

Recollections of initial attack of the Barry Point Fire, the first three days

Meeting Date: Sept 11, 2012

Location: Lakeview Interagency office Gearhart conference room

Reason for Meeting: Fred Way, Fremont-Winema Forest Supervisor, requested information on the beginning days of the Barry Point Fire to get an understanding of how the Forest responded.

Note Taker: Lucinda Nolan and Glen Westlund, Forest Environmental Coordinator, FOIA coordinator, and litigation coordinator

Attending:

Fred Way, Forest Supervisor; Coley Neider, 8/6 Operations, Trent Wilkie, 8/6 Division A Supervisor, Chad Bergren, 8/6 Division B Supervisor, Clark Hammond, air operations (on phone), Helitak Foreman; Dustin Gustaveson, Oregon Dept of Forestry Supervisor (not assigned to fire); Barry Shullanberger, 8/7-8/8 Day Operations; Noel Livingston, Not present during incident, currently acting Fremont-Winema NF Fire Staff officer; Bob Crumrine, Federal Duty Officer; Eric Knerr, 8/6-8/7 (morning) IC and logistical support; Mitch Wilson, 8/7-8/8 Division Z Supervisor; Abel Harrington, 8/7-8/8 Division A Supervisor; Kevin Burdon, Not assigned to fire ODF Supervisor.

Evening August 5: Lighting storm begins with the first strike occurring at 8:59 am (0859) and the last strike at 10:56 pm (2256). See Attachment 1, Lightning Display Map.

Day of August 6th 2012

Due to lightning incidents on 8/5 and expecting more on 8/6 the Lakeview Interagency Fire Center is placed in lightning mode (see attachment 2 and 3 for roles and responsibilities) which dispatches two resources per event as they get reported. The Forest has seven engines and many lookouts (5) manned (in service) by 0700, in preparation for any potential fires from previous night's storm. Dog Mountain Lookout reports being in service at 0748, all 7 lookouts are in service by 0800. The full complement of engines, crews, and aircraft report in service between 0800 and 0900. The first engine is committed to a fire, returning to Fremont Winema Forest (FWF) 665 at 0757; fire SHR-673 also had engines committed at 0753 with additional FS engines at 0816. By 0900 several other engines were committed to fires from previous days, there are 5 active fires that are being manned at the time the Barry Point Fire was reported at 1626 and another was reported at 1639 (FWF-681). At 1626 the Barry Point fire was named and tracked as incident FWF 680.

The following were committed to the fire as initial attack as shown in the Lakeview Interagency Fire Center daily log for 08/06/2012.

Time Dispatched	Time Arrive at Fire (on Scene)	Equipment/Crew	Type	Action
	1628	8203	Rob Wood, ODF	First to arrive and size up fire and access.
1629	1720	3HT *	Helicopter, pilot plus 8.	Left Fire at 2017 leaving crew on the fire for the night.
1629	1847	E312	Type 3 engine, FS Bly, X crew members	1633 BC10 moved E312 to FR 3916 to stage.
1629	1637	BC-20	Coley Neider, FS Lakeview	Notified of the incident and began ordering air craft at 1634.
1629	1738	T-802	SEAT - Lakeview	
1629	1637	DV1	Eric Knerr	Arrived at fire
	1629	9B	Eric Wolf	Arrived Quartz Mountain Helispot
1629	1712	4AW	Helicopter, type 3	Left fire 2005
1629	1841	AA-3UV	Air Attack	Performs aerial supervision of the incident and coordinates air craft us with the ground.
1629	1742	E-613 *	Type 6 engine, FS Bly	
1629	1841	2-B *	Squad, FS Lakeview, 5 members minimum	Hikes into fire
1629	1847	E-7679 *	Type 6 engine, BLM Gerber,	
1629	1847	E-421 *	Type 4 engine, FS Lakeview	
1629	1847	E-7471 *	Type 4 engine, BLM Gerber,	
1647	1812	Crew 7	FS, Klamath Falls	
1647	1847	E-531	Type 3 engine	
1648	1738	Chase 86	Tender for Dozer 86	
1648	1738	D-86	ODF Dozer	
1648	1847	E-312	Type 3 engine, FS Bly	
1649	1714	E-8262	Type 6 engine, ODF Lakeview	Staged with E613. Not ordered

