



BARRY POINT FIRE
FREMONT-WINEMA NATIONAL FOREST
FACT FINDING REVIEW REPORT

Prepared for:

Regional Forester
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Portland, Oregon

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PREFACE

December 14, 2012

I thank Ed Shepard & Associates, LLC for their diligence and effort in developing this report. My intent in commissioning Ed's work was to further understand the circumstances and experiences surrounding the Barry Point Fire in Oregon. Ed's report will help me identify further steps for the Forest Service to respond to and learn from the Barry Point Fire. I recognize that the experience of affected landowners varied and that each may proceed as they see fit in dealing with the losses to their property.

The Forest Service, in cooperation with the Oregon Department of Forestry, provided Shepard & Associates full access to fire documents. We provided factual suggestions and edits on earlier drafts of this report. The report includes valuable information regarding the sequence and timing of events as well as the impressions and recollections of a good number of people who were involved or directly affected by the fire. I appreciate the candor and honesty shown by many landowners and agency personnel during the interviews. It was most important to me that this report capture the facts and impressions of the community, landowners, and those closest to this fire because my exposure to your experiences was limited to one visit with you after the fire. I believe that your common concerns are reflected in this report.

This initial fact-finding report is extremely helpful because it focuses my next steps in key areas. Clearly, there is much for the Forest Service and other agencies to learn from this fire. The National Fire and Aviation Management staff will be conducting a review of this fire to evaluate the response performance for large fire costs to ensure that fire management actions were appropriate, risk-based, and effective. I have asked that the national team include an evaluation of the recommendations and information contained in this report during their review. In particular, I am interested in exploring ways we can better manage fire team transitions and specific ways we can improve communication with other agencies and landowners on future fires.

Kent Connaughton
Regional Forester

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Barry Point Fire occurred on the Fremont-Winema National Forest in South Central Oregon; the Modoc National Forest in northern California; on private lands in Oregon protected by the Klamath-Lake District of the Oregon Department of Forestry; and on private lands in California protected by the Modoc National Forest under agreement with CalFire. The fire was ignited by lightning on August 5, 2012 and spread rapidly over the next few weeks, crossing into California on August 14th. It was contained on August 27th at approximately 93,000 acres after burning through National Forest System lands containing many values including timber and livestock forage; and private timber and grazing lands. No homes were lost from the fire, but there was considerable property loss to landowners and permittees in and around the two national forests and ODF protected lands.

The 2012 fire season was severe throughout the west with several large, destructive fires causing significant property losses and the loss of human life. In eastern Oregon, several large fires burned, including the largest fire in Oregon in 150 years. The Barry Point Fire started at a time when fire behavior and fire growth potential was extreme. The fire challenged the incident management teams until the weather moderated and the fire burned into less hazardous fuels.

Community members raised several questions over the management of the fire and communication between the managing agencies, landowners, and permittees. The Regional Forester attended a meeting in Lakeview and, after listening to some of the stakeholders' concerns, decided to commission this fact finding report. The objectives of our report are to provide a better understanding of landowner and community concerns about the fire, provide a common understanding of what occurred on the fire and to identify any lessons that could be learned for future fires.

This report draws on interviews with more than 30 state and federal forest and fire personnel, members of the incident management teams, landowners, and permittees; and a review of some of the pertinent parts of the large fire record. We found many similarities between what we heard from local stakeholders and what we heard from Forest personnel and firefighters. Many times we heard similar stories, but from different perspectives, or from differing times or locations on the fire. Sometimes we could find some reference to reported events in the record, but other times we were unable to find documentation of events. This is not surprising as many things happen rapidly on a fire of this size and what may have been a significant event in one person's perspective was not as significant to another, or may have been unknown when reports were written.

For almost two weeks (August 6-17), the Barry Point Fire defeated containment efforts by four incident management teams. Fire managers called in air tankers, crews, and incident management teams beginning with a local Type 3 team and progressing to a national Type 1 team – the highest-level designation in the wildland firefighting arsenal. Firefighters were able to protect homes but were unable to make headway on controlling the perimeter of the fire until the weather began to moderate on August 18th.

During the fire's rapid initial spread, communication between firefighters and community members was limited. This led to important differences in perspective and sense-making regarding fire management decisions. As the fire continued to grow in spite of the IMT's efforts, community members became frustrated and began to question the teams' and agency leadership, performance, and dedication to protecting private property and the national forest.

The fire caused substantial economic damage to landowners and permittees, and we heard many questions regarding compensation for losses suffered during the fire. The issue of compensation for losses is not a part of our charge and is not included in this report.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was supported by several people that helped the fact-finding proceed smoothly. Deana Wall from the Deschutes National Forest provided logistical support including the arduous task of scheduling interviews, arranging meeting space, and keeping us informed. Fred Way, Fremont-Winema Forest Supervisor, and his employees provided us with a room for phone interviews and to review the records. The Steering Group (Appendix 1) provided insight into whom to interview and reviewed drafts of the report. We would like to say a special thank you to Audrey Henry, Executive Director of the Lake County Chamber of Commerce, for graciously hosting us at the Chamber of Commerce Office where most of the interviews occurred.

We would also like to thank the interviewees from the Lake County community, Fremont-Winema National Forest, Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) Klamath-Lake District, and the Incident Management Teams (IMTs). Several of these interviews required people to recall painful and emotional memories. Without the interviews, this report could not have been prepared.

As with any fact finding report, we are reporting on what transpired after the event occurred. It is easier to look back and make judgments on decisions made during the hectic times of a wildland fire than it is in real time. Agency officials and incident management teams make decisions based on the best information available at the time, and make plans based on that information and resources available to them. Most of the Forest Service and ODF employees and firefighters we interviewed were very forthcoming on events as they saw them. Some indicated that they learned things on Barry Point that they used on other fire assignments during the 2012 season. We hope that this report can help improve future wildland firefighting operations.

**Barry Point Fire
Fact-Finding Report
Final
January 9, 2013**

I. FACT-FINDING REPORT

A. Background

The Barry Point Fire (OR-FWF-120680) was ignited by lightning on Sunday evening August 5, 2012, and was declared 100% contained on August 27, 2012, after burning 92,977 acres in Oregon and California on the Fremont-Winema and Modoc National Forests and private ground. The rapid growth of the fire in acres and complexity led to multiple transitions of Incident Management Teams (IMT). The fire was aggressively attacked and then managed by a Type 3 IMT, but rapidly progressed in complexity to a Type 2 IMT. The Type 2 IMT was augmented by a National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) team, and then relieved by a Type 1 IMT. The rapid growth in complexity and size and the presence of intermingled homes, private ranches, and timberlands within the fire area resulted in damage to private land, improvements; and resources, and spawned local controversy over how the fire was fought and managed.

Kent Connaughton, Regional Forester and Congressman Greg Walden, Oregon 2nd Congressional District met with many of the local stakeholders and landowners in Lakeview. The Regional Forester agreed to provide for an independent third-party fact-finding report on what transpired during the Barry Point Fire and actions after the fire was contained. Shepard & Associates, LLC was contracted by the Region to conduct the review in Oregon.

This Fact-finding Report focuses on activities in Oregon in keeping with the direction of the Regional Forester. The Modoc National Forest and land owners/permittees in California also suffered losses. The Modoc Forest and the Region are working to resolve issues and concerns resulting from the fire with those landowners. Our charge is to report on findings in Oregon related to the Fremont-Winema National Forest and associated private lands.

The size and rapid rate of spread of the Barry Point Fire are symptomatic of fires that are occurring across the West over recent years. Fires are getting larger and more complex to fight. Drier and warmer conditions and changes in precipitation patterns are resulting in longer fire seasons. Forest health problems in many areas combine with fire weather to create the “perfect storm” for large, severe fires.

While issues of long-term forest management and more active fuels management were raised in many of the interviews, our charge is to address the Barry Point Fire and not those forest policy questions beyond the ability of any one National Forest or even one Region to resolve. Such issues are for higher levels of the executive and legislative branches of the Government to address.

B. Objectives

The Delegation of Authority for the Fact-finding Report on the Barry Point Fire (Appendix 2), signed by Regional Forester Connaughton on October 22, 2012 set the following objectives:

- Conduct key interviews with fire personnel and community members to develop a common understanding of what occurred on the fire.
- Develop a report that captures the common community and landowner concerns or narrative about the fire.
- Include any “lessons learned” that might be applied to future fires.

In accomplishing these objectives, we were to coordinate with the Oregon Department of Forestry and with the Team Leader of the Barry Point Fire Coordination Group. An informal steering group of key community contacts assisted with the report.

As work on this report progressed, the Regional Forester asked that we add an objective of recommending issues that were beyond the scope of this review and could be addressed by a subsequent review.

C. Methodology

The work began with a meeting with the Regional Forester and his deputies to go over the objectives and timelines for the report. We reviewed fire documents and maps the week of October 22nd.

Fieldwork started in Lakeview on October 29th with a meeting of the informal steering group to ask for help in identifying community members to interview and to review the report draft, and to help identify issues they heard as community leaders.

Following the steering group meeting, we attended a previously scheduled stakeholders meeting at the Fremont-Winema Supervisor’s Office. Shane Jeffries, Team Leader for the Barry Point Fire Coordination Group, introduced us to the stakeholders. We briefly informed the attendees of our objectives and sought their cooperation in the process. Some stakeholders had the impression that the fact-finding review was a forensic investigation of the fire. We informed them that it was not and that our intent was to develop a fact-finding report that would focus on fire related events from the local community and firefighter community perspectives.

The Forest arranged with the Lakeview Chamber of Commerce to hold interviews at their office. From Monday evening, October 29th through Saturday, November 3rd we interviewed 24 individuals or families that had property damaged by the fire or were part of the firefighting effort. Most interviews lasted an hour or more. We asked the interviewees how they were involved or affected by the fire and allowed them to give a verbal narrative of how the fire progressed and any related actions after the fire. We had no set questions, but asked clarifying questions as the interview progressed. Most interviews were conducted in person; however fire personnel from the incident management teams that were not stationed in Lakeview were interviewed by phone.

On November 2nd we were given a tour of the fire area in Oregon that helped us visualize what people had shown us on maps.

Interviews of key fire personnel, including incident commanders and operation section chiefs were held by phone during the weeks of November 5th and 12th.

A list of those interviewed can be found in Appendix 3.

We reviewed pertinent records, particularly records related to the fire operations and planning. We corroborated the information gained through interviews with other interview and the records to the extent we could.

II. SITUATION

A. Forest and ODF Klamath-Lake District Organizations

The Fremont-Winema National Forest is a member of the Lakeview Interagency Fire Center (LIFC) along with the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Oregon Department of Forestry Klamath-Lake District, and Lake County Fire Defense Board. LIFC has plans in place to adequately cover expected fire situations for various fire conditions. The Forest has a fire staff consisting of 4 employees including the Fire Staff Officer. At the time of the Barry Point Fire, the Fire Staff Officer was out of state on another fire. He was also transitioning to a new position on a NIMO team. He returned to the Forest when his NIMO team was ordered to support the Barry Point Fire. Because of the transition to the NIMO position, the Forest had detailed a second employee to act as the Fire Staff Officer. One other fire employee was off-forest on the Holloway Fire and two were working on-forest when the Barry Point Fire started. At the time of the fire, the District Ranger position was vacant and the Forest Supervisor had assigned an acting Ranger.

The Oregon Department of Forestry Klamath-Lake District is staffed by a District Forester and a Protection Unit Forester and Protection Supervisor. During the first two days of the Barry Point Fire, the District Forester was out of the area and was represented by the Lake Unit Protection Unit Forester.

B. Fire Conditions and Fire Behavior

The 2012 fire season started early in the West and continued well into the fall. Oregon experienced several large timber and range fires, including the Long Draw Fire – at over 500,000 acres, the largest wildland fire in Oregon in 150 years. Southeast Oregon experienced a dry winter and an extended period with very little precipitation throughout the summer months. Range and timber fuels were at or below seasonal normal moisture content and continuing to dry. The Energy Release Component (ERC)¹ was above average and continuing to rise before and during the Barry Point Fire.

On August 5th a lightning storm hit southern Oregon and northern California, with lightning strikes occurring from 9:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m. LIFC went into lightning mode as called for in their plans and made sure that their complement of resources was prepared and lookouts staffed.

Lightning detection data showed several strikes in the Barry Point area around the fire's point of origin. Several fires were detected from this storm and previous storms. By 9:00 a.m. on August 6th, there were five active fires identified on the LIFC side and more fires on

¹ Energy Release Component (ERC) is a number related to the available energy, measured in British Thermal Units, per square foot within the flaming front at the head of a fire, or the heat release per unit area of the flaming area. Since it is a composite fuel moisture value, reflecting live and dead fuels, it is used as a measure of potential fire intensity.

the Forest and ODF District. At the time the fire started the Pacific Northwest Region was at Preparedness Level (PL)² 3 and the Nation was at PL4.

Environmental factors and fire behavior experienced throughout the Barry Point Fire resulted in high resistance to control and presented management challenges from initial attack through multiple IMT transitions.

Fire behavior on the Barry Point Fire from the day of initial attack on August 6th through August 9th was influenced by heavy loadings of dry fuel, terrain, warm temperatures in the 85 to 90 degree range, low relative humidity, gusty winds from the west/southwest up to about 10 m.p.h., and unstable atmospheric conditions as reflected by the Haines Index³ level 5. These conditions produced high intensity fire generally from mid to late morning with torching, crowning, and spotting up to ½ mile. Fire spread was generally to the northeast due to prevailing winds, which is typical of most fires on the Fremont-Winema National Forest, however a change in wind direction pushed the fire to the south, burning the east face of Dog Mountain and pushing the fire across the Dog Lake Road. Most firefighters with past fire experience in this area reported that they expected the fire to continue spreading to the northeast.

From August 10th through August 14th, the fire experienced changes in wind direction with winds varying from night to day. During nighttime, wind direction was predominantly from the northeast to east, and this changed the direction of fire spread to the south during the night. During each afternoon the wind direction was generally from the southwest to west up through August 13th, and then it blew from the northwest on August 14th. Sustained wind speeds were generally less than 10 m.p.h. with gusts up to 15 m.p.h. The Haines Index was at level 5 except on August 12th when it reached level 6. The nighttime winds from the north and the resulting fire spread to the south over a several day period was not typical of fires in this area. All those interviewed with previous firefighting experience in this area had stated they had never seen this before and certainly had not expected it.

