did an outstanding job, was by herself most of the time, was always cheerful and never gave up on UTF orders.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Getting accurate maps of Incident for operational personnel.
- Keeping situational awareness current due to the dynamic environment.
- Timely input into the planning process (two shifts vs. 24 hour plan took some time to get used to for everyone).
- Inconsistency of IAP input. It seemed to be a moving target at times. We can improve our communication in this area.
- Getting good night and swing shift sleeping areas established
- Resources, especially air were difficult at times to get, along with key overhead positions like DIVS, Heavy equipment boss (HEQB) and TFLDs.

Recommendations:

- Continue to develop and expand the Risk Management Processes and Procedures within the Unit to other functional (wildlife, archeologists, Resource Advisors, etc) areas.
- Night shift operations resources should be rotated with day operations resources for fatigue issues.
- Move current ICP south to the California line, and leave a spike camp operation in Lakeview.

Safety – Risk Management Process/Assessment

Most Notable Successes:

- Cooperation with local law enforcement (sheriff's office) and Forest personnel.
- Comparison of Indirect and direct strategy as it pertains to firefighter exposure, based on expected fire behavior.
- The way our team responded to Fred Way's challenge!

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Mental model of what risk management is and what it is not, and how best to display that to the rest of the team.
- Establishing the Dutch Creek Protocol on fast moving emerging incident.

Recommendations:

- Continue to educate and use the Risk Management Process (modified 215A, Severity Table).
- Safety would like to try the Deputy facilitating the Deliberate Risk Management Process. This approach has seemed to work on other teams.

Fire Behavior Analyst/IMET

On August 5th, 2012 a complex of thunderstorms developed across portions of northern California and southern Oregon. Lightning data indicates that several strikes occurred on Barry Point near the identified ignition point at 1536 PDT on August 5, 2012. Fire was detected at this location the following day.

A general west to southwest flow developed across the area through August 9th in the wake of the upper shortwave trough that generated the thunderstorms on August 5th. The air mass over the region during this period was very warm, very dry and unstable.

From August 10th through the 14th, the combination of an upper level ridge and a surface thermal trough over northern California and southern Oregon maintained hot, dry and unstable conditions over the area of the fire. Daily high temperatures were generally in the lower 90s with minimum relative humidity values between 6 and 15 percent. Very poor overnight humidity recoveries occurred each of these nights with values generally between 25 and 40 percent. High level Haines values were a 5 through the period with the exception of August 12th when the Haines Index peaked at a 6 through the day operational period.

An indicator of this instability was visible through the pyro-cumulus clouds that developed over the smoke column on August 12th and 13th. The tops of these pyro-cumulus clouds, as measured by the National Weather Service Doppler Radar in Medford Oregon, reached 20,000 to 25,000 feet on August 12th and 35,000 to 40,000 feet on August 13th.

During the period from August 10th-14th, the fire experienced winds with directions varying from night to day. During night operational periods the wind direction was predominately from the northeast to east while each afternoon the wind direction was generally southwest to west through August 13th and then northwest on the 14th. Sustained wind speeds over the fire through this period were generally less than 10 mph with gusts 15 mph or less.

Demobilization Unit Leader

Most Notable Successes:

- We were able to quickly develop a strong working relationship with Expanded Dispatch, having previously worked with these folks.
- Great being in close proximity to Resources and Finance to resolve database and resource issues.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Cleaning the ISUITE database became a major priority before any accurate Section Reports or Tentative Release posters could be produced.
- Sections need to follow established protocols and procedures to better communicate and better utilize available time effectively.
- Vertical communication between C&G and Unit Leaders needs to be strengthened to improve clear, concise and consistent transfer of information.

- Emphasis needs to be placed on all Sections utilizing ICS 213 to document decisions/information (who, what, when, where and how) in a timely manner.
- Even though the Agency issued a delegation of authority, local program managers did not relinquish management of their resources.
- Demobilization Plan did not have Section Review and signoff, nor did Expanded get a chance to review (no air travel timeline or procedures included).

Recommendations:

- Have all Sections follow the procedures outlined within the signed Demobilization Plan, incorporate standard ICS protocols to improve communications vertically and horizontally.

Operations Section Chief

Most Notable Successes:

- Took care of firefighter
- Maintained proper span of control with resources ensuring safety
- Took advantage opportunities to burn of roads and barriers when and where appropriate
- Flexibility of suppression resources to use limited resources where needed
- Good integration with READs on line
- Integration with local resources and landowners helped to develop the right tactics in the right place.
- Resources focused on what could be done and moved resource forward as appropriate
- Good opportunities for trainees and high number of trainees given the opportunity
- Consistency of resources with positive attitude in spite challenging circumstances
- Flexibility of logistics to meet operation needs
- Night shift IAP separate from day