Time Dispatched	Time Arrive at Fire (on Scene)	Equipment/Crew	Type	Action
				through Dispatch.
1653	1720	15S	Helicopter, Type III	Left fire 2014
1700	1746	CH4	Barry Shullanburger, FS	Arrived at fire at 1659 (incident card) Left fire 2136
1706		E-8266	Type 6 engine, ODF Camp 6,	Stage in Bly
1711	1751	DV2	Barry Hanson	Arrived with ranger. Left fire 2229
1717	1908	T-847	SEAT	
1842	2031	Doz1150	FS Dozer	
1849		Lockett WT	Contract water tender	
1852	2124	Richmand DZ	Contract Dozer	

*First crews dispatched by Lakeview Interagency Fire Center all copied dispatch and responded immediately. Additional resources were requested to report to the fire by the Bly District Duty Officer, BC10, Leland Hunter; ODF Duty Officer; and Lakeview Duty Officer BC20. *There were people from local District Office's, ODF as well as others that saw the potential for this fire to become large quickly and it was apparent to everyone working the fire that this was a priority incident.*

In summary: 7 engines, 20 person hand crew, 10 person hand crew, 3 helo, (2 mediums and one light with 11 crewmen) 2 SEAT planes, 2 dozers, and an air attack platform for the initial attack.

Initial Fire growth: The Dog Mountain Lookout reported the fire at 1626. The fire was also spotted about the same time by Rob Wood (ODF) while travelling to the Dent Creek Road towards Yokum Valley. He tried to contact the lookout but could not be heard. By this time the lookout was reporting the fire to the Lakeview Interagency Fire Center. The Lookout reported the fire as an ¼ acre, than came back as a ½ acre, than again as an acre before LIFC could respond. By 1636 Dog Mountain reports the fire has doubled in size and is experiencing erratic winds. At 1638 Dog Mountain reports torching and a change in smoke from gray to very black. At 1658 Dog Mountain reports a spot fire west of the original fire.

Dustin Gustaveson recalled hearing Dog Mountain Lookout reporting the fire at a half acre with a grey column. Before Dispatch could “tone” out the fire, Dog Mountain had called back two more times and each time the fire had doubled in size.

Dog Mtn first reported the smoke at 1626 on 8/6/12. At 1635 Dog Mtn reported “doubled in size headed NE getting erratic winds”. At 1638 Dog Mtn reported the fire as “starting to torch gray

to very black”. At 1656 Horsefly lookout reported “130 degrees and 29 seconds, T40 R16 Sec 10. At 1657 Dog Mtn reported “spot fire on the west side now, just started up”.

1708: Report from 4AW: Fire is 7 acres in heavy timber and the adjacent fuels are the same. The fire is running and torching with flame lengths of 4 to 8 feet. The fire is positioned on the top third of 30 to 45 percent slope on the west aspect of the ridge. The ridge is flat on top with winds from the west at 5 to 10. Spread rate is high and timber is at risk, more air support is needed. The fire is spotting 300 yards ahead of the fire.

1829: 15 acre fire with ½ acre spot a quarter mile ahead of fire.

2024: Fire is at 40 acres with multiple spots, crews continue to work but all aircraft are off the fire.

2153: Fire is about 100 acres

0046: Fire is about 100 acres

0337: Fire size 100acres, could be 200 acres.

0448: Fire size about 150 acres.

Aviation: 1632: Coley Neider (BC20) asked if any SEATs were available, none were available at the time but Helicopter 4AW is available. At 1634 Coley again asked for a SEATs, called SIFC and one was diverted from another fire. At 1640 he again asked about a helicopter (4AW is dispatched) and an Air Attack plane to coordinate air operations. At 1701 dispatch was told that no heavy air tankers were available, they were committed to another fire. Aircraft got ordered before people were on scene because they anticipated the need.