On August 15th the fire continued to make a big push to the south further into California on the Modoc National Forest before it began to reach a different fuel type. Weather conditions changed and on August 18th light moisture fell over the area. Afterward, more normal weather conditions with cooler temperatures, higher relative humidity and a more stable air mass settled over the area.

While the fire had major increases in acres burned during most days, as shown on the Fire Progression Map (Appendix 4) with increases of some 5,000 acres to 29,000 acres over each of 5 days, there's no indication that this was ever a wind-driven fire. Nevertheless, fire behavior experienced throughout the Barry Point Fire resulted in high resistance to control.

² Preparedness Level is a scale from 1-5 that describes staffing levels based on burning conditions, fire activity, and the availability of firefighting resources. PL5 represents the highest level of competition for firefighting resources and the greatest number and complexity of ongoing fires.

³ Haines Index (HI) is a measure of the moisture content and stability of the lower atmosphere. It is used as a predictor of the potential for fires to become large fires with extreme fire behavior. It is rated on a scale of 2 to 6 with 2 being very low and 6 being high.

C. Barry Point Fire Regional and National Priority:

The Northwest Multi-agency Coordination Group (NW MAC)⁴ assigns a priority to large fires to help allocate scarce resources. Initial attack is always given the top priority so that new fire starts do not escape and become large fires. Preparedness Levels are assigned by the National Multiagency Coordination Group at the National Interagency Coordination Center in Boise for the entire Nation and by the Northwest Coordination Center for the Pacific Northwest. The NW MAC priorities for the Barry Point Fire and the National and Geographic PL during the dates of the Barry Point Fire are found in the table below.

¹ Date	Barry Point Fire Priority	National Preparedness Level	PNW Preparedness Level
8/6		3	2
8/7-8		3	3
8/9-13	1	4	3
8/14-16	2	4	4
8/17-18	1	4	4
8/19	3	4	4
8/20	4	4	4
8/21	3	4	4
8/22	4	4	4
8/23	6	4	4
8/24	5	4	4
8/25		4	3

D. Critical Values at Risk

Values at risk in the fire area as identified by Forest Service and Oregon Department of Forestry Agency Administrators included homes and businesses; public and private timber (including active logging operations); public and private grazing (forage) and ranch lands (including infrastructure, e.g. fences and corrals); threatened, endangered and sensitive species and habitat; transmission lines; communication sites; recreation sites; the Ruby pipeline; and cultural resources.

Other resource values, such as wildlife habitat, watershed values, aesthetics, etc. were identified to us by agency personnel but not specifically identified in records we observed.

Personal and social values not identified in documents but expressed by local landowners include sentimental and spiritual values attached to the land and resources derived from a long legacy in the area by families, and the desire to leave that legacy to their future generations. This value was expressed universally and at times very passionately by the local landowners we interviewed.

⁴ NW MAC consists of the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Oregon Department of Forestry, Washington State Department of Natural Resources, and representatives from the Oregon and Washington State Fire Marshal Offices. The MAC prioritizes fires and allocates or reallocates resources during periods of shortages.

There are at least 6 grazing permittees and 38 land owners in Oregon that were directly affected, with property in or adjacent to the fire perimeter. At least 24 had losses or damage in the fire or due to suppression activities. No homes were lost, but several were threatened and required structure protection. At least two residences are within the fire perimeter. Private economic losses included livestock (including loss, injury and death of animals, and loss of weight), forage, fences and corrals, and timber. Additional property was affected in California.

E. Incident Objectives

The incident management objectives as directed through Delegations of Authority and the Strategic Risk Assessment from the Agency Administrators' (Fremont-Winema NF Supervisor and Oregon Department of Forestry District Forester, and later the Supervisor of the Modoc National Forest) (Appendices 5) were to:

- Implement good risk management practices in order to provide for firefighter, other responder and public safety. Use good risk analysis processes, the principles of the 10 Standard Fire Fighting Orders, LCES and the 18 Watch-out Situations as the foundation for risk decisions at all levels.
- Coordinate and consult with local agency safety managers.
- Implement all strategies and tactics based on firefighter and public safety, taking into consideration sound, efficient and effective financial practices as well as appropriate land, resource management and forest management plans. Spend funds as identified in the suppression cost objectives of the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS)⁵.
- Protect private property and structures to minimize private landowner resource loss.
- Minimize acreage burned and damage to private property and improvements by safely and aggressively suppressing fire.
- Business practices will comply with the Region 5, Region 6 Incident Business Management Guidelines, the ODF Business Practices and the local Operating Guidelines for Incident Administration.
- Track costs in accordance with the local cost share agreement (August 11, 2012).
- Maintain financial records and systems utilizing current program models that allow for daily apportionments by jurisdiction.
- Utilize resource advisors to minimize environmental concerns related to suppression activities.
- Comply with Federal Aviation Policies on federal lands.

⁵ WFDSS or Wildfire Decision Support System is a tool developed by Forest Service Research to support wildfire decisions by incorporating models for fire behavior, land use plans, economic models, etc. It is sanctioned by the National Wildfire Coordination Group for all federal agencies and used by some states. Oregon Department of Forestry does not use WFDSS. They do provide input into the decision-making when appropriate through other means. On the Barry Point Fire they provided input through Delegations of Authorities and Incident Action Plans

- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public. Additionally, all personnel assigned to the incident shall be treated with dignity and respect while providing a safe and productive work environment.
- Use aggressive outreach to insure timely and accurate dissemination of information regarding fire related activities is provided to the public, land owners, cooperators, elected officials, and other stakeholders.
- Ensure that relationships are maintained or enhanced with local land owners, business owners, the general public, and other key stakeholders.
- Coordinate with ODF, the District and Forests resources regarding resource considerations, and Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) input.

Operational Objectives were to:

- Continue to implement strategies for engaging the fire that will help ensure coordinated efforts for mission success.
 - Implement identified actions at the appropriate time to allow for the right operational tempo to accomplish mission and reduce risk to fire fighters.
 - Where it can be safely done, minimize acreage burned, damage to private property, damage to private property and improvements.
 - Utilize resource advisors for input to help minimize environmental concerns related to operational activities.
 - Assess daily the validity of the strategy and tactics.
- Utilize operational strategies and tactics that minimize impacts to private lands and structures, resource damage, economic impacts, and minimize the disruption to local activities and business where practical.
- Provide timely initial attack assistance to the forest and local agencies within the Temporary Flight Restrictions (TRF) or as requested.

III. NARRATIVE OF THE BARRY POINT FIRE

This narrative is based on:

- Interviews with
 - Forest managers and fire staff,
 - ODF managers and fire staff, and
 - IMT personnel assigned to the Barry Point Fire;
- Documents found in the Barry Point Fire Final Documentation Package, including
 - Incident Action Plans,
 - After Action Reviews,
 - the Barry Point Narrative Summary Introduction, *Barry Point Daily Chronology (Aug. 15th-24th)*; and
- Lakeview Interagency Fire Center records as compiled in the report, *Recollections of Initial Attack of the Barry Point Fire, the First Three Days* (Appendix 6).

The fire document record is extensive and it is not necessary to include all documents used to prepare this narrative as part of this report. The most extensively used records are included in the appendices.

The following table summarizes key transitions as the fire progressed⁶:

Day	Date	Command	Transition	Fire Size (ac.)
1	August 6	Initial Attack	Type 3 Team ordered	258
2	August 7	Extended Attack	Type 2 Team ordered	1,587
3	August 8	Type 3		3,212
4	August 9	Type 2		11,813
5	August 10	Type 2	NIMO Team ordered	17,277
6	August 11	Type 2		28,402
7	August 12	(NIMO/Type 2	NIMO took command 6:00 p.m.	30,824
8	August 13	NIMO/Type 2	Type 1 Team ordered(enters California night shift of 12th early morning hours of the 13th)	45,484
9	August 14	NIMO/Type 2		74,568
10	August 15	Type 1		83,791
11	August 16	Type 1		92,614
12	August 17	Type 1		92,629
13	August 18	Type 1	Weather and fire behavior moderate	
14	August 19	Type 1	Evacuations lifted	
20	August 25	NIMO/Type 3		92,977
22	August 27	Type 3	Contained	92,977

A. Initial Attack – Day 1 (August 6th)

According to dispatch records, the Dog Mountain Lookout reported the Barry Point Fire at 4:26 p.m. on August 6th. An ODF employee also spotted and reported the fire about the same time and was the first to arrive on scene. Local resources were dispatched immediately. The Forest Supervisor, Fire Staff, and ODF fire manager recognized this fire's potential early on, and directed that it receive increased resources over what would normally be dispatched.

At the time the Barry Point Fire was reported, 5 active fires were already being staffed by LIFC. Another fire was reported within 13 minutes after the Barry Point Fire, all competing for local firefighting resources. In addition, other firefighting resources were committed to fires in central Oregon. The Incident Management Situation Report⁷ for August 7, 2012, (Appendix 7) shows that in the Northwest Area (Oregon and Washington) there were 26 new fires and 3 uncontained large fires ranging in size from 467 to 21,546 acres that were competing for firefighting resources on August 6th.

⁶ Acres have been updated in this final to reflect the Final Progression Map dated January 8, 2013.

⁷ Incident Management Situation Report – a synopsis of national wildland fire activity that occurred the previous day. It is produced by the National Interagency Coordination Center daily at 5:30 a.m. Mountain Time at national Preparedness Level 2 and above or whenever activity warrants daily reporting. The report shows the number of fires occurring nationally and for each Geographic Area.

Interagency initial attack forces from Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), U.S. Forest Service, and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) – including crews, engines, dozers, helicopters, and Single-Engine Air Tankers (SEATs) – took suppression action but were unable to control the fire with the resources available.

The fire escaped initial attack due to intense fire behavior resulting from heavy, dry fuels and wind conditions that produced 4-8 foot flame lengths, torching, rapid spread, and spotting of up to ¼ mile. Extreme fire conditions pushed the fire to the northeast. The fire size was reported as approximately 258 acres by the end of August 6th.

Due to the fire's increase in size and complexity and the expectation that similar burning conditions and fire behavior would continue, the Forest ordered the South Central Oregon Fire Partnership (SCOFP) Type 3 IMT at 9:15 p.m. August 6th to relieve initial attack forces.

Issues that affected the success of initial attack include:

- a. Lack of safe road access – This required firefighting personnel to walk into the fire, which delayed initial attack by about 30 minutes. A two-track road into the fire area was deemed not safe for equipment ingress and egress in a fire situation.
- b. Competition for firefighting resources from other fires in LIFC's area of responsibility and elsewhere in the Northwest Area – This reduced the availability of some resources including large air tankers and delayed some resources from being dispatched to the Barry Point Fire.
- c. Large federal contract air tankers were not available – They were already committed to other fires in the Northwest Area.
- d. Environmental factors and fire behavior – The burning intensity, rapid spread, and spotting across firelines made it difficult to hold firelines as they were constructed.

B. Extended Attack – Day 2 (August 7th)

On day 2 (August 7th), additional engines, crews, dozers and aerial support including 3 large air tankers, 2 ODF large air tankers, 2 SEATs, and 3 helicopters with water dropping capability were assigned to the fire, but suppression forces were still unable to stop the fire's spread when fire behavior began to intensify around noon and became more erratic throughout the afternoon. The incident commander recognized that this would be a difficult fire and reacted accordingly by ordering additional suppression capability. Competition from other fires (See the Incident Management Situation Report for August 8th, Appendix 8) made it difficult to fill orders for critical resources such as Type 1 crews, Type 1 helicopters, fireline supervisors, and engines.

Issues that affected the success of suppression actions on day 2 include:

- a. Competition for firefighting resources – Fires burning in central Oregon were threatening structures and took priority for some firefighting resources.
- b. Wind shifts and extreme fire behavior with spotting across dozer lines – Efforts to construct and secure firelines were hampered by spotting ahead of the fire and across firelines. This caused forces to temporarily disengage in Division A and move to a safety zone. They later re-engaged.
- c. Combination of fire behavior, terrain, and lack of breaks in the fuel – line construction could never catch up and get ahead of the fire.

C. Type 3 Command – Days 2 – 3 (August 7th – 8th)

The South Central Oregon Fire Partnership (SCOPF) Type 3 Team arrived, received a delegation of authority from the Forest Supervisor (Appendix 5a), and assumed command of the fire at 6:30 p.m. August 7th starting with the night shift. By this time the fire had grown to approximately 1,587 acres and had spread to private land under ODF protection responsibility. Lake Unit, Klamath-Lake ODF District personnel were members of the team, and other ODF resources were also assigned to the fire. An ODF representative was actively engaged with the Type 3 IMT.

When the Type 3 IMT assumed command of the fire, they retained the existing organization already on the fire. This minimized the impact of a transition between IMTs which usually results in some lost productivity in suppressing the fire as team members get familiar with the fire. During the night shift, a line was established and burned out in Division B (See Briefing Map, Appendix 9) along the south end of the fire. This was the first real success experienced by suppression forces in constructing and holding fire line on the Barry Point Fire.

Fremont-Winema National Forest and ODF personnel recognized from the beginning that this was not a typical fire, and was displaying behavior that indicated it had potential to become a large complex fire. On August 7th (day 2), the Forest Supervisor and acting Fire Management Officer went out to the fire to observe the fire suppression activities. While on site, they saw first-hand the extreme fire behavior and challenges faced by the firefighters. The fire documentation package includes a completed Incident Complexity Analysis form signed by the incoming Type 3 IC at 12:00 noon on August 7th which recommended a Type 2 team.

Due to the increased complexity of the fire and rapid spread to the north and northeast with the potential to impact private lands, numerous structures, and continuous areas of heavy fuels in the path of the fire, the Forest Supervisor made the decision to order a Regional Type 2 IMT at 3:35 p.m. on August 7th.

On day 3 (August 8th), the Type 3 IMT's plans, as described in the incident action plan (IAP), were to construct fire lines and burn out in all Divisions. Air operations were affected early in the morning by low visibility from smoke caused by an inversion. Mechanical problems with air tankers added some delay, but once the inversion lifted and repairs were made, the fire received good air support including SEATs, large air tankers, and helicopters with water drops. There were not enough ground forces to adequately back up the retardant and water drops, however, so their effectiveness was limited. Additional crews had been ordered but had not yet arrived.