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Lack of maps to reflect rapid fire spread
- Lack of ability to obtain intermediate overhead to supervise resources resulting in unstaffed divisions
- Smoke inversion limiting use of air craft for suppression tactics
- Helicopter batch plant using Therma-Gel in lieu of retardant
- Limited fireman maps
- Lack of changes in fuels types ahead of the fire limited control opportunities
- Extremely dry receptive fuels/coupled with extreme fire behavior during both day and night operational shifts limited suppression opportunities
- Two planning cycles doubled meetings
- Lack of sufficient day sleeping areas
- Lack of type 1 crews

Recommendations:

- Maintain 2 person staff in planning ops as appropriate
- Think bigger box based on fire behavior
- Consider control strategies on based modeled fire spread
- Night Ops brief day ops from field via radio for 0530 operations meeting

Air Operations

Most Notable Successes:

- The ability to establish helibase at the Lakeview Inter-Agency Air Base located on the Airport property was very successful. Having the local support and knowledge greatly benefitted the entire operation; this includes the Forest Supervisor down through the entire staff.
- The Aircraft Dispatcher is very knowledgeable in her job and very helpful, and a great asset.
- Having the exclusive use helitack crews made operating simple and was able to fill in the middle staffing positions required until orders could be filled.
- Having the CL-215's and the available water source is a great asset.
- Having multiple water sources available for the helicopters made for short turn times and greatly assisted the needed support to the line.
- Radio communications was very good across the entire.
- Having a Helco available and operational made it possible to continue helicopter support when it was too smoky for Air Attack.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Shortage of aircraft and personnel made it difficult to provide the necessary support to the line.
- Density Altitude limits the use of the CL-215's
- Smoke and inversions greatly hamper flight operations and line support.

Recommendations:

- Continue to look for staffing for the helibase so the local helitack can be made available for Initial Attack.
- Keep all resource orders open for aircraft and personnel. As they UTF re-order so that the needs can be met.
- Continue to look for a location where the second Thermo-Gel plant can be set. One possibility is located at the Albertson Reservoir approximately three miles west of Division CC. Branch is working on a land use agreement with the land owner.
- Look for Helibase locations to the South as the fire progresses and with the anticipated move of ICP.

Finance Section Chief

Most Notable Successes

COST

- Cost Share Agreement was entered with Oregon Department of Forestry and Fremont National Forest.
- Successfully tracked costs as agreed upon utilizing the Isuite application

PERSONNEL TIME

- Deanna Drinkwater, ODF, was integrated into our finance organization. She was a very valuable resource who had many contacts.
- Worked with Douglas County Parole and Probation/Douglas Forest Protective Association and Warner Creek Correction Facilities to ensure correct time keeping procedures.
- Fire Time Reports were successfully faxed utilizing Efax.

EQUIPMENT TIME

- The contractors were very prepared and provided the information we needed.
- Of the 3 EQTRs, 1 was a trainee and 1 was TIME qualified. It was a good mix and we were able to keep the posting current.
- Leif Shjeflo was the PROC. He was able to resolve any issues we had. His help was greatly appreciated.

CONTRACT INSPECTION

- The contract Resources assigned to the Barry Point incident were the following:
 - 43 contract engines
 - 28 contract water tenders
 - 4 contract faller modules
 - 23 contract crews
 - 2 hand washing stations
 - 4 skidders
 - 3 feller benchers
 - 1 weed washing station
 - 1 water truck
 - 1 refer trailer
 - 1 bus
 - 1 communication trailer
 - 1 office trailer
 - 1 gray water tender
 - 1 medical unit

- Leo Robb and Bill Helphinstine were assigned as ICPI for this incident and performed pre-use inspections for the engines, tenders, fallers, crews and other equipment
- Olga Casarez was assigned ICPI (t).
- Local BLM employee, Berry Phelps (assigned to expanded dispatch) was given the opportunity to inspect several pieces of equipment when his schedule allowed.
- Having an extra ICPI available allowed for one ICPI to spend more time in the cache to prevent contractors from checking out durable property.
- The 3 ICPIs reduced in-camp waiting time for inspections of resources.

COMP/CLAIMS

- We appreciated that Patty Westgate and Nina Hardin provided resources for late arrival of COMP for Oregon Team 4.

Most Difficult Challenges

PERSONNEL TIME

- Getting the Efax set up was challenging but rewarding.

EQUIPMENT

- The location and setup of the office was good but extremely hot.

Recommendations

PERSONNEL

- Continue to use Efax when possible.
- Have a dedicated fax line for that procedure and fax during non-peak hours.

Decision based upon the best balance between the desired outcome and responder exposure:

Based on the findings outlined below, our decision is to implement Prospect #1 – Full *Perimeter Control, Direct Attack (Primary) with Indirect Options*.

Findings:

The selected prospect provides the opportunities to meet the desired objectives with the least amount of exposure to firefighters, the public and to other incident assigned personnel.