1805: There is again a request for heavies (air tankers) and relief or other air support on Division B of the fire. The heavies were originally ordered at 1700.

1835: No heavy air tankers are available, COIDC has priority.

1840: T802 and T847 will flight follow with 3UV on the Barry Point Incident. Flight follow means that the planes will no longer check in with Dispatch about flight locations but will with 3UV. Air attack, 3UV, arrives on the fire at 1841.

Ground Suppression:

Rob Wood arrived to the scene of the fire at 1628.

1636: Rob Wood (8203) sized up the access to the fire and said it was not visible from roads and may be a walk in. He asked about helicopter 3HT and it was on its way. (incident card).

1638 Crew 7 was contacted and staged at the base of Bly Mountain (Beatty) rather than return to Klamath Falls. At 1647 they were dispatched to the fire and arrived at the fire at 1812. See table above for a listing of initial crew orders for the fire and the additions that came shortly after.

1740: All resources on the fire meet for a briefing at the junction of Forest Roads 3910000 and 3910012. *Fire suppression will be a hand operation because engines do not have access to the fire. There is no safe road access because of heavy fuel loads and ingrowth with single access requiring ingress and egress on the same route. It takes about a half hour to walk into the fire. Helicopter and engine crewman were divided and assigned to Alpha or Bravo divisions (units). Division A worked the north flank from west to northeast and Division B worked the south flank from west to east.*

1749: IC organization was established: Rob Woods as IC and Baker is a trainee, Coley Neider (BC20) operations, Trent Wilkie Division A supervisor and Chad Bergren Division B supervisor and Eric Knerr DV1 was overseeing. *We inserted Eric Knerr as overhead for Rob Wood as dispatch was not sure Rob was IC 3 qualified. Once this determination was made, Eric stepped back in an advisory role.*

1852, Two federal and one contract dozer were ordered for the fire. At 1858 the Richman dozer (contract) was coming out of Bly estimated an hour and half from the fire. This joined dozer DZ86 which was dispatched at 1648. DZ86 was on the fire at 1738 and worked with crews and the Richmand Dozer arrived at 2124.

1935: Crews anchored the fire and split in two divisions, A and B, and started to work their way around the fire with crews and dozer. Later that night the second dozer arrived.

Div Alpha, Trent Wilkie. Tied in with Chad came up with a plan. We worked north and lost line right away, the fire was spotting across the dozer line. Fuel load was mixed conifer and over 6 foot manzanita, with a heavy down dead component. (Fuel model 10: 40 tons per acre) Every time we would get the line in, fire would torch and spot across the line. The single dozer had to rework lines. By morning when I got the second dozer I used one dozer going ahead and one going behind picking up spots and improving the line.

Div Bravo, Chad Bergren. From the hill we went direct with a handline. We had an 11 person crew. First chunk was open ponderosa and we made some good progress. We were assisted by aircraft. The line reached the rock out crop of Barry Point proper and once we broke over the top, everything changed. The brush was over 6 foot high, the kind you get lost in. A lot of fir and snags were catching. The wind was still with us (in our back), this was dozer country. Handcrews could not get it done. We were asking for dozers but none were available. Division A was in some real bad stuff and needed the dozers more. Using the air support we were doing pretty well. We could use the helicopters effectively.

A little after dark we got a wind shift and it kind of went more to the west. With this wind the fire really started torching and spotting. The spotting was a good quarter mile ahead. The seat drop was not affective once you got on the ground you could tell the fuel load was not suited for seat drops.

Note on Dozers: Oregon Department of forestry (ODF) dozer, DZ86, was dispatched by Dustin Gustavson before it was called into dispatch.

Coley Neider (BC20) ordered 4 dozers, Dustin called saying that one ODF dozer was on the way and a FS dozer was dispatched. Two FS dozers showed up on the fire later that night, one was not able to be staffed because the operator had maxed his time for the day. Because of this we made the decision to let this dozer rest the night and bring them on the next morning. The dozer was transported to the fire staging area to be ready for the next day. One ODF and one FS dozer remained working the incident.