In Division A, fire line construction and burnout were initiated by the day shift and completed by the night shift. This was successful in stopping the fire's spread to the north in this division. The other divisions were not successful, and the fire continued to spread onto the western slopes of Dog Mountain and to the north and east. .

Issues that affected the success of suppression actions on day 3 include:

- a. Smoke from inversion and mechanical problems delayed air operations.

- b. Insufficient ground forces to back up air operations (on order).

D. Type 2 Command – Days 4 – 7 (August 9th -12th)

The Pacific Northwest Blue Mountain IMT (Team 4) arrived in Lakeview on August 8th and received a joint delegation of authority from the Agency Administrators for the Fremont-Winema National Forest and Klamath-Lake District of Oregon Department of Forestry (See Appendix 5b). The IMT took command of the fire the following morning at 6:00 a.m. August 9th. According to records and interviews, they didn't get time to go through a normal transition before assuming command although they were shadowed throughout the shift by the local SCOPF Type 3 IMT.

The fire continued to spread to the east and northeast and by 11:00 a.m. was reported by the operations section as approximately 4500 acres. Shortly after that the fire compromised efforts to contain the fire on the west slope of Dog Mountain and the fire continued to spread to the northeast toward Drew's Reservoir until a wind shift changed the spread to the south, burning the east face of Dog Mountain. A level 2 evacuation was recommended for the south end of Drew's Reservoir and plans were made for a level 3 evacuation in that area. The fire grew to 11,813 acres on that day and by 10:00 p.m. had crossed the Dog Lake Road.

Northerly winds aligned with the terrain along the south side of Dog Lake Road aided in pushing the fire to the south and southeast on August 10th, expanding the fire to 17,277 acres. The Agency Administrators from the Forest and ODF, Forest fire staff, and the IC met at 10:30 a.m. to discuss and develop options to address the increasing complexity of the fire and options for its long term management. They decided to augment the operational capacity of the Type 2 Team with a National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) Team. A NIMO Team was ordered on August 10th. At 9:00 that evening the IC met again with the agency administrators from the Forest and ODF and officials from the State Office/Regional Office in Portland to set containment strategies.

August 11th was another active burning day with the fire spreading to the south and east, threatening over 50 residences in the Westside Community and private timberlands with active timber harvests. Long range spotting and active fire behavior pushed the fire south toward California, and the IMT received a delegation of authority from the Forest Supervisor for the Modoc National Forest (See Appendix 5c). Plans were initiated to prep the Ruby Pipeline for burnout to stop the southern spread. Transition plans for shifting command to NIMO were also initiated. The fire reached 28,402 acres.

On August 12th the level 2 evacuation was expanded to residences north of the 4017 Road and on the east side of the fire. A liaison group was established, consisting of ODF, Forest staff, IMT personnel, and Collins Pine to address growing concerns on communication and coordination being raised by landowners and permittees. The fire was active to the west of the Dry Creek drainage.

E. NIMO / Type 2 Command – Days 7 – 9 (August 12th – 14th)

The NIMO Team arrived and the NIMO IC assumed command of the incident at 6:00 p.m. August 12th. The After Action Report states that integration of the NIMO and Type 2 teams “was seamless and extremely positive.” This may have been the general feeling of the Type 2 team; however some team members interviewed felt they were adequately managing the fire and did not support the integration with the NIMO team.

While the NIMO team, comprised of a Type 1 Command and General Staff, brought a high level of expertise and experience, it did not add the full organizational structure needed to adequately staff the Operations Section for the Barry Point Fire which had expanded to a incident of some 30,000 acres and was rapidly spreading south toward the Oregon/California state line and the Modoc National Forest. The NIMO Incident Commander reported to us that they needed additional branch directors. However, due to competition for firefighting resources among over 60 large fires nationally, the resource ordering system was unable to provide all the additional positions needed to complete the organizational structure for effective management of the fire.

Active burning continued through the night as it had throughout the fire and on August 12th the fire grew to 30,824 acres. Pressure toward the California line prompted evacuation of homes six miles into California and west of Goose Lake.

The agency administrators decided to order a full Type 1 IMT.

On August 13th – during the night shift of August 12th the fire spread south across a contingency line (Ruby Pipeline) and into California onto private timber lands and Modoc National Forest protection, expanding to 45,484 acres.

F. Type 1 Command – Days 10 – 19 (August 15th – 24th)

Command transferred to PNW Team 2 at 6:00 a.m. on August 15th. The fire was actively burning to the south in California with the size increasing to 83,791 acres. Evacuations were occurring 15 miles south of the Oregon border. Level 3 evacuations continued in portions of the Westside Community, southeast of Drew’s Reservoir, and west of Goose Lake. The fire continued to grow to 92,629 acres with gusty, erratic winds hitting the fire with a storm on August 17th.

The storm also brought light precipitation that started to moderate fire behavior. The weather and fire behavior continued to moderate through the next few days allowing good progress on containment. Most evacuations were lifted on August 19th. Firefighting resources continued to strengthen and hold containment lines, and mop up operations. Rehabilitation of the fire lines and hazard tree felling was initiated on the northern part of the fire.

G. NIMO/Type 3 Command – Days 20 – 22 (August 25th – 27th)

On August 25th at 6:00 a.m., command of the fire was transferred back to the SCOFPP Team, the original Type 3 team. Because the fire was still heavily staffed with crews and

resources, the NIMO Team was again assigned but this time it was to augment the Type 3 team's capabilities. The fire was 92.977 acres and was declared contained on August 27th.

H. Post-Fire Activities (August 27th – Present)

The Type 3 team was given "turn back standards" from the Fremont-Winema and Modoc National Forests and the ODF District Forester that provided the team with direction on repairing fire suppression damage, such as cut fences and dozer trail rehabilitation prior to turning the fire back to the two National Forests and the Oregon Department of Forestry local unit. The fire was turned back to the local units on September 5th.

A Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation Team was brought in to develop a plan of action for emergency rehabilitation of damage to public lands. This plan will include a request for funding for necessary work.

A team of off-forest employees was also brought in to increase the capacity of local forest staff to deal with the aftermath of the Barry Point Fire. This team is called the Barry Point Fire Coordination Group.

IV. PERCEPTIONS AND COMMUNICATION

The Barry Point Fire challenged each incident management organization assigned to it. The fire challenged agency administrators to keep up with its increasing size and complexity. A Type 3 team was ordered the first day. Before they even assumed command, a Type 2 team had been ordered to replace them. On the second day of the Type 2 team's operations, a NIMO team had been ordered to supplement them. On the second shift of the NIMO team's assignment, a Type 1 team was ordered.

The fire also challenged relationships and communications among firefighters and between firefighters and the community. With the fire growing faster than the firefighting organization, information was often incomplete and lines of communication were strained. This section addresses perceptions among many of the players as raised in the interviews.

A. Initial and Extended Attack

Forest and ODF staff and the firefighters involved, agreed that initial and extended attack were rapid, aggressive, and consistent with generally accepted fire suppression tactics for the fuel types, weather, and terrain encountered, while assuring the safety of firefighters. While unsuccessful, this phase of the suppression effort was carried out primarily by local forces familiar with each other and with the land and the community.

Two of the landowners interviewed had the opinion that the fire could have been controlled during initial attack if some firefighting resources seen in a staging area had been put to work. Fire records do show that a dozer operator for a dozer transferred from another fire had worked his maximum hours. As no relief operator was available, the dozer was placed in staging.

B. Ordering the Type 2 IMT

The Type 2 team was ordered on the second day of the fire, before the Type 3 team assumed command. During interviews with local Forest Service, ODF, and IMT personnel, most said they recognized that this was going to be a difficult fire from the start. Several personnel with extensive fire experience on the Fremont-Winema National Forest also commented that they had seriously under-estimated this fire and that it behaved differently than any fire they had seen in the area, especially with its spread to the south.

The decision to order a Type 2 team committed fire managers to transition with a team from outside the local area, with limited local experience and relationships. Subsequent frustration with the Type 2 team's performance and communications stemmed partly from this fact.

Some interviewees from the fire community, after the fact and with hindsight, wished that they had jumped directly to ordering a Type 1 team on the 2nd day, when the fire grew to over a thousand acres in size. The Forest's fire staff reported that WFDSS was not used to make this decision, relying instead on experience and intuition. A WFDSS was prepared the next day (using a program called "Revised Complexity Analysis and Needs Assessment") that affirmed the decision to order a full type 2 IMT.

C. Agency Administrator Direction and Engagement

The Forest Supervisor, acting Fire Management Officer, and the ODF Klamath-Lake District Forester, or their deputy or acting were actively engaged with IMTs in all phases of the fire. Interviews brought out some charged communications between Forest representatives and the Type 2 team as the fire frustrated control efforts, but the Type 2 IC commented that he felt that the Forest Supervisor was supportive and challenged the team to address the issues that they were struggling with.

The joint Delegations of Authority issued to the incident management teams provided principal objectives to be accomplished (See Appendix 5). Three of these describe expectations concerning private property and communications with landowners and the public. These are:

- Minimize acreage burned and damage to private property and improvements.
- Protect private property and structures.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public.

The rate of fire growth challenged the IMTs ability to meet these objectives. Several interviewees questioned not the objectives themselves but the agencies' and IMTs' commitment to these objectives.

D. Type 2 IMT

Several interviews focused on the performance of the Type 2 IMT which had command of the fire from August 9th to 12th (and supported the NIMO team until the 14th). The Blue Mountain Type 2 Team comes from eastern Oregon and arrived without the local relationships and familiarity enjoyed by the Type 3 team it replaced.

The following lists some of the issues raised in interviews. The Regional IMTs are coordinated by an interagency board under the oversight of the Pacific Northwest Wildfire Coordinating Group (PNWCG). When a Regional IMT arrives on a fire, they report to the agency administrators. The team conducted a post-assignment After-Action Review (AAR) and received a performance evaluation from the agency administrators. These are used by the board and PNWCG to evaluate and improve team effectiveness. As the board has responsibility to review the performance of teams, we do not make any attempt to do this; however information and interviews from this report will also be shared with the Regional Forester and PNWCG.

1. Strategic Focus:

Several interviewees said that in an effort to minimize acres burned, the Type 2 IMT used direct attack when interviewees felt indirect attack might have been more successful given the intensity and spread of the fire. Plans for indirect attack, weren't implemented because resources were redirected to direct attack as the fire made runs. The Type 2 IMT identified this as one of their "Most Difficult Challenges" in the team's AAR (Appendix 10).

Several interviewees from the IMTs, Forest, and landowners expressed concern over the use of “the box” as a strategy. The “box” referring to the areas identified on a map as being potential containment points based on predicted fire growth related to fuels, terrain, weather, and available firefighting resources. Although most seemed to understand the concept of this strategy, many felt that initially the “box” was too small to allow for successful containment, while later in the fire the “box” was bigger than perceived as being needed. Some felt that changing fire conditions late in the fire could have allowed for the “box” to be shrunk avoiding further resource damage.

2. Use of Resources:

Local personnel and landowners complained that planned actions were not always accomplished. After the fire crossed the Dog Lake Road during the night of August 9th, plans were made to use the Ruby Pipeline to stop the fire’s movement to the south. IAPs for the day and night shifts on August 11th and 12th planned for preparing the Ruby Pipeline right-of-way and burnout ahead of the advancing fire. This work was not completed due to several factors; including fire behavior, resource shortages, and plan implementation. The fire crossed the Ruby Pipeline on the morning of August 13th.

Members of the IMT pointed out that a shortage of critical resources prevented the IMT from adequately staffing the fire. Resource shortages resulted from competition from other fires in the Northwest Area and other western states. The daily Incident Status Summaries (ICS-209) for August 9th – 12th, list critical resource needs as type 1 crews, division supervisors, task force leaders, heavy equipment bosses, and type 1, 2, and 3 helicopters.

Forest and ODF personnel and some landowners said they had travelled across the entire fire area without seeing any firefighters engaged in work on the fire. Some landowners and permittees said they saw firefighters sitting idle in their vehicles out in the fire area who said they were “on hold, waiting for instructions.” During a period of rapid fire growth, changing fire behavior, and limited resources, with the IMT challenged to keep pace and protect firefighter safety, some firefighters may indeed have been held at staging areas. However, based on explanations given casually by firefighters, this was perceived by landowners as a lack of commitment to fire management objectives.

3. Gaps Between Day and Night Shifts:

Some interviewees said that for several days shift changes had 2-4 hour gaps between the time firefighting resources going off-shift left the line and the time resources going on-shift arrived to replace them. They said that this left the line unstaffed at a time when they felt that work could have been most effective, especially during morning shift changes. Some interviewees felt that this gap may have contributed to the fire crossing the Ruby pipeline.

4. Planning:

Some interviewees said that they thought the IMT didn’t have the right plan for the right time, and didn’t have the right resources in the right place at the right time.

5. Tactical Actions by Fireline Supervisors:

In a dynamic environment with the fire advancing rapidly, some interviewees suggested that fireline supervisors may have taken tactical actions on their own just to try to check fire growth. Some burnouts on private lands may have been the result of these types of actions.

6. Maps:

Interviews and a review of documents suggest that maps were not always kept current as the fire advanced. This issue was identified in the AAR (Appendix 10) as one of the IMT's "Most Difficult Challenges." Interviewees reported difficulty in planning and implementing effective suppression actions because the maps weren't keeping up with the rapid fire spread.

7. Coordination with ODF:

The Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) has protection responsibility for private lands within the fire area, so the delegation of authority to the Type 2 IMT was issued jointly by agency administrators from the US Forest Service and ODF.

ODF assigned representatives to work directly with the Type 2 IMT and coordinate suppression actions on private lands to ensure their interests were represented in strategic and tactical planning. Two General Control Objectives for the incident were established relative to private property and improvements, landowners, and the public (ICS 202). These are:

- Minimize acreage burned and damage to private property and improvements.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public.

There's general agreement among Forest Service and ODF personnel that day-to-day working relationships are effective; however, the ODF representatives interviewed did not feel that objectives for protecting private lands in the Barry Point Fire were met by the Type 2 IMT. Most landowners expressed this same view. ODF fire staff reported examples of areas where the working relationship with the Forest and IMTs could have worked better. Examples include the Forest Supervisor's decision to order the Type 2 IMT being done without ODF involvement (this was acknowledged as an oversight by the Supervisor and fire staff and rectified); lack of acknowledgement of ODF personnel in incident action plans and division assignments; listening to ODF's advice, but not accepting it without feedback as to why it was not accepted; and perceived lack of implementation to protect private lands. One ODF fire manager expressed that some of the resource orders not available under the Federal ordering system might have been available through the State system if the needs were made known locally to ODF staff. He cited an example of where the Type 1 team was short on resources, made the need known to the ODF personnel, and ODF was able to come up with the resources.