Due to the conditions of the fuels, private lands and the landscape within the fire environment; the high to extreme burning conditions; the fact that there is high competition for fire resources both regionally and nationally, utilizing this fire for resource benefit was not ~~a consideration~~. *an option*.

The selected prospect allows the incident managers in concert with line officers and key stakeholders some flexibility in where to priorities suppression activities based on the locations of the critical values at risk, changes in fuel models, changes in weather conditions or other opportunities to reduce exposures and increase the probability of success. In the selection criteria matrix for these activities the values to be protected should be a driving factor. Of these values to be protected, fire fighters, the public and other incident assigned personnel are listed as the number one value.

The selected prospect as outlined in the comparison chart has the highest probability of success, the least cost and the least responder exposure.

Risk Communication

The Fremont-Winema/Modoc National Forests created and refined this decision while communicating and collaborating with adjacent primary landowners and cooperating agencies. Agencies with jurisdiction agreed to assign this fire to PNW Incident Management Team 2, which assumed command on August 15th at 0600. All parties will continue to be involved in management of this incident to its conclusion. Both the Region 5 & 6 Regional Offices will be consulted and informed of progress, decisions, and issues. Press releases will continue being sent to concerned members of the public, interest groups, neighboring agencies, partners, and media. These groups will continue to receive relevant information and public comment will be considered in the management of the incident.

Risk Sharing

The Forest Supervisors and Fire Staff Officers are working closely, with each other and the key stakeholders, in the management of this incident. The Forest Supervisors have been in contact with regional staff and have briefed the Deputy Regional Forester, Acting Deputy Director and Regional Fire Operations during their visit on August 15, 2012. The Forest Supervisors will continue to engage the Regional Office in further decisions.

This AASRA document was prepared with the participation of PNW Incident Management Team 2. Additionally, this document will be included in the published WFDSS decision so that the risks assessed and identified can be shared vertically and horizontally throughout the organization.

Critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed alternative.

As this incident develops, we will monitor the effectiveness of the course of action with the IMT. The critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the selected alternative include any significant changes in the fire environment, including fuels, topography and weather.

**Appendix A
Barry Point Fire
Prospect Details**

Prospect 1 – Full Perimeter Control, Direct Attack with Indirect Options

Resource Type	Number of Resource Units	Persons Per Resource Unit	Days Needed	Total exposure (person-hours) ^a	Rate per Day	Total Rate
T1 Crews	4	20	9	10,080	\$9,384	\$337,824
T2 Crews	29	20	9	73,080	\$10,200	\$2,662,200
Engines	84	3	9	31,752	\$1,492	\$1,127,952
Fallers	10	2	9	2,520	\$1,465	\$131,850
Dozers	12	1	9	1,512	\$1,456	\$157,248
Water Tender(s)	30	1	9	3,780	\$1,430	\$386,100
Fixed Wing Aircraft	1	2	9	108	\$2,000	\$18,000
Type 1 Helicopters	2	1	9	108	\$4,000	\$72,000
Type 2 Helicopters	0	-	-	-	-	-
Type 3 Helicopters	3	1	9	162	\$1,008	\$27,216
Overhead (line)	964	1	9	121,464	\$800	\$6,940,800
Overhead (camp)	383	1	9	42,258	\$800	\$2,757,600
Other: Support Cost	1347	1	9	42,258	\$200	\$269,400
Other: Support Cost	-	-	-	-	-	-

Prospect 1 Totals

Total Responder Exposure Hours	292,824
Total Estimated Cost	\$14,888,190
Total Responders Needed to Implement (average over 9 days)	1347

**Appendix A
Barry Point Fire
Prospect Details**

Prospect 2 - Full Perimeter Control, Indirect Attack in Combination with Direct Attack/Point Protection

Resource Type	Number of Resource Units	Persons Per Resource Unit	Days Needed	Total exposure (person-hours)^a	Rate per Day	Total Rate
T1 Crews	6	20	16	26,880	\$9,384	\$900,864
T2 Crews	0	20	16	-	\$10,200	-
Engines	84	3	16	56,448	\$1,492	\$2,005,248
Fallers	10	2	16	4,480	\$1,465	\$234,400
Dozers	12	1	16	2,688	\$1,456	\$279,552
Water Tender(s)	30	1	16	6,720	\$1,430	\$686,400
Fixed Wing Aircraft	1	2	16	192	\$2,000	\$32,000
Type 1 Helicopters	2	1	16	192	\$4,000	\$128,000
Type 2 Helicopters	0	1	0	0	\$1,773	\$ -
Type 3 Helicopters	3	1	16	288	\$1,008	\$48,384
Overhead (line)	694	1	16	155,456	\$800	\$8,883,200
Overhead (camp)	383	1	16	85,792	\$800	\$4,902,400
Other: Support Cost	1347				\$200	\$269,400

Prospect 2 Totals

Total Responder Exposure Hours	469,056
Total Estimated Cost	\$23,102,648
Total Responders Needed to Implement (average over 16 days)	1,347