2009: Aviation requested the Helitack crews be pulled off the fire for the night so they would be available to staff the helicopter the next day. Not all helitack crewmen are pulled. Eleven were pulled off the fire and nine left to work through the night.

2153: The note in the Incident Card is a miss communication from the fire. There has never a line around the fire. The head of the fire was still active and unsafe to approach. The crew expected the existing dozer line to hold. The line was a quarter mile long from the anchor point and halted because of spotting and erratic fire behavior. Fire behavior would normally moderate at night but conditions kept this fire active. IC Rob Wood gave the update on fire at 2153 fire size of 100 acres plus or minus, active fire burning, dozer line is indirect and would not call it contained. We had one dozer line on one side of the fire that looked like it would hold. Further progress on that line was halted because of spotting.

0046: Fire is active in some parts and calmed in other parts. IC beds down crew to have them available the next day. Coley, Rob, Trent, Chad and Mike McGirr discussed what resources need to be bedded down so that we will still have crews avail for tomorrow. The decision was also based on the erratic fire behavior that came when the wind changed and not being able to see spot fires early enough to take action.

0223: Coley Neider, E421, E312, Squad 2B, 9 from Helitack, Doz 1150 and one dozer boss from E679 remain working while others bed down. Those bedding down are E 679, 471, 531, Crew 7, 8262, Richmand Dozer and D-86. Battalion 20, E421, E312, squad 2b, 7 helitact, agency dozer and dozer boss were used to hold the dozer line on left flank and hand line on div Bravo right flank. Dozer was used to improve existing line from div alpha to the head of fire. There was no containment of the fire because of spotting, slope, fuel conditions, and limited ability to hold the line with resources we had.

0337: Fire behavior diminished with isolated torching. Working dozer lines where possible.

0448: Continuing line construction and holding actions on the SE flank. North flank, Div A, is indirect line and 50 percent is holding. *IC says fire is 150 acres they are continuing line construction and taking holding actions on southeast. Both flanks are holding*

Night Crew Summary: *Worked on indirect line on north side. The dozer line around the north edge of Div Alpha 50% holding. Put line between Forest Roads 028 and the 028, this is a loop road and we connected those two roads on div Alpha; however, did have not enough help to hold this line. Scouted a location for an indirect line down to the Hay Creek Road and for a hold line on SE. Rest of night shift, tried to hold line (rough estimate 50% around the fire) and scout for next day.*

Line around the heal provided a secure anchor point

Fire Management

2115: Type 3 team ordered for fire

0217: Rob Wood leaves fire to bed down and transfers IC to Eric Knerr

0737: IC is transferred from Eric Knerr to Bustamonte for the day.

August 7 beginning with Day Crew

Available Resources

At staging area:

GHR type 2 engine, PeH?, Bly Mountain Fire Department?, Leehmen Contracting water tender type 2, Saw-livin Inc tender, Simms Dozer, Lockett water tender, Richmand Contracting dozer type 2, ASI Crew, Alan Taylor TFLD

Those who bedded down the night before were on the fireline. They include E7679, E7471, Crew 7, E613?, E531, and E8262 as well as Dozer D86.

Division A had the Simms and Jeff and Billie Wessel dozer type 2 E-11, Lockett Tender, Jess Pitt Engine, Inbound Engine, GHR Engine, GHR Engine, Leehman Tender, Crew2A

Division B had Crew 7, Dozer 86, ASI Crew, 7471, 613, 8262 and 531

Fire behavior and growth

1223: Size 175 acres. Fire activity is starting to pick up, gusty winds, the air resources and helicopters are buying us some good time. Starting to see some spotting and torching is picking

up. Fire is burning toward the north. Crews are continuing to construct dozer line, flanking the fire. Biggest need is for hand crews.

1628: From air attack - Fire is at 500 acres with short range spotting. Spots along FR 3940 are running in the grass.

1631: Acres set at 1,500

Aviation: The day began with aggressive aerial support..