E. Communications with Permittees and Landowners

Many interviews focused on communication among permittees, landowners, and fire managers, especially the Type 2 IMT. The Team's After Action Review (Appendix 10) recognized this as one of their "Most Difficult Challenges" saying: "We missed communicating with all affected landowners and permittees as the fire moved into new areas. This caused considerable angst, confusion, mixed messages, and angry reactions."

1. Agency Administrator's Direction on Coordination and Communication:

The delegation of authority, Appendix 5b, and the Type 1 IMT's Strategic Risk Assessment described the Agency Administrators' expectations in communication:

- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public.
- Use aggressive outreach to insure timely and accurate dissemination of information regarding fire related activities is provided to the public, land owners, cooperators, elected officials, and other stakeholders.
- Ensure that relationships are maintained or enhanced with local land owners, business owners, the general public, and other key stakeholders.

2. Contacts With Landowners:

Many of the landowners interviewed felt that they received insufficient information during the early stages of the fire to alert them to the possible threat to their private property. Landowners said that by the time they became aware that their property was in imminent danger, suppression forces were in some cases preparing for burnouts involving their lands.

Two residential landowners said that they were first contacted by the Lake County Sheriff's office early on August 10th and advised of a Level 1 evacuation. By this time the smoke plume was visible to the north/northeast of their property. These landowners chose to ignore evacuation orders and to remain on site to protect their home, which increased risk to them and to firefighters who remained with them to defend the property when the fire burned through the area on August 12th.

Some landowners reported that as they became confused and frustrated, they initiated contact with suppression forces on the line and at fire camp. These contacts were sometimes confrontational and generally increased frustration and misunderstanding on both sides. Landowners perceived some of what they heard as arrogant and insensitive, and felt that the agencies and IMTs were more concerned with impacts to the national forests and did not value their property.

On August 12 (Day 7), fire managers established a Landowner Liaison Group representing the Fremont-Winema National Forest, ODF, Collins Pine, and the Type 2 IMT to try to improve communications with landowners and resolve some of the issues that had arisen. Landowners appreciated this effort but by the time the group was formed, frustrations were so high that it was extremely difficult to resolve differences and establish effective communications. Nevertheless, the IMT and some agency personnel considered the Landowner Liaison Group a positive effort in facilitating communication with landowners.

3. Contacts With Permittees:

Several grazing permittees interviewed felt that they did not receive timely notification of the possible threat to their cattle as the fire progressed. Four permittees said that they were first alerted of the threat after the fire crossed the Dog Lake Road on August 9th (day 4). When they tried to enter the national forest to move their cattle, they said they were stopped at road check-points set up to prevent public entry. Permittees interpreted the closure, intended to protect their safety, as reflecting a lack of concern for them and their property.

The closure caused delay in cattle movement and frustrated permittees trying to get access to move their cattle. After visiting with a couple of the landowners on the fire on August 11th, the Forest Supervisor authorized landowners and grazing permittees entry into closed areas of the national forest.

4. Timely, Accurate Information:

As the fire unexpectedly spread south, additional allotments and permittees were affected. They too felt that they did not receive timely, accurate information about the fire's movement so they could move their cattle to safety. Permittees felt that information they did receive was often conflicting, resulting in confusion and a rapid, chaotic roundup and fast movement of cattle. Some went southward many miles into California just to escape the advancing fire, and others were able to move their cows to the west. Numerous livestock that could not be rounded up were killed and injured as the fire burned over them. Some permittees had not yet located all their cows as of the dates of their interviews.

Landowner/permittee complaints of a lack of information carried over to post-fire activities. Some landowners said that they were not informed of road closures to repair culverts.

5. Local Knowledge and Relationships:

Several landowners and permittees said they observed fireline construction and preparations for burnouts in areas that, in their view, was not the best location. When they offered advice, they said it was ignored. They said they ran into firefighters traveling around the fire who didn't know where they were or how to get to their destination. Landowners, permittees, and local Forest Service and ODF personnel interviewed agreed that IMTs can benefit greatly by consulting with local people with knowledge of the land and the road system. The After Action Review report for PNW Team 2 (Appendix 11) had the following statement with respect to coordination with landowners and permittees and use of local knowledge:

“Based on the number of affected permittees and landowners, closer coordination would have benefitted the team and agency administrators. Local permittees and landowners can aid in firefighting efforts by providing valuable information, such as additional people in the area, lay of the land, access roads, road conditions, structures, livestock locations, fences, water sources, and other information. Lack of coordination can lead to independent actions by permittees and landowners potentially creating difficult and unsafe situations for them and responding fire resources.”

6. Structure Protection, Evacuations:

The Type 2 IMT formed a Structure Protection Group utilizing local fire department resources and other assigned resources, and worked with the Lake County Sheriff to develop evacuation plans. As the fire grew and threatened residences, the County Sheriff issued evacuation notices as planned. Based on interviews, the evacuations were handled in an excellent manner. The fire documentation package includes documentation on evacuation plans and implementation.

One of the most notable communication successes during the Barry Point Fire was when the Structure Protection Group was used to protect a residence on the east side of the fire in Division L. According to the landowner, the Structure Protection Group made contact with him well before the fire reached his property and worked with him to protect his residence. They communicated with him and got his authorization in advance for every action they took on his property. The fire eventually burned through the area but his residence was protected, and damage to his property overall was minimal. The landowner was very pleased with the assistance received.

7. Checking on Safety of Permittees Moving Cattle

One permittee stated that IMT members were checking on their movement of cattle and may have delayed some tactical operations to ensure their safety. He was very appreciative of this.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are issues that the Region may want to address as part of the Forest Service's continuing effort to improve operations:

- a. Work with ODF to clarify delegations of authority, joint operations, and supervision and evaluation of IMTs on fires that cross jurisdictions.
- b. Ensure that the Forest Service addresses how local knowledge of terrain, and environmental conditions as well as community and landowner communication can best be addressed by IMTs at the time they are ordered and throughout the duration of the fire.
- c. Establish procedures to ensure ongoing direct communications with individual landowners and permittees relative to future fire threats to their property and grazing allotments and suppression actions to mitigate those threats.
- d. Conduct a further review of the events that occurred when the fire burned across the Morris and Harvey properties and the Albertson's property; and evaluate the risk to the landowners and firefighters as the events occurred.

Appendices

Appendix 1-----	Steering Group
Appendix 2-----	Regional Foresters Delegation of Authority for Fact Finding Report
Appendix 3-----	Interviewees
Appendix 4-----	Fire Progression Map
Appendix 5-----	Delegations of Authority
Appendix 5a-----	Delegation of Authority to SCOPF Type 3 IMT, Leland Hunter, IC
Appendix 5b-----	Delegation of Authority, Forest Supervisor Fremont-Winema NF and ODF District Forester to PNW Blue Mountain IMT 4, Type 2, Brian Watt, IC
Appendix 5c-----	Delegation of Authority, Forest Supervisor Modoc NF to PNW Blue Mountain IMT 4, Type 2, Brian Watt, IC
Appendix 5d-----	Delegation of Authority to Portland NIMO Team, Steve Gage, IC
Appendix 5e-----	Delegation of Authority to PNW Team 2, Type 1, Mike Morcom, IC
Appendix 5f-----	Delegation of Authority to SCOPF Type 3 IMT, Leland Hunter, IC
Appendix 5g-----	Delegation of Authority to Portland NIMO Team, Steve Gage, IC
Appendix 5h-----	Delegation of Authority to SCOPF Type 3 IMT, Leland Hunter, IC
Appendix 6-----	Recollections of Initial Attack of the Barry Point Fire, the First Three Days
Appendix 7-----	Incident Management Situation Reports for August 7 th , 2012
Appendix 8-----	Incident Management Situation Reports for August 8 ^h , 2012
Appendix 9-----	Briefing Map (showing all Divisions)
Appendix 10-----	After Action Review Rollup, Oregon IMT 4/Portland NIMO Team
Appendix 11-----	After Incident Review, PNW Team 2

Appendix 1

**Barry Point Fire
Fact Finding Report
Steering Group**

Name	Association
Dan Shoun	Lane County Commissioner
Leigh Ann Evans	South Valley Bank/Landowner
Audrey Henry	Executive Director, Lake County Chamber of Commerce
Greg Pittman/Dustin Gustaveson	Oregon Department of Forestry

Appendix 2



United States
Department of
Agriculture

Forest
Service

Pacific
Northwest
Region

333 SW First Avenue (97204)
PO Box 3623
Portland, OR 97209-3623
503-808-2468

File Code: 1230
Route To:

Date: OCT 22 2012

Subject: Fact Finding Report on Barry Point Fire

To: Ed Shepard

Thank you for assisting Region 6 and Fremont-Winema National Forest develop a fact-finding report on the Barry Point Fire. Within three weeks we would like you to accomplish the following:

- Conduct key interviews with fire personnel and key community members to develop a common understanding of what occurred on the fire.
- Develop a fact-finding report.
- Include any "lessons learned" that might be applied to future fires.

In carrying out these key objectives please coordinate with your Oregon Department of Forestry representative and Shane Jeffries, Team Leader for the Barry Point ecological and social recovery effort. He will be providing you with logistical and writing/editing support and helping you obtain relevant fire documents. As you conduct your interviews, please keep in mind that you may encounter information that might be helpful to Shane and his team.

Your work may be enhanced by developing an informal steering group of key community contacts that represent various interests who can assist as you develop a community narrative that reflects a holistic view of the fire and its effects as part of your report. Shane Jeffries, Bill Aney or Forest Supervisor Fred Way can assist you in identifying key fire and community contacts.

Ed, I very much appreciate your willingness to take on this assignment. Your background and experience makes you uniquely qualified to assist us.



KENT P. CONNAUGHTON
Regional Forester

cc: Meg Mitchell, Frederick I. Way, Lisa E Freedman



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Printed on Recycled Paper



Appendix 3

Barry Point Fire Fact Finding Report Interviewees


Name	Association
Mike and Matt Morris	Landowners
Lee Fledderjohann	Collins Pine Company
Roger and Kathy Miles	Landowners
Dan Shoun	Lake County Commissioner
Dustin Gustaveson	Lake Unit Protection Forester, Oregon Dept. of Forestry
Paul Harlan	VP, Resources, Collins Pine Company
Bill Albertson	Landowner
John Albertson	Landowner
Bill Wilson	Landowner (CA)
Virgil and Sharon Harvey	Landowners
Fred Way	Forest Supervisor, Fremont-Winema NF
David Summer	Fire Director, USFS, R-6
Bobbi Scopa	Assistant Director, Operations, State Office-Regional Office
Doug Baxter	Blue Mountain IMT4 (Type 2) Operations Section Chief
Randy Ostman	Blue Mountain IMT4 (Type 2) Branch Director/Landowner Liaison Group
Billy Flournoy	Landowner (CA)
Ace, Rosa, and Lee Felder	Permittees
Greg Pittman	Klamath-Lake District Forester, ODF
Jeff McNeley	Landowner/Permittee
Phil McDonald	Lake County Sheriff
Barry Shullanberger	Acting Fire Staff, Fremont- Winema NF/ PNW Team 2 (Type 1)
Jack and Bev Sparrowk	Landowners
Leland Hunter	SCOFP Team (Type 3) Incident Commander
James, Jerry, and Bob Evans	Landowners
Steve Rawlings	NIMO Operations Section Chief
John Giller	PNW Team 2 (Type 1) Operations Section Chief
Brian Watts	Blue Mountain IMT 4 (Type 2) Incident Commander
Mike Morcom	PNW Team 2 (Type 1) Incident Commander
Steve Gage	NIMO Incident Commander
Brenda Younker	Blue Mountain IMT 4 (Type 2) Branch Director

Barry Point Fire Final Progression Map
OR-FWF-120680 Corrected Jan. 8, 2013

Corrected to show initial progression as August 6 rather than August 7 Clint Albertson
 *All area calculations are from electronic spatial data and may not reflect those stated in official documents.

Legend

Symbol	Date	Fire Origin	Growth Acres*
⊗	August 6, 1600hrs.	Fire Origin	
—	Major_fs_rds		
—	State Boundary		
Blue Box	August 6, 2012	258 Acres	258
Light Blue Box	August 7, 2012	1,587 Acres	1,329
Medium Blue Box	August 8, 2012	3,212 Acres	1,625
Dark Blue Box	August 9, 2012	11,813 Acres	8,601
Light Green Box	August 10, 2012	17,277 Acres	5,464
Green Box	August 11, 2012	28,402 Acres	11,124
Yellow-Green Box	August 12, 2012	30,824 Acres	2,423
Yellow Box	August 13, 2012	45,484 Acres	14,660
Orange-Yellow Box	August 14, 2012	74,568 Acres	29,084
Orange Box	August 15, 2012	83,791 Acres	9,223
Dark Orange Box	August 16, 2012	92,614 Acres	8,823
Red-Orange Box	August 17, 2012	92,629 Acres	15
Red Box	August 20, 2012	92,977 Acres	348



Appendix 5a

Delegation of Authority



United States
Department of
Agriculture

Forest
Service

Fremont-Winema National Forests

Lakeview Ranger District
18049 Highway 395
Lakeview, OR 97630
541-947-3334

August 7, 2012

To: Eckhard Hunter, Incident Commander

Subject: Delegation of Authority, Barry Point Fire

As of 1800 August 7, 2012 I am delegating authority to you to manage the Barry Point Fire on the Lakeview Ranger District of the Fremont-Winema National Forest. This fire originated on August 5, 2012. Fire Number for the incident is 580.

I expect all incident management activities to be executed in accordance with the strategy that has been identified within the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFSS). Plan your management of the incident within the scope of the Objectives and Courses of Action as described in WFSS. Please notify me or my staff if you see that this guidance in the WFSS is no longer accurate or valid while you are commanding the incident. I will provide guidance and updates as needed so that my intent remains clear.

Should I be unavailable to you during your command, I will assign Rachele Huddleston-Lorton as a representative to your Team. She can be reached at 541-219-2753. Bryan Yost is assigned as the lead Resource Advisor for this incident and is assigned to work directly with your team on all matters pertaining to land and resource management objectives and mitigations required by implementation of your tactics.