0801: Redmond says that 3 heavies are available and asks if they are wanted. Dispatch says they can be used and Redmond will let them know when they can be launched. 0851 the 3 heavies and a lead plane are dispatched to Barry Point.

0817: 2 SEATs are ordered and by 8:27 are in the air to the fire.

0857: Helicopter 15S is ordered and leaves Klamath Falls to arrive in 30 minutes.

0917: Both SEAT(S T847 and T802) and Air Attack (3UV) are at the fire.

0935: Air Attack is in contact with heavies

0941: Air Tankers T142, T40, and T12 are 23 minutes from the fire.

1016: First heavy drops retardant on the fire.

1033: air attack requests another heavy air tanker

1112: Air attack will flight follow aircraft.

1113: relief air attack filled after lengthy search for a replacement for 3UV who is running out of time. Air Attack will be 3ME.

1134: helicopter 3HT arrives with pilot plus 8.

1135: order for a 4th heavy still pending

1142: Clark Hammond (Sup9 with crew and fuel truck) arrives at Dog Lake to set up a helibase.

1146: 8401 arrives at Quartz Mountain to work helicopter support (H15S)

1151: Lead plane L64 arrives at fire

1237: Air attack cancels the order for the forth heavy. 1246 dispatch says the order for a heavy was cancelled.

1301: 3ME takes over as air attack from 3UV. Requests relief lead plane for 1515. L65 will take lead.

1337: Sup 9 reports that Helicopter 3HT is working from the Dog Lake boat ramp and H15S is working out of the Quarts Mountain gravel pit.

1446: Ops checking on type 1 helicopter order, one is coming from Idaho, the other is pending.

1508: Request from NW; would like 1 or 2 air tankers for the Medford incident. Air Attack relays that the tankers are needed for this fire and would like to keep them.

1530: 2 ODF Airtankers entered the mix sometime between 1530-1600?

1608: 3EM turns air attack over to 3UV and returns to Lakeview for fuel

1707: Air Attack observes that helicopters 15S and 3HT are on the ground and will hold them there at this time to save flight time.

1724: Air Attack would like 96W on Division B.

1800: Air Attack relays that since they are unable to fill the relief lead that tankers would be shut down at 1900 and helicopters would be retained. Also advised that Type 2 helicopters are not needed at this time.

1817: NW informs dispatch that the fire will not be getting the relief air attack requested as COIDC has a new incident. Tankers can remain on the fire until 1900 to 1915.

1824: Type 2 helicopter is back over the fire.

1824: NW COIDC caught the incident and the fire can have the air attack relief, the fire takes it.

1917: T847 lands in Lakeview and is off for night.

1926: 96W lands in Lakeview

1943: T40 and T62 from Klamath Falls to the fire

1951: Helicopter 15S is released from fire for the night

1958: Helicopter 3HT is on the ground in Lakeview.

Ground Suppression:

The day crew works to extend the flanks. There are two active fire heads and the goal is to eliminate one of them. Division Z is added today.

Division A: BC72, Able Harrington division supervisor. *Started with 2 dozers and contract engine personnel. Pretty good hike in for crews and uphill, was not sure how well they would do*

after the hike. One dozer improved the line to Barry Point and the other was used to work downhill to the 028. Dozers were working the 028 road and split them to work both sides. Shifts in wind made it impossible to keep the fire within the lines. The dozer line would not take much wind shift and fire spotted across this line. There was spotting across the upper part of the 028 (left side). By the time I got the dozers in place the fire was already causing suppression issues (concerns). It was not safe to put crews into that situation and fire behavior and fuel conditions caused problems to the crew reaching the safety zone at Squaw Flat. At 1300 Division A disengaged the fire for safety reasons then later engaged again. The fire was spotting across the dozer line and running up slope to the ridge. FR 028? was compromised.

Div Alpha continued to experience extreme fire behavior with multiple spotting across existing dozer line and without enough resources was not able to hold existing line. Once the sun went down the ODF dozer was able to punch line to northeast slope and it held.

Resources were not available not from lack of ordering but from lack of availability. There were fires burning in Central Oregon that were burning/threatening structures and that created competition for resources. (see log at 1104 and 1232)

The NW preparedness level was a three. After the Barry Point fire started the Nation went to a preparedness level four.

Division B: Brent Miesinger, Division Supervisor. Crew seven and dozer extend division B down to the FR 3940. The dozer constructs direct and indirect lines utilizing the moderating effect of the retardant from the morning air drops. The fire is burning to the northeast with no break in fuels between FR 3940 and the active fire making it difficult to get in front of the fire. The slope, fuels, and flame lengths make it unsafe to construct direct fire lines so much of the line is indirect and would require burning out.

Division Z, Mitch Wilson division supervisor.

Scouted 406 to 052 could see fire was coming over top of nob in hay creek drainage. Once fire crossed Hay Creek it added complexity to suppression efforts on Dog Mt due to mid-slope road systems and lack of natural fuel breaks for control. Fire can easily jump mid-slope roads. Efforts were made to stop the fire using these roads but was unsuccessful. The combination of fire behavior, terrain, lack of control features (breaks in fuel) and fire now at the base of Dog Mountain made suppression efforts difficult.

The fire was pushing back towards the 3940.

The dozer line was completed to FR 3940 road (Hay Creek) and held. The dozer line intersection with FR 3940 became the end of Division B. FR 3940 became the start of division Z with Mitch Wilson Division supervisor.

1215: First had the engines knock down snags and secure FR 3940 (Hay Creek Road). Scouted the 069 and 062 roads and then travelled to the Dog Mountain Road to look back and see what the fire was doing. It was making a lateral run downhill. I discussed the need to burnout from FR 3940 to stop it the fire at the road. After two strips the approaching fire started spotting a 1/4 mile to a mile ahead of us so we pulled back and stopped the burnout. We moved from the road into Dry Valley and chased spots.

1104: Order for 4 crews has been filled and 2 orders are outstanding for type 1 crews.

1232: Greyback should be at fire at 1400. GFP 10B (hand crew) left dispatch and heading to the fire.

1338: Have one dozer boss dispatched and 2 orders are pending. IC asks to order an additional.

1418: Staging area moved to end of pavement on FR 4017.

1514: notified by air attack that spotting is occurring across FR 3940; Dog Mountain Lookout is notified to be on alert.

1515 Barry Shullanberger witnesses several spots across the 3940 road (Hay Creek).

1530 sent three engines and dozer with two air tankers to Dry Valley area and used these resources for direct attack on private lands within Dry Valley.

1625: Dog Mountain lookout leaves tower.

2159: Night Resources: A night shift was developed with Tom Goheen as Div Supervisor. FS; 3 type 2 crews, and 3 type 3 engines. ODF; 2 type 6 engines and dozer and dozer boss. Night crew completed the black line on B Division to reduce the possibility of the fire moving to the south. A mobile attack crew with dozer and crew was sent to Dry Valley.

2217: test fire to start burnout.

2254: Harlin Dozer is at Dog Lake but does not have a dozer boss with it. It stages at Dog Lake.

2331: Burn out on Division B (south end of fire) has about a mile to go and everything is looking good.

0135: Burnout still looking good. Working the southeast section of line and will tie into FR 3940 in about a quarter mile.

0309: The burn out has brought fire from Barry Point to FR 3940. Will soon begin to carry fire to burnout along FR 3940 and begin burning to the north.

0348: Started burnout along FR 3940 heading north.

0533: Completed burnout along FR 3940.

Fire Management

0837: BC20 begins ordering planes.

0847: Barry Shullanberger transitions with Coley Neider becoming day operations. Informs dispatch that there are 3 divisions.

0950: Greg Funderburk assigned as IC trainee for type 3 team.

1530: Discussion to order a type 2 team to manage the fire between Fred Way, Barry Shullanberger, and Bob Crumrine.

1535: Richard Bustamonte, day shift IC ordered the type two team.