I will expect you to ensure that all actions and consequences have been analyzed against risk to human life and other values. You are expected to provide clear leader's intent at all levels of your organization and use your experience and judgment and make timely and prudent decisions as to the best course of action. You are expected to maximize opportunities for success through mindful decision making and heightened situation awareness, while minimizing exposure to risk.

The principal objectives I wish to have accomplished on this fire are:

- Provide for firefighter and public safety.
- Implement all strategies and tactics based on firefighter and public safety, taking into consideration sound efficiency as well as effective financial practices as well as appropriate land and resource management plans and fire management plans. You are authorized to spend funds as identified in the suppression cost objective of Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFSS).
- Business practices will comply with the Region 6 Incident Business Management Guidelines and the local Operating Guidelines for Incident Administration.
- Maintain financial records and systems utilizing COST that allow for daily apportionments by jurisdiction.
- Minimize acreage burned and damage to private property and improvements.
- Utilize resource advisors to minimize environmental concerns related to suppression activities.
- Comply with Federal Aviation Policies on federal lands.
- Coordinate and consult with local agency safety managers.
- Protect private property and structures.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public. Additionally, all personnel assigned to the incident shall be treated with dignity and respect while providing a safe and productive work environment.

All actions should continue to implement the Thiermytic Hazard Abatement Plan, be in compliance with the



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National Wild and Coordinating Group (NWCWG) work-rest guidelines, and follow the **Code of Conduct for Fire Suppression**.


1. Firefighter safety comes first on every fire every time.
2. The 10 Standard Firefighting Orders are firm...we don't break them; we don't bend them.
3. All 18 Watch Out Situations must be mitigated before engagement or re engagement of suppression activities.
4. Every firefighter has the right to know that his or her assignments are safe.
5. Every fireline supervisor, every fire manager, and every administrator has the responsibility to confirm that safe practices are known and observed.

You are directly accountable to me. The designated fire management representatives for the Forest Service are Bob Crumrine (541-947-6264), Barry Shullanberger (541-947-6394) or Barry Hanson (541-947-6337, cell 541-219-0438). The designated representative of the Oregon Department of Forestry is Greg Filman (541-947-3311, cell 541-719-0446) or Justin Gustafson (541-947-3311). The Incident Business Advisor for the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management is Nina Hardin (541-947-6286), and the Finance Advisor for ODF is Dave Horton (541-883-5681).

I expect all suppression efforts will be executed in accordance with the selected strategy identified in the respective WFDSS prepared for the incident. Effective management of costs commensurate with resource values to be protected and strategic direction of the respective WFDSS alternatives is critical. I also request that as much purchasing as possible and practical be done through local vendors. Property accountability should demonstrate adherence to National direction on acceptable fire loss/use rates.

Fire information and media relations will be coordinated with the Interagency Public Affairs Officer, Lisa Swinney (541-947-6261) and Greg Pittman ODF.

I wish you and your team a safe and successful assignment. You can reach me at the following phone numbers: 541-947-6201 or 541-219-1305.


Fred Way
Forest Supervisor
Fremont Winema National Forest


Leland Hurler
Incident Commander
SCDHMP IMT3

Appendix 5b

Delegation of Authority



To: Pacific Northwest IMT Team 4, Blue Mountain

Subject: Delegation of Authority, Barry Point Fire

Date: August 8, 2012

As of 0600 Thursday August 9, 2012 we are delegating authority to you to manage the Barry Point Fire on the Lakeview Ranger District of the Fremont-Winema National Forest and the Lake Unit of the Klamath-Lake District of Oregon Department of Forestry. This fire originated on August 5, 2012. Fire Number for the Incident is 680.

We expect all incident management activities to be executed in accordance with the strategy that has been identified within the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFSS). Plan your management of the incident within the scope of the Objectives and Courses of Action as described in WFSS. Please notify one of us or our staff if you see that this guidance in the WFSS is no longer accurate or valid while you are commanding the incident. We will provide guidance and updates as needed so that our intent remains clear.

Should we be unavailable to you during your command, we will assign Rachelle Huddleston-Lorton as a Forest Service representative and Dustin Gustaveson as the Oregon Department of Forestry representative to your Team. Rachelle can be reached at 541-219-2153 and Dustin can be reached at 541-219-0446. Bryan Yost is assigned as a Liaison Resource Advisor for this incident and is assigned to work directly with your team on all matters pertaining to land and resource management objectives and mitigations required by implementation of your tactics.

We will expect you to ensure that all actions and consequences have been analyzed against risk to human life and other values. You are expected to provide clear leader's intent at all levels of your organization and use your experience and judgment and make timely and prudent decisions as to the best course of action. You are expected to maximize opportunities for

success through mindful decision making and heightened situational awareness, while minimizing exposure to risk.

The principal objectives we wish to have accomplished on this fire are:

- Provide for firefighter and public safety.
- Implement all strategies and tactics based on fire fighter and public safety, taking into consideration sound efficient as well as effective financial practices as well as appropriate land and resource management plans and fire management plans. You are authorized to spend funds as identified in the suppression cost objective of Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFSS).
- Business practices will comply with the Region 6 Incident Business Management Guidelines, the ODF Business Practices and the local Operating Guidelines for Incident Administration.
- Costs will be tracked in accordance with the local cost share agreement (August 8, 2012).
- Maintain financial records and systems utilizing COST that allow for daily apportionments by jurisdiction.
- Minimize acreage burned and damage to private property and improvements.
- Utilize resource advisors to minimize environmental concerns related to suppression activities.
- Comply with Federal Aviation Policies on federal lands.
- Coordinate and consult with local agency safety managers.
- Protect private property and structures.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public. Additionally, all personnel assigned to the incident shall be treated with dignity and respect while providing a safe and productive work environment.

All actions should continue to implement the Thirtymile Hazard Abatement Plan, be in compliance with the National Wildland Coordinating Group (NWCG) work-rest guidelines, and follow the Code of Conduct for Fire Suppression.

1. Firefighter safety comes first on every fire every time.
2. The 10 Standard Firefighting Orders are firm...we don't break them; we don't bend them.
3. All 18 Watch Out Situations must be mitigated before engagement or re-engagement of suppression activities.
4. Every firefighter has the right to know that his or her assignments are safe.
5. Every fireline supervisor, every fire manager, and every administrator has the responsibility to confirm that safe practices are known and observed.

You are directly accountable to us. The designated Forest Service fire management representative for the incident is Barry Shullanberger (541-947-6394). The designated


representative of the Oregon Department of Forestry is Dustin Gustaveson (541-219-0446). The Incident Business Advisor for the U.S. Forest Service is Nina Hardin (541-947-6286) and Mikell Newton (541) 219-1015, and the Finance Advisor for ODF is Dave Horton (541-883-5681).

We expect all suppression efforts will be executed in accordance with the selected strategy identified in the respective WFSS prepared for the Incident. Effective management of costs commensurate with resource values to be protected and strategic direction of the respective WFSS alternatives is critical. We also request that as much purchasing as possible and practical be done through local vendors. Property accountability should demonstrate adherence to National direction on acceptable fire loss/use rates.


Fire information and media relations will be coordinated with the Interagency Public Affairs Officer, Lisa Swinney (541-947-6261) and Anne Maloney, ODF (541-883-5681).

We wish you and your team a safe and successful assignment. You can reach us, Fred Way at (541) 219-1605 and Greg Pittman at (541) 891-8534.


IA responsibility within TFR and outside when requested.



Fred Way
Forest Supervisor
Fremont-Winema National Forest



Greg Pittman
District Forester
Klamath-Lake District
Oregon Department of Forestry



Brian Watts
Incident Commander
PNW IMT Team 4 - Blue Mountain

Appendix 5c

CALIFORNIA WILDFIRE COORDINATING GROUP



LMT Delegation of Authority

Date: 08/11/2012

To: Brain Watts Incident Commander PNW IMT 4 Blue Mountain

From: Kimberly Anderson, Forest Supervisor Modoc National Forest

Subject: Barry Point Fire, OR-FWF-120680 Incident Delegation of Authority

Effective at 1800 hours on 08/11/2012, you are delegated authority as the Incident Commander for the overall management of the Barry Point, OR-FWF-120680 incident on the Modoc National Forest. This delegation carries with it the full responsibility for managing the incident. You have full authority and responsibility for managing incident operations within the framework of legal statute, current policy, and the broad direction provided in your oral and written briefing materials. You are expected to do a complete and efficient job, while providing for Safety First. Safety will be the number one priority throughout the incident.

I expect open communication during all phases of management under this delegation. Please ensure the immediate notification of any significant concerns, issues or events as they arise.

I will meet with you at the end of the incident for a closeout briefing. A formal evaluation of your performance will be conducted prior to your departure from the incident. This formal evaluation may be followed up within sixty days after your departure once the Forest has had the opportunity to review accountability, claims, financial matters, and other items that require time to evaluate.

I have confidence in the abilities of you and your team, and appreciate the technical expertise that you offer us.

Should problems arise contact Kimberly H. Anderson (530-233-8700, 530-708-0065, 530-233-5937) or Dave McMaster (530-233-8813 or 530-640-1690).

Reference: the attachment which includes my performance expectations for you and your team.

Incident Commander

Handwritten signature of Brain Watts in blue ink, written over a horizontal line.

Brain Watts

Agency Administrator

Handwritten signature of Kimberly Anderson in blue ink, written over a horizontal line.

Kimberly Anderson

Appendix 5d



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

To: Steve Gage, Incident Commander, Portland NIMO

Subject: Delegation of Authority, Barry Point Fire

Date: August 12, 2012

Effective at 1800 Sunday August 12, 2012 you are delegated Incident Commander for overall management of the Barry Point Fire (OR-FWF-120680, ODF-982018-13) on the Lakeview Ranger District of the Fremont-Winema National Forest (FWF) and the Lake Unit of the Klamath-Lake District of Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), in conjunction with the Modoc National Forest (MDF). This fire originated on August 5, 2012. Fire Dispatch Number for the Incident is 680.

We expect all incident management activities to be executed in accordance with the signatory Agency Administrators Leaders' Intent and the strategy that has been identified within the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS). Plan your management of the incident within the scope of the Objectives and Courses of Action as described in WFDSS and Leaders' Intent. Please notify one of us or our staff if you see that this guidance in the WFDSS is no longer accurate or valid while you are commanding the incident. We will provide guidance and updates as needed so that our Intent remains clear.

Should we be unavailable to you during your command, we will assign Rachelle Huddlestone-Lorton (541-219-2153) and Rick Newton (541-892-0487) as FWF representatives, Dustin Gustafson (541-219-0446) as the ODF representative, Dave McMaster (530-540-1690) as MDF representative to your Team. Mike Ramsey (541-891-9653) is assigned as the liaison to the Lead Resource Advisor for the (NFS) lands on the FWF, Mary Flores (530-279-6116) for the private and NFS lands on the MDF in California on this incident and is assigned to work directly with your team on all matters pertaining to land and resource management objectives and mitigations required by implementation of your tactics.



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

We will expect you to ensure that all actions and consequences have been analyzed against risk to human life and other values. You are expected to provide clear leaders' intent at all levels of your organization and use your experience and judgment and make timely and prudent decisions as to the best course of action. You are expected to maximize opportunities for success through mindful decision making and heightened situational awareness, while minimizing exposure to risk.

You are responsible for Initial attack within the Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) and will support outside of the designated TFR when requested.

The principal objectives we wish to have accomplished on this fire are:

- Implement good risk management practices in order to provide for firefighter, other responder and public safety. Use good risk analysis processes, the principles of the 10 Standard Fire Orders, LACES, and the 18 Watch-Out Situations as the foundation for risk decisions at all levels.
- Coordinate and consult with local agency safety managers.
- Implement all strategies and tactics based on fire fighter and public safety, taking into consideration sound, efficient and effective financial practices as well as appropriate land, resource management and fire management plans. You are authorized to spend funds as identified in the suppression cost objective of Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS).
- Protect private property and structures to minimize private landowner resource loss.
- Minimize acreage burned and damage to private property and improvements by safely and aggressively suppressing fire.
- Business practices will comply with the Region 5, Region 6 Incident Business Management Guidelines, the ODF Business Practices and the Local Operating Guidelines for Incident Administration.
- Costs will be tracked in accordance with the local cost share agreement (August 11, 2012).
- Maintain financial records and systems utilizing current program models that allow for daily apportionments by jurisdiction.
- Utilize resource advisors to minimize environmental concerns related to suppression activities.
- Comply with Federal Aviation Policies on federal lands.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public. Additionally, all personnel assigned to the Incident shall be treated with dignity and respect while providing a safe and productive work environment.



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
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Oregon Department of Forestry**

All actions should continue to implement the Thirtymile Hazard Abatement Plan, be in compliance with the National Wildland Coordinating Group (NWC6) work-rest guidelines, and follow the **Code of Conduct for Fire Suppression**.

1. Firefighter safety comes first on every fire every time.
2. The 10 Standard Firefighting Orders are firm...we don't break them; we don't bend them.
3. All 18 Watch Out Situations must be mitigated before engagement or re-engagement of suppression activities.
4. Every firefighter has the right to know that his or her assignments are safe.
5. Every fireline supervisor, every fire manager, and every administrator has the responsibility to confirm that safe practices are known and observed.

You are directly accountable to us. The designated Forest Service Fire Management Representatives for the incident are Barry Shullanberger FWF (541-219-1672) and Dave McMaster MDF (530-640-1690). The designated representative for the ODF is Dustin Gustavson (541-219-0446). The Incident Business Advisor for the U.S. Forest Service is Nina Hardin (541-947-6286) and Mikell Newton (541-219-1015), and the Finance Advisor for ODF is Dave Horton (541-883-5681).

We expect all suppression efforts will be executed in accordance with the selected strategy identified in the respective WFDSS prepared for the incident. Effective management of costs commensurate with resource values to be protected and strategic direction of the respective WFDSS alternatives is critical. We also request that as much purchasing as possible and practical be done through local vendors. Property accountability should demonstrate adherence to National direction on acceptable fire loss/use rates.

Fire information and media relations will be coordinated with the following Public Affairs Officers: Lisa Swinney FWF (541-947-6261), Suzi Johnson MDF (530-640-0195), and Anne Maloney, ODF (541-883-5681).

Your team's performance will be evaluated based on the elements above.

We wish you and your team a safe and successful assignment. You can reach us, Fred Way FWF at (541-219-1605), Kimberly Anderson MDF (530-708-0065) and Greg Pittman at (541-891-8534).



Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry

Fred Way
Forest Supervisor
Fremont-Winema National Forest

Greg Pittman
District Forester
Klamath-Lake District
Oregon Department of Forestry

Kimberly Anderson
Forest Supervisor
Modoc National Forest

Steve Gage
Incident Commander
Portland NIMO

Appendix 5e



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

To: Michael Morcom, Incident Commander, PNW Team 2

Subject: Delegation of Authority, Barry Point Fire

Date: August 14, 2012

Effective at 0600 on Wednesday August 15, 2012 you are delegated Incident Commander for overall management of the Barry Point Fire (OR-FWF-120680, ODF-982018-13) on the Lakeview Ranger District of the Fremont-Winema National Forest (FWF) and the Lake Unit of the Klamath-Lake District of Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), in conjunction with the Modoc National Forest (MDF). This fire originated on August 5, 2012. Fire Dispatch Number for the Incident is 587.

We expect all incident management activities to be executed in accordance with the signatory Agency Administrators Leaders' Intent and the strategy that has been identified within the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS). Plan your management of the Incident within the scope of the Objectives and Courses of Action as described in WFDSS and Leaders' Intent. Please notify one of us or our staff if you see that this guidance in the WFDSS is no longer accurate or valid while you are commanding the incident. We will provide guidance and updates as needed so that our intent remains clear.

Should we be unavailable to you during your command, we will assign Rachelie Huddleston-Lorton (541-219-2153) and Rick Newton (541-892-0487) as FWF representatives, Dustin Gustaveson (541-219-0446) as the ODF representative, Dave McMaster (530-640-1690) as MDF representative to your Team. Mike Ramsey (541-891-9653) is assigned as the liaison to the Lead Resource Advisor for the (NFS) lands on the FWF, Mary Flores (530-279-6116) for the private and NFS lands on the MDF in California on this incident and is assigned to work directly with your team on all matters pertaining to land and resource management objectives and mitigations required by implementation of your tactics.



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
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We will expect you to ensure that all actions and consequences have been analyzed against risk to human life and other values. You are expected to provide clear leaders' intent at all levels of your organization and use your experience and judgment and make timely and prudent decisions as to the best course of action. You are expected to maximize opportunities for success through mindful decision making and heightened situational awareness, while minimizing exposure to risk.

You are responsible for initial attack within the Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) and will support outside of the designated TFR when requested.

The principal objectives we wish to have accomplished on this fire are:

- Implement good risk management practices in order to provide for firefighter, other responder and public safety. Use good risk analysis processes, the principles of the 10 Standard Fire Orders, LCEs, and the 18 Watch-Out Situations as the foundation for risk decisions at all levels.
- Coordinate and consult with local agency safety managers.
- Implement all strategies and tactics based on fire fighter and public safety, taking into consideration sound, efficient and effective financial practices as well as appropriate land, resource management and fire management plans. You are authorized to spend funds as identified in the suppression cost objective of Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS).
- Protect private property and structures to minimize private landowner resource loss.
- Minimize acreage burned and damage to private property and improvements by safely and aggressively suppressing fire.
- Business practices will comply with the Region 5, Region 6 Incident Business Management Guidelines, the ODF Business Practices and the local Operating Guidelines for Incident Administration.
- Costs will be tracked in accordance with the local cost share agreement (August 11, 2012).
- Maintain financial records and systems utilizing current program models that allow for daily apportionments by jurisdiction.
- Utilize resource advisors to minimize environmental concerns related to suppression activities.
- Comply with Federal Aviation Policies on federal lands.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public. Additionally, all personnel assigned to the incident shall be treated with dignity and respect while providing a safe and productive work environment.



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

All actions should continue to implement the Thirtymile Hazard Abatement Plan, be in compliance with the National Wildland Coordinating Group (NWCWG) work-rest guidelines, and follow the **Code of Conduct for Fire Suppression**.

You are directly accountable to us. The designated Forest Service Fire Management Representatives for the incident are Barry Shullanberger FWF (541-219-1672) and Dave McMaster MDF (530-640-1690). The designated representative for the ODF is Dustin Gustavson (541-219-0446). The Incident Business Advisor for the U.S. Forest Service is Nina Hardin (541-947-6286) and the Finance Advisor for ODF is Dave Horton (541-883-5681).

We expect all suppression efforts will be executed in accordance with the selected strategy identified in the respective WFDSS prepared for the incident. Effective management of costs commensurate with resource values to be protected and strategic direction of the respective WFDSS alternatives is critical. We also request that as much purchasing as possible and practical be done through local vendors. Property accountability should demonstrate adherence to National direction on acceptable fire loss/use rates.

Fire information and media relations will be coordinated with the following Public Affairs Officers: Lisa Swinney FWF (541-947-6261), Suzi Johnson MDF (530-640-0195), and Anne Maloney, ODF (541-883-5681).

Your team's performance will be evaluated based on the elements above.

We wish you and your team a safe and successful assignment. You can reach us, Fred Way FWF at (541-219-1605), Kimberly Anderson MDF (530-708-0065), Tyrone Kelley Agency Administrator for the Barry Point Incident on the Modoc National Forest (707-499-0521), Lakeview BLM District Manager E. Lynn Burkett (202-468-4110) and Greg Pittman at (541-891-8534).

Fred Way
Forest Supervisor
Fremont-Winema National Forest

E. Lynn Burkett
District Manager
Lakeview BLM



Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry

Greg Pittman
District Forester
Klamath-Lake District
Oregon Department of Forestry

Kimberly Anderson
Forest Supervisor
Modoc National Forest

Tyrone Kelley
Agency Administrator
Barry Point Incident
Region 5 USFS

Michael Morcom
Incident Commander
PNW Team 2

Amendment to PNW Team 2 Delegation of Authority

The following describes Initial Attack responsibilities of Team 2 and Home Unit(s)

- Team 2 will be responsible for Initial Attack within one mile of the Barry Point Fire perimeter.
- Home Unit(s) will be responsible for Initial Attack outside one mile of Barry Point Fire perimeter and will coordinate all Initial attack within the TFR with Team 2. Barry Point Communications will be contacted via phone for initial coordination.
- Communication plans will be shared between Team 2, Dispatch Centers, and resources affected.



Fred Way

Forest Supervisor


Fremont-Winema National Forest



Heather Whitman

Associate District Manager

Lakeview Dist. 3-M



Louis Medema Deputy Chief

Greg Pittman

District Forester

Klamath-Lake District ODF



Tyrone Kelly

Agency Administrator

Region 5 JSES



Mike Morcom

Incident commander

PNW Team 2

Appendix 5f



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

To: Leland Hunter, Incident Commander, SCOFMP IM13

Subject: Delegation of Authority, Barry Point Fire

Date: August 23, 2012

Effective at 0600 on Saturday August 25, 2012 you are delegated Incident Commander for overall management of the Barry Point Fire (OR-FWF-120680, ODF-982018-13) on the Lakeview Ranger District of the Fremont-Winema National Forest (FWF) and the Lake Unit of the Klamath-Lake District of Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), in conjunction with the Modoc National Forest (MDF). This fire originated on August 5, 2012. Fire Dispatch Number for the Incident is 580.

We expect all incident management activities to be executed in accordance with the signatory Agency Administrators Leaders' Intent and the strategy that has been identified within the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFSS). Plan your management of the incident within the scope of the Objectives and Courses of Action as described in WFSS and Leaders' Intent. Please notify one of us or our staff if you see that this guidance in the WFSS is no longer accurate or valid while you are commanding the incident. We will provide guidance and updates as needed so that our intent remains clear.

Should we be unavailable to you during your command, we will assign Rachelle Huddleston-Lorton (541-219-2153) and Rick Newton (541-892-0487) as FWF representatives, Dustin Gustaveson (541-719-0446) as the ODF representative, Dave McMaster (530-640-1690) as MDF representative to your Team. Mike Ramsey (541-891-9653) is assigned as the liaison to the Lead Resource Advisor for the (NFS) lands on the FWF, Mary Flores (530 279-6116) for the private and NFS lands on the MDF in California on this incident and is assigned to work directly with your team on all matters pertaining to land and resource management objectives and mitigations required by implementation of your tactics.

We will expect you to ensure that all actions and consequences have been analyzed against risk to human life and other values. You are expected to provide clear leaders' intent at all levels of your organization and use your experience and judgment and make timely and prudent



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
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decisions as to the best course of action. You are expected to maximize opportunities for success through mindful decision making and heightened situational awareness, while minimizing exposure to risk.

Initial attack will be the responsibility of the local units. You will support IA efforts as requested and you have resources available.

The principal objectives we wish to have accomplished on this fire are:

- Implement good risk management practices in order to provide for firefighter, other responder and public safety. Use good risk analysis processes, the principles of the 10 Standard Fire Orders, LCES, and the 18 Watch-Out Situations as the foundation for risk decisions at all levels.
- Coordinate and consult with local agency safety managers.
- Implement all strategies and tactics based on firefighter and public safety, taking into consideration sound, efficient and effective financial practices as well as appropriate land, resource management and fire management plans. You are authorized to spend funds as identified in the suppression cost objective of Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS).
- Protect private property and structures to minimize private landowner resource loss.
- Maintain containment of the fire and prevent further fire spread to minimize impact to private property and improvements by safely and aggressively suppressing fire.
- Business practices will comply with the Region 5, Region 6 Incident Business Management Guidelines, the ODF Business Practices and the local Operating Guidelines for Incident Administration.
- Costs will be tracked in accordance with the local cost share agreement (August 23, 2012).
- Maintain financial records and systems utilizing current program models that allow for daily apportionments by jurisdiction.
- Utilize resource advisors to minimize environmental concerns related to suppression activities.
- Implement rehabilitation work as identified in the Turnback Standards and rehabilitation plan in conjunction with local unit and resource advisors.
- Comply with Federal Aviation Policies on federal lands.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public.
- Additionally, all personnel assigned to the incident shall be treated with dignity and respect while providing a safe and productive work environment.



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

All actions should continue to implement the Thirtymile Hazard Abatement Plan, be in compliance with the National Wildland Coordinating Group (NWCG) work-rest guidelines, and follow the **Code of Conduct for Fire Suppression**.

You are directly accountable to us. The designated Forest Service Fire Management Representatives for the incident are Barry Shullanberger FWF (541-219-1672) and Dave McMaster MDF (530-640-1690). The designated representative for the ODF is Dustin Gustaveson (541-219 0446). The Incident Business Advisor for the U.S. Forest Service is Nina Hardin (541-947-6286) and the Finance Advisor for ODF is Dave Horton (541-883-5681).

We expect all suppression efforts will be executed in accordance with the selected strategy identified in the respective WFSS prepared for the incident and consistent with the ODF suppression policy on private lands. Effective management of costs commensurate with resource values to be protected and strategic direction of the respective WFSS alternatives is critical. We also request that as much purchasing as possible and practical be done through local vendors. Property accountability should demonstrate adherence to National direction on acceptable fire loss/use rates.

Fire information and media relations will be coordinated with the following Public Affairs Officers: Lisa Swinney FWF (541-947-6261), Suzi Johnson MDF (530-640-0195), and Anne Maloney, ODF (541-883-5681).

Your team's performance will be evaluated based on the elements above.

We wish you and your team a safe and successful assignment. You can reach us, Fred Way FWF at (541 219-1605), Kimberly Anderson MDF (530-708-0065), and Greg Pittman at (541-891-8534).

Fred Way
Forest Supervisor
Fremont-Winema National Forest

Kimberly Anderson
Forest Supervisor
Modoc National Forest



**Eremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Greg Pittman'.

Greg Pittman
District Forester
Klamath-Lake District
Oregon Department of Forestry

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Leland Hunter'.

Leland Hunter
Incident Commander
SCOFMP IMT3

Appendix 5g



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

To: Steve Gage, Incident Commander, Portland NIMO

Subject: Delegation of Authority, Barry Point Fire

Date: August 26, 2012

Effective at 1600 Sunday August 26, 2012 you are delegated Incident Commander for overall management of the Barry Point Fire (OR-FWF-120680, ODF-982018-13) on the Lakeview Ranger District of the Fremont-Winema National Forest (FWF) and the Lake Unit of the Klamath-Lake District of Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), and the Devils Garden District of the Modoc National Forest (MDF). This fire originated on August 5, 2012. Fire Dispatch Number for the Incident is 680.

We expect all incident management activities to be executed in accordance with the signatory Agency Administrators Leaders' Intent and the strategy that has been identified within the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFSS). Plan your management of the incident within the scope of the Objectives and Courses of Action as described in WFSS and Leaders' Intent. Please notify one of us or our staff if you see that this guidance in the WFSS is no longer accurate or valid while you are commanding the incident. We will provide guidance and updates as needed so that our intent remains clear.

Should we be unavailable to you during your command, we will assign Rachelle Huddleston-Lorton (541-219-2153) as FWF representative, Dustin Gustaveson (541-219-0446) as the ODF representative, Dave McMaster (530-640-1690) as MDF representative to your Team. Mike Ramsey (541-891-9653) is assigned as the liaison to the Lead Resource Advisor for the (NFS) lands on the FWF, Mary Flores (530-279-6116) for the private and NFS lands on the MDF in California on this incident and is assigned to work directly with your team on all matters pertaining to land and resource management objectives and mitigations required by implementation of your tactics.



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

We expect you to ensure that all actions and consequences have been analyzed against risk to human life and other values. You are expected to provide clear leaders' intent at all levels of your organization and use your experience and judgment and make timely and prudent decisions as to the best course of action. You are expected to maximize opportunities for success through mindful decision making and heightened situational awareness, while minimizing exposure to risk.

Initial attack will be the responsibility of the local units. You will support IA efforts as requested based upon resource availability.

The principal objectives we wish to have accomplished on this fire are:

- Implement good risk management practices in order to provide for firefighter, other responder and public safety. Use good risk analysis processes, the principles of the 10 Standard Fire Orders, LCES, and the 18 Watch-Out Situations as the foundation for risk decisions at all levels.
- Coordinate and consult with local agency safety managers.
- Implement all strategies and tactics based on fire fighter and public safety, taking into consideration sound, efficient and effective financial practices as well as appropriate land, resource management and fire management plans. You are authorized to spend funds as identified in the suppression cost objective of Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFSS).
- Protect private property and structures to minimize private landowner resource loss.
- Maintain containment of the fire and prevent further fire spread to minimize impact to private property and improvements by safely and aggressively suppressing fire.
- Business practices will comply with the Region 5, Region 6 Incident Business Management Guidelines, the ODF Business Practices and the local Operating Guidelines for Incident Administration.
- Costs will be tracked in accordance with the local cost share agreement (signed August 23, 2012).
- Maintain financial records and systems utilizing current program models that allow for daily apportionments by jurisdiction.
- Utilize resource advisors to minimize environmental concerns related to suppression activities.
- Implement suppression rehabilitation work as identified in the turnback standards and rehabilitation plan in conjunction with the local units.
- Comply with Federal Aviation Policies on federal lands.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public.



Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'J. Richard Newton'.

J. Richard (Rick) Newton
Deputy Forest Supervisor
Fremont-Winema National Forest

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Greg Pittman'.

Greg Pittman
District Forester
Klamath-Lake District
Oregon Department of Forestry

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Kimberly Anderson'.

Kimberly Anderson
Forest Supervisor
Modoc National Forest

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Steve Gage'.

Steve Gage
Incident Commander
Portland NIMO

Appendix 5h



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

To: Leland Hunter, Incident Commander, SCQFMP IMT 3

Subject: Delegation of Authority, Barry Point Fire

Date: August 30, 2012

Effective at 2100 Thursday August 30, 2012 you are delegated Incident Commander for overall management of the Barry Point Fire (OR-FWF-120680, ODF-982018-13) on the Lakeview Ranger District of the Fremont-Winema National Forest (FWF) and the Lake Unit of the Klamath-Lake District of Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), and the Devils Garden District of the Modoc National Forest (MDF). This fire originated on August 5, 2012. Fire Dispatch Number for the Incident is 680.

We expect all incident management activities to be executed in accordance with the signatory Agency Administrators Leaders' Intent and the strategy that has been identified within the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS). Plan your management of the Incident within the scope of the Objectives and Courses of Action as described in WFDSS and Leaders' Intent. Please notify one of us or our staff if you see that this guidance in the WFDSS is no longer accurate or valid while you are commanding the incident. We will provide guidance and updates as needed so that our intent remains clear.

Should we be unavailable to you during your command, we will assign Racheile Huddleston-Lorton (541-219-2153) as FWF representative, Dustin Gustaveson (541-219-0446) as the ODF representative, Dave McMaster (530-640-1690) as MDF representative to your Team. Mike Ramsey (541-891-9653) is assigned as the liaison to the Lead Resource Advisor for the (NFS) lands on the FWF, Mary Flores (530-279-6116) for the private and NFS lands on the MDF in California on this Incident and is assigned to work directly with your team on all matters pertaining to land and resource management objectives and mitigations required by implementation of your tactics.



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

We expect you to ensure that all actions and consequences have been analyzed against risk to human life and other values. You are expected to provide clear leaders' intent at all levels of your organization and use your experience and judgment and make timely and prudent decisions as to the best course of action. You are expected to maximize opportunities for success through mindful decision making and heightened situational awareness, while minimizing exposure to risk.

Initial attack will be the responsibility of the local units. You will support IA efforts as requested based upon resource availability.

The principal objectives we wish to have accomplished on this fire are:

- Implement good risk management practices in order to provide for firefighter, other responder and public safety. Use good risk analysis processes, the principles of the 10 Standard Fire Orders, LCES, and the 18 Watch-Out Situations as the foundation for risk decisions at all levels.
- Coordinate and consult with local agency safety managers.
- Implement all strategies and tactics based on fire fighter and public safety, taking into consideration sound, efficient and effective financial practices as well as appropriate land, resource management and fire management plans. You are authorized to spend funds as identified in the suppression cost objective of Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS).
- Protect private property and structures to minimize private landowner resource loss.
- Maintain containment of the fire and prevent further fire spread to minimize impact to private property and improvements by safely and aggressively suppressing fire.
- Business practices will comply with the Region 5, Region 6 Incident Business Management Guidelines, the ODF Business Practices and the local Operating Guidelines for Incident Administration.
- Costs will be tracked in accordance with the local cost share agreement (signed August 30, 2012).
- Maintain financial records and systems utilizing current program models that allow for daily apportionments by jurisdiction.
- Utilize resource advisors to minimize environmental concerns related to suppression and rehabilitation activities.
- Implement suppression rehabilitation work as identified in the tumbuck standards and rehabilitation plan in conjunction with the local units.
- Comply with Federal Aviation Policies on federal lands.
- Maintain and enhance the relationships with local landowners and the public.



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

Additionally, all personnel assigned to the incident shall be treated with dignity and respect while providing a safe and productive work environment.

All actions should continue to implement the Thirtymile Hazard Abatement Plan, be in compliance with the National Wildland Coordinating Group (NWCWG) work-rest guidelines, and follow the **Code of Conduct for Fire Suppression**.

You are directly accountable to us. The designated Forest Service Fire Management Representatives for the incident are Barry Shullanberger FWF (541-219-1672) or Barry Hansen FWF (541-219-0438) and Dave McMaster MDF (530-640-1690). The designated representative for the ODF is Dustin Gustavson (541-219-0446). The Incident Business Advisor for the U.S. Forest Service is Nina Hardin (541-947-6286) and the Finance Advisor for ODF is Dave Horton (541-883-5681).

We expect all suppression and suppression related rehabilitation efforts will be executed in accordance with the selected strategy identified in the respective WFDSS prepared for the incident. Effective management of costs commensurate with resource values to be protected and strategic direction of the respective WFDSS alternative and in accordance with ODF policy for private lands is critical. We also request that as much purchasing as possible and practical be done through local vendors. Property accountability should demonstrate adherence to National direction on acceptable fire loss/use rates.

Fire information and media relations will be coordinated with the following Public Affairs Officers: Lisa Swinney FWF (541-947-6261), Suzi Johnson MDF (530-640-0195), and Anne Maloney, ODF (541-883-5681).

Your team's performance will be evaluated based on the elements above.

We wish you and your team a safe and successful assignment. You can reach us, Rick Newton FWF at (541-892-0487), Kimberly Anderson MDF (530-708-0065), and Greg Pittman at (541-891-8534).



**Fremont-Winema and Modoc
National Forests
Oregon Department of Forestry**

J. Richard (Rick) Newton
Deputy Forest Supervisor
Fremont-Winema National Forest

Dustin Gustavson for Greg Pittman
Greg Pittman
District Forester
Klamath-Lake District
Oregon Department of Forestry

Kimberly Andersen
Forest Supervisor
Modoc National Forest

Leland Hunter
Incident Commander
SCDFMP IMT 3

Appendix 6

Recollections of initial attack of the Barry Point Fire, the first three days

Meeting Date: Sept 11, 2012

Location: Lakeview Interagency office Gearhart conference room

Reason for Meeting: Fred Way, Fremont-Winema Forest Supervisor, requested information on the beginning days of the Barry Point Fire to get an understanding of how the Forest responded.

Note Taker: Lucinda Nolan and Glen Westlund, Forest Environmental Coordinator, FOIA coordinator, and litigation coordinator

Attending:

Fred Way, Forest Supervisor; Coey Neider, 8/6 Operations, Trent Wilkie, 8/6 Division A Supervisor, Chad Bergren, 8/6 Division B Supervisor, Clark Hammond, air operations (on phone), Helitac Foreman; Dustin Gustafson, Oregon Dept of Forestry Supervisor (not assigned to fire); Barry Shullanberger, 8/7-8/8 Day Operations; Noel Livingston, Not present during incident, currently acting Fremont-Winema NF Fire Staff officer, Bob Crumrine, Federal Duty Officer; Eric Knerr, 8/6-8/7 (morning) IC and logistical support; Mitch Wilson, 8/7-8/8 Division Z Supervisor; Abel Harrington, 8/7-8/8 Division A Supervisor; Kevin Burdon, Not assigned to fire ODF Supervisor.

Evening August 5: Lightning storm begins with the first strike occurring at 8:59 am (0859) and the last strike at 10:56 pm (2256). See Attachment 1, Lightning Display Map

Day of August 6th 2012

Due to lightning incidents on 8/5 and expecting more on 8/6 the Lakeview Interagency Fire Center is placed in lightning mode (see attachment 2 and 3 for roles and responsibilities) which dispatches two resources per event as they get reported. The Forest has seven engines and many lookouts (5) manned (in service) by 0700, in preparation for any potential fires from previous night's storm. Dog Mountain Lookout reports being in service at 0748, all 7 lookouts are in service by 0800. The full complement of engines, crews, and aircraft report in service between 0800 and 0900. The first engine is committed to a fire, returning to Fremont Winema Forest (FWF) 665 at 0757, fire SIFR-673 also had engines committed at 0752 with additional FS engines at 0816. By 0900 several other engines were committed to fires. From 0900 on, there are 5 active fires that are being manned at the time the Barry Point Fire was reported at 1526 and another was reported at 1639 (FWF-681). At 1626 the Barry Point fire was named and the first engine (FWF 665)

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Note Taker: Lucinda Nolan and Glen Westlund, Forest Environmental Coordinator, FOIA coordinator, and litigation coordinator

Attending:

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The following were committed to the fire as initial attack as shown in the Lakeview Interagency Fire Center daily log for 08/06/2012.

Time Dispatched	Time Arrive at Fire (on Scene)	Equipment/Crew	Type	Action
	1628	8203	Rob Wood, ODF	First to arrive and size up fire and access.
1629	1720	3HI *	Helicopter, pilot plus 8	Left Fire at 2017 leaving crew on the fire for the night
1629	1847	E312	Type 2 engine, FS Bly, X crew members	1633 BC10 moved E312 to FR 3916 to stage
1629	1637	BC 20	Coley Neider, FS Lakeview	Notified of the incident and began ordering air craft at 1634.
1629	1738	T-802	SEAT - Lakeview	
1629	1637	DV1	Eric Knerr	Arrived at fire
	1629	9B	Eric Wolf	Arrived Quartz Mountain Helispot
1629	1712	4AW	Helicopter, type 3	Left fire 2005
1629	1841	AA 3UV	Air Attack	Performs aerial supervision of the incident and coordinates air craft us with the ground.
1629	1742	E-613 *	Type 6 engine, FS Bly	
1629	1841	2-B *	Squad, FS Lakeview, 5 members minimum	Hikes into fire
1629	1847	E-7679 *	Type 6 engine, BLM Gerber,	
1629	1847	E-421 *	Type 4 engine, FS Lakeview	
1629	1847	E-7471 *	Type 4 engine, BLM Gerber,	
1647	1812	Crew 7	FS, Klamath Falls	
1647	1847	E-531	Type 3 engine	
1648	1738	Chase 86	Tender for Dozer 86	
1648	1738	D-86	ODF Dozer	
1648	1847	E-312	Type 3 engine, FS Bly	
1649	1714	E-8262	Type 6 engine, ODF Lakeview	Staged with E613, Not ordered

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1647	1812	Crew 7	FS, Klamath Falls	
1647	1847	E-531	Type 3 engine	
1648	1738	Chase 86	Tender for Dozer 86	
1648	1738	D-86	ODF Dozer	
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Time Dispatched	Time Arrive at Fire (on Scene)	Equipment/Crew	Type	Action
1653	1720	155	Helicopter, Type III	through Dispatch Left fire 2014
1700	1746	CH4	Barry Shullanburger, FS	Arrived at fire at 1659 (incident card) Left fire 2136
1706		E-8266	Type 6 engine, ODF Camp 6.	Stage in Bly
1711	1751	DV2	Barry Hanson	Arrived with ranger. Left fire 2229
1717	1908	T-847	SEAT	
1842	2031	Doz1150	FS Dozer	
1849		Lockett WT	Contract water tender	
1852	2124	Richmand DZ	Contract Dozer	

*First crews dispatched by Lakeview Interagency Fire Center all copied dispatch and responded immediately. Additional resources were requested to report to the fire by the Bly District Duty Officer, BC10, Leland Hunter, ODF Duty Officer, and Lakeview Duty Officer BC20. *There were people from local District Office's, ODF as well as others that saw the potential for this fire to become large quickly and it was apparent to everyone working the fire that this was a priority incident.*

In summary: 7 engines, 20 person hand crew, 10 person hand crew, 3 helo. (2 mediums and one light with 11 crewmen) 2 SEAT planes, 2 dozers, and an air attack platform for the initial attack.

Initial Fire growth: The Dog Mountain Lookout reported the fire at 1626. The fire was also spotted about the same time by Rob Wood (ODF) while travelling to the Dent Creek Road towards Yotum Valley. He tried to contact the lookout but could not be heard. By this time the lookout was reporting the fire to the Lakeview Interagency Fire Center. The Lookout reported the fire as an ¼ acre, then came back as a ½ acre, then again as an acre before LIFC could respond. By 1636 Dog Mountain reports the fire has doubled in size and is experiencing erratic winds. At 1638 Dog Mountain reports torching and a change in smoke from gray to very black. At 1658 Dog Mountain reports a spot fire west of the original fire.

Dustin Gustavson recalled hearing Dog Mountain Lookout reporting the fire at a half acre with a grey column. Before Dispatch could "tone" out the fire, Dog Mountain had called back two more times and each time the fire had doubled in size.

Dog Mtn first reported the smoke at 1626 on 8/6/12. At 1635 Dog Mtn reported "doubled in size headed NE getting erratic winds". At 1638 Dog Mtn reported the fire as "starting to torch gray

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Dog Mtn first reported the smoke at 1626 on 8/6/12. At 1635 Dog Mtn reported "doubled in size headed NE getting erratic winds". At 1638 Dog Mtn reported the fire as "starting to torch gray

to very black". At 1656 Horsefly lookout reported "130 degrees and 29 seconds, T40 R16 Sec 10. At 1657 Dog Mtn reported "spot fire on the west side now, just started up".

1708: Report from 4AW. Fire is 7 acres in heavy timber and the adjacent fuels are the same. The fire is running and torching with flame lengths of 4 to 8 feet. The fire is positioned on the top third of 30 to 45 percent slope on the west aspect of the ridge. The ridge is flat on top with winds from the west at 5 to 10'. Spread rate is high and timber is at risk, more air support is needed. The fire is spotting 300 yards ahead of the fire.

1829: 15 acre fire with 1/2 acre spot a quarter mile ahead of fire

2024: Fire is at 40 acres with multiple spots, crews continue to work but all aircraft are off the fire.

2153: Fire is about 100 acres

0046: Fire is about 100 acres

0337: Fire size 100acres, could be 200 acres

0448: Fire size about 150 acres

Aviation: 1632: Coley Neider (BC20) asked if any SEATs were available, none were available at the time but Helicopter 4AW is available. At 1634 Coley again asked for a SEATs, called SIFC and one was diverted from another fire. At 1640 he again asked about a helicopter (4AW is dispatched) and an Air Attack plane to coordinate air operations. At 1701 dispatch was told that no heavy air tankers were available, they were committed to another fire. Aircraft got ordered before people were on scene because they anticipated the need.

1805: There is again a request for heavies (air tankers) and relief or other air support on Division B of the fire. The heavies were originally ordered at 1700.

1835: No heavy air tankers are available, COIDC has priority.

1840: T802 and T847 will flight follow with 3UV on the Harry Point Incident. Flight follow means that the planes will no longer check in with Dispatch about flight locations but will with 3UV. Air attack, 3UV, arrives on the fire at 1841.

Ground Suppression:

Rob Wood arrived to the scene of the fire at 1628.

1636: Rob Wood (8203) sized up the access to the fire and said it was not visible from roads and may be a walk in. He asked about helicopter 3HT and it was on its way (incident card).

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Rob Wood arrived to the scene of the fire at 1628.

1636: Rob Wood (8203) sized up the access to the fire and said it was not visible from roads and may be a walk in. He asked about helicopter 3HT and it was on its way (incident card).

1638 Crew 7 was contacted and staged at the base of Bly Mountain (Beatty) rather than return to Klamath Falls. At 1647 they were dispatched to the fire and arrived at the fire at 1812. See table above for a listing of initial crew orders for the fire and the additions that came shortly after.

1740 All resources on the fire meet for a briefing at the junction of Forest Roads 3910000 and 3910012. *Fire suppression will be a hand operation because engines do not have access to the fire. There is no safe road access because of heavy fuel loads and ingrowth with single access requiring ingress and egress on the same route. It takes about a half hour to walk into the fire. Helicopter and engine crewmen were divided and assigned to Alpha or Bravo divisions (units). Division A worked the north flank from west to northeast and Division B worked the south flank from west to east.*

1749: IC organization was established. Rob Woods as IC and Baker is a trainee, Coley Neider (BC20) operations, Trent Wilkie Division A supervisor and Chad Bergren Division B superv. and Eric Knerr (DV) was overseeing. *We inserted Eric Knerr as overhaul for Rob Wood as dispatch was not sure Rob was IC 3 qualified. Once this determination was made, Eric stepped back in an advisory role.*

1852, Two federal and one contract dozer were ordered for the fire. At 1858 the Richman dozer (contract) was coming out of Bly estimated an hour and half from the fire. This joined dozer DZ86 which was dispatched at 1648. DZ86 was on the fire at 1738 and worked with crews and the Richman Dozer arrived at 2124.

1935: Crews anchored the fire and split in two divisions, A and B, and started to work their way around the fire with crews and dozer. Later that night the second dozer arrived.

Div Alpha, Trent Wilkie. Tied in with Chad came up with a plan. We worked north and lost line right away, the fire was spotting across the dozer line. Fuel load was mixed conifer and over 6 foot manzanita, with a heavy down dead component. (Fuel model 10: 40 tons per acre) Every time we would get the line in, fire would torch and spot across the line. The single dozer had to rework lines. By morning when I got the second dozer I used one dozer going ahead and one going behind picking up spots and improving the line.

Div Bravo, Chad Bergren. From the hill we went direct with a handline. We had an 11 person crew. First chunk was open ponderosa and we made some good progress. We were assisted by aircraft. The line reached the rock out crop of Barry Point proper and once we broke over the top, everything changed. The brush was over 6 foot high, the kind you get lost in. A lot of fir and snags were catching. The wind was still with us (in our back), this was dozer country. Handcrews could not get it done. We were asking for dozers but none were available. Division A was in some real bad stuff and needed the dozers more. Using the air support we were doing pretty well. We could use the helicopters effectively.

A little after dark we got a wind shift and it kind of went more to the west. With this wind the fire really started torching and spotting. The spotting was a good quarter mile ahead. The seat drop was not effective once you got on the ground you could tell the fuel load was not suited for seat drops.

Note on Dozers: Oregon Department of forestry (ODF) dozer, DZ86, was dispatched by Dustin Gustavson before it was called into dispatch.

Coley Neider (BC20) ordered 4 dozers, Dustin called saying that one ODF dozer was on the way and a FS dozer was dispatched. Two FS dozers showed up on the fire later that night, one was not able to be staffed because the operator had maxed his time for the day. Because of this we made the decision to let this dozer rest the night and bring them on the next morning. The dozer was transported to the fire staging area to be ready for the next day. One ODF and one FS dozer remained working the incident.

2009: Aviation requested the Helitack crews be pulled off the fire for the night so they would be available to staff the helicopter the next day. Not all helitack crewmen are pulled. Eleven were pulled off the fire and nine left to work through the night.

2153: The note in the Incident Card is a miss communication from the fire. There has never a line around the fire. The head of the fire was still active and unsafe to approach. The crew expected the existing dozer line to hold. The line was a quarter mile long from the anchor point and halted because of spotting and erratic fire behavior. Fire behavior would normally moderate at night but conditions kept this fire active. IC Rob Wood gave the update on fire at 2153 fire size of 100 acres plus or minus, active fire burning, dozer line is indirect and would not call it contained. We had one dozer line on one side of the fire that looked like it would hold. Further progress on that line was halted because of spotting.

0046: Fire is active in some parts and calmed in other parts. IC beds down crew to have them available the next day. Coley, Rob, Trent, Chad and Mike McGinn discussed what resources need to be bedded down so that we will still have crews avail for tomorrow. The decision was also based on the erratic fire behavior that came when the wind changed and not being able to see spot fires early enough to take action.

0223: Coley Neider, L-21, E312, Squad 2B, 9 from Helitack, Doz 1150 and one dozer boss from E679 remain working while others bed down. Those bedding down are E 679, 471, 531, Crew 7, 8262, Richmond Dozer and D-86. Battalion 20, 1:421, E.312, squad 2b, 7 helitack, agency dozer and dozer boss were used to hold the dozer line on left flank and hand line on div Bravo right flank. Dozer was used to improve existing line from div alpha to the head of fire. There was no containment of the fire because of spotting, slope, fuel conditions, and limited ability to hold the line with resources we had.

0337: Fire behavior diminished with isolated torching. Working dozer lines where possible.

0448: Continuing line construction and holding actions on the SE flank. North flank, Div A, is indirect line and 50 percent is holding. IC says fire is 150 acres they are continuing line construction and taking holding actions on southeast. Both flanks are holding

Night Crew Summary: Worked on indirect line on north side. The dozer line around the north edge of Div Alpha 50% holding. Put line between Forest Roads 028 and the 028, this is a loop road and we connected those two roads on div Alpha; however, did have not enough help to hold this line. Scouted a location for an indirect line down to the Hay Creek Road and for a hold line on SE. Rest of night shift, tried to hold line (rough estimate 50% around the fire) and scout for next day.

Line around the head provided a secure anchor point

Fire Management

2115: Type 3 team ordered for fire

0217: Rob Wood leaves fire to bed down and transfers IC to Eric Knerr

0737: IC is transferred from Eric Knerr to Bustamonte for the day

August 7 beginning with Day Crew

Available Resources

At staging area:

GHR type 2 engine, PeFF?, Bly Mountain Fire Department?, Leehmen Contracting water tender type 2, Saw-livin Inc tender, Simms Dozer, Lockett water tender, Richmand Contracting dozer type 2, ASI Crew, Alan Taylor TFLD

Those who bedded down the night before were on the fireline. They include E7679, E7471, Crew 7, E613?, E531, and E8262 as well as Dozer D86

Division A had the Simms and Jeff and Billie Wessel dozer type 2 E-11, Lockett Tender, Jess Pitt Engine, Inbound Engine, GHR Engine, GHR Engine, Lechuran Tender, Crew2A

Division B had Crew 7, Dozer: 86, ASI Crew, 7471, 613, 8262 and 531

Fire behavior and growth

1223: Size 175 acres. Fire activity is starting to pick up, gusty winds, the air resources and helicopters are buying us some good time. Starting to see some spotting and torching is picking

up. Fire is burning toward the north. Crews are continuing to construct dozer line, flanking the fire. Biggest need is for hand crews.

1628: From air attack - Fire is at 500 acres with short range spotting. Spots along RR 3940 are running in the grass.

1631: Acres set at 1,500

Aviation: The day began with aggressive aerial support.

0801: Redmond says that 3 heavies are available and asks if they are wanted. Dispatch says they can be used and Redmond will let them know when they can be launched. 0851 the 3 heavies and a lead plane are dispatched to Barry Point.

0817: 2 SEATs are ordered and by 8:27 are in the air to the fire.

0857: Helicopter 155 is ordered and leaves Klamath Falls to arrive in 30 minutes.

0917: Both SEAT(S T847 and T802) and Air Attack (3UV) are at the fire.

0935: Air Attack is in contact with heavies.

0941: Air Tankers T142, T40, and T12 are 23 minutes from the fire.

1016: First heavy drops retardant on the fire.

1033: air attack requests another heavy air tanker.

1112: Air attack will flight follow aircraft.

1113: relief air attack filled after lengthy search for a replacement for 3UV who is running out of time. Air Attack will be 3ME.

1134: helicopter 3HI arrives with pilot plus 8.

1135: order for a 4th heavy still pending.

1142: Clark Hammond (Sup9 with crew and fuel truck) arrives at Dog Lake to set up a helibase.

1146: 8401 arrives at Quartz Mountain to work helicopter support (H155)

1151: Lead plane L64 arrives at fire.

1237: Air attack cancels the order for the fourth heavy. 1246 dispatch says the order for a heavy was cancelled.

1201: 3ME takes over as air attack from 3UV. Requests relief lead plane for 1515. L65 will take lead.

1337: Sup 9 reports that Helicopter 3HT is working from the Dog Lake boat ramp and TH55 is working out of the Quartz Mountain gravel pit.

1446: Ops checking on type 1 helicopter order, one is coming from Idaho, the other is pending.

1508: Request from NW; wou'd like 1 or 2 air tankers for the Medford incident. Air Attack relays that the tankers are needed for this fire and would like to keep them.

1530: 2 ODF Airtankers entered the mix sometime between 1530-1600?

1608: 3FM turns air attack over to 3UV and returns to Lakeview for fuel

1707: Air Attack observes that helicopters 15S and 3HT are on the ground and will hold them there at this time to save flight time

1724: Air Attack would like 96W on Division B.

1800: Air Attack relays that since they are unable to fill the relief lead that tankers would be shut down at 1900 and helicopters would be retained. Also advised that Type 2 helicopters are not needed at this time.

1817: NW informs dispatch that the fire will not be getting the relief air attack requested as COTDC has a new incident. Tankers can remain on the fire until 1900 to 1915.

1824: Type 2 helicopter is back over the fire.

1824: NW COTDC caught the incident and the fire can have the air attack relief, the fire takes it.

1917: T847 lands in Lakeview and is off for night.

1926: 96W lands in Lakeview

1943: T90 and T82 from Klamath Falls to the fire

1951: Helicopter 15S is released from fire for the night

1958: Helicopter 3HT is on the ground in Lakeview.

Ground Suppression:

The day crew works to extend the flanks. There are two active fire heads and the goal is to eliminate one of them. Division Z is added today.

Division A: BC72, Able Harrington division supervisor. *Started with 2 dozers and contract engine personnel. Pretty good hike in for crews and uplift, was not sure how well they would do*

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after the hike. One dozer improved the line to Barry Point and the other was used to work downhill to the 028. Dozers were working the 028 road and split them to work both sides. Shifts in wind made it impossible to keep the fire within the lines. The dozer line would not take much wind shift and fire spotted across this line. There was spotting across the upper part of the 028 (left side). By the time I got the dozers in place the fire was already causing suppression issues (concerns). It was not safe to put crews into that situation and fire behavior and fuel conditions caused problems to the crew reaching the safety zone at Squaw Flat. At 1200 Division A disengaged the fire for safety reasons then later engaged again. The fire was spotting across the dozer line and running up slope to the ridge. FR 028? was compromised.

Div Alpha continued to experience extreme fire behavior with multiple spotting across existing dozer line and without enough resources was not able to hold existing line. Once the sun went down the ODF dozer was able to punch line to northeast slope and it held.

Resources were not available not from lack of ordering but from lack of availability. There were fires burning in Central Oregon that were burning threatening structures and that created competition for resources. (see log at 1104 and 1232)

The NW preparedness level was a three. After the Barry Point fire started the Nation went to a preparedness level four.

Division B: Brent Miesinger, Division Supervisor. Crew seven and dozer extend division B down to the FR 3940. The dozer constructs direct and indirect lines utilizing the moderating effect of the retardant from the morning air drops. The fire is burning to the northeast with no break in fuels between FR 3940 and the active fire making it difficult to get in front of the fire. The slope, fuels, and flame lengths make it unsafe to construct direct fire lines so much of the line is indirect and would require burning out.

Division Z: Mitch Wilson division supervisor.

Scouted 406 to 052 could see fire was coming over top of nob in hay creek drainage. Once fire crossed Hay Creek it added complexity to suppression efforts on Dog Mt due to mid-slope road systems and lack of natural fuel breaks for control. Fire can easily jump mid-slope roads. Efforts were made to stop the fire using these roads but was unsuccessful. The combination of fire behavior, terrain, lack of control features (breaks in fuel) and fire now at the base of Dog Mountain made suppression efforts difficult.

The fire was pushing back towards the 3940.

The dozer line was completed to FR 3940 road (Hay Creek) and held. The dozer line intersection with FR 3940 became the end of Division B. FR 3940 became the start of division Z with Mitch Wilson Division supervisor.

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The fire was pushing back towards the 3940.

The dozer line was completed to FR 3940 road (Hay Creek) and held. The dozer line intersection with FR 3940 became the end of Division B. FR 3940 became the start of division Z with Mitch Wilson Division supervisor.

1215: First had the engines knock down snags and secure FR 3940 (Hay