1631: Completed the 209 with Greg Funderburk. See attachment 4

1714: 8265 moves to the north end of the fire as instructed by 8202.

1838: Transitioned to type 3 team retaining the present organization.

2016: Day operations are transferred to night operations and all day resources are returning to fire camp.

August 8 being with Day Shift

Available Resources: See Incident Status Summary (ICS-209) for 09/08/2012 (Attachment 5)

Fire growth behavior and growth

1729: Air attack report the fire is 1.5 to 2 miles from the lookout and is making a good push.

Night time recoveries never happened on this fire. Weather was a factor in the erratic fire behavior.

Aviation:

0707: Placed order for 3 heavies, a lead plane, and air attack with KIFC and for helicopters and crews.

0721: Helicopter 15S is available and will fly to Quartz Mountain Helispot at 0800.

0800: IC asked if SEATs were available the first thing this morning and they are not and the order for 3 heavies is still pending.

0829: SEATs, 4JE, and heavies T12 and T40 plus lead plane are dispatched to the fire. T142 is on day off and T66 needs repairs. Operations says there is an inversion over the fire and will not be able to use heavies yet this morning.

0854: Clean air is reported on Division A and request bucket work, helicopter 15S is available.

0920: Air Attack 3UV is 17 minutes from the fire, they are asked to report to the north end of the fire.

0930: 3UV arrived on the fire.

0938: Air attack orders a type 1 helicopter to Division A, and says to launch L65 and 2 heavies because fire is threatening state lands.

0945: Dry Valley sec 36/31 and 052 road, Dry Valley is being threatened; 1 hour with 2 tankers would be good for the day. Support for burnout on 012 road.

0949: Helicopter 15S is dispatched to Division A.

1012: Oder placed for T66.

1015: air attack asks to launch 2 SEATs and would like second State (ODF) air taker, T62 is available MFR

1040: T66 took off and has to jettison load, still having problems.

1046: T847, T802, 4AW arrive in Lakeview, Ops asks to have SEATs held in Lakeview.

1027: Machado says he needs the air cleared 4AW can fly the fire for mapping it. Ops is on 4AW and requests to hold SEATs.

1058: T802 and T847 are loaded and returning to fire.

1108: Lead65 says to hold tankers and SEATs from Lakeview because it is too smoky.

1113: KIFC was unable to hold tankers.

1159: would like type 2 helicopter on Division A.

1214: Lockett transport is fixed and operational

1237: Helicopter 3HT arrives at fire and goes to Dog Lake, lands at 12:44

1239: HC92 and fuel truck arrive at Dog Lake

1245: Ops says visibility OK and would like Air Attack to report to Division E on Dog Mountain.

1311: Air Attack takes off from Lakeview. Ops will wait for them to order more resources.

1416: LMT tanker base was wondering if T62 was needed, the reply was not at this time.

1438: Air Attack was wondering if there were reports of a fire near the California boarder south of Dog Mountain. This smoke was well into California. At 1500 air attack says the smoke is located near Clear Lake.

1447: Lead relief, LD64, is 20 minutes from fire.

1543: LD64 says for LD65 should go to LMT, but there is still no Jet A in LMT.

1611: Northwest wants to know the plans for the Klamath Tanker base use for the night while construction occurs on the Klamath Falls runway. Would like to know when they can start work. At 1618 Air Attack says when they are done with the tankers for the night.

1645: Air Attack sent a type 2 helicopter to Division A.

1652: Air attack would like to launch 2 heavies with lead and 2 SEATs out of Lakeview. T40 is down for mechanical problems and a second tanker is ordered from NW.

1652: another air tanker called was unavailable due to mechanical

1721: T847 loads and returns to fire

1726: T802 loads and returns to fire.

1729: Air Attack wants to know the condition of the Klamath Falls runway and if it is open so the tankers can land.

1734: Tanker Base in Klamath Falls confirms that tankers will not be able to land once the construction starts. Small planes will be able to land.

1742: NW would like LD65 and T12 to return to Redmond for night. T12 will get two loads from Medford.

1811: LD65, lead, needs relief at 1900. 2ZZ has 1.6 hours left of flight time for the day and can take lead at 1900.

1840: Last drop of the day so lead relief is not needed. T12 will be staying in LMT. LD65 returns to Redmond.

2002: All air resources are off the incident.

Airtankers had to go to Medford to refuel as the Klamath was repairing the airstrip.

2 type three helicopters, two type two, and one type one were available for the day. Another type two was down for mechanical issues

Ground Suppression:

0850: Eastern Oregon Task Force called dispatch informing them that engine E676 broke down and will be fixed and back on the road the next day. The rest of the task force is proceeding to the fire.

1129: A dozer transport has blown radiator hose and mechanic is requested.

1133: Dozer D 86 and chase arrive at fire and leaves at 1611 along with 8263.

0051: Night Ops says all people are in place and completing burnouts on division A, B, E, and Z.

Division A: The objective was to stop the fire spread to the north and west. Plans called for burning out of the indirect lines. This burnout, when completed, would stop the active spread of the fire to the west and north. Firing operations would be from FR 3940 to 012 using line made the previous day. Two Hand crews, one from helitac and the other Winema IHC (Hot Shots). There was concern about the narrowness of buzzard roost draw and that fire could easily jump it. A double dozer blade contingency line was constructed from the 012 to 3940 straight north to fall back to should the fire cross buzzard roost draw. Same fuel type dead and down receptive to firing operation.

The wind was in our favor. Burnout began between 930-1000 before the heat of the day. The Helitack crew worked from 3940/012 junction to the south. Winema worked from origin of fire along Division. B to the North. The two crews eventually met in the middle near Squaw Flat.

Between 1200-1300 the Winema Hot Shots began burnout of Barry Point along a cat line to the 012 road. They worked north with a twenty person crew coming along behind the firing operation. We felt good after we hooked the corner. The burning moved slow because it was a fuel model ten. Nasty country for the most part. After the Winema Hot Shots got started we held up at Squaw Flat. There was not enough time to finish what we wanted to do so the night shift completed the line.

This firing operation stopped the spread of fire spread to the north.

Division Z brought resources up to junction of the 053 and 052 roads (the pond staging). Dog Lake dozer unloaded. Walked from the 052 road to the division break and constructed dozer line to the west into Dry Valley with dozer boss Brennan Hawk. Engine task force supported the

dozer line in the morning by mopping up and made hose lays. An order was placed for hose and fittings.

1130 Harlan dozer, transport blew a radiator hose and became a concern for traffic coming in and out.

The fire pushed hard on the 052 road. We had trouble keeping fire west of the 052 road. The fire continued spotting and making uphill runs to the 053 road. Holding the fire was difficult because both the 052 and 053 roads are mid-slope roads on Dog Mountain but were the best options for holding the fire at that time.

Division E: Request was made for additional engines. The ordered was filled with the Bly heavy engine, Lakeview's heavy, and Paisley RD heavy. They arrived on the fire midmorning except the Lakeview heavy which arrived on the fire in midafternoon due to checking the original lightning fires found on the 6th.

Prineville IHC burned along the 052 road to the south to stay ahead of the main fires uphill runs.

Due to fire behavior the main fire crossed the 052 south of the Prineville crew before they could complete black line.

Prineville and the resources on Div E went up the main Dog Mountain road as a last chance to hold the fire on the westside of mountain. They prepped the main road (Dog Mountain Road) down to the 053 and dozer line was put in on the 019 road from Big Dog spring down to the 053.

Dog Mountain Lookout was wrapped in preparation for the fire burning over it.

Fire Management

0910: all night crew resources are off the fire and arrived in camp.

See Day Plans, Attachment 6

Night Crew: The night crew burned what Prineville had started prepping on the Dog Mountain road from Big Dog Spring down to the 053 road. There was active fire a various distances from the road. The night crew did not burn out the portion of line Big Dog Spring down the 019 road that tied to the 053 road. On Division B the night crew also burned out from the Hay Creek 3940 road to the 053 road on Dog Mtn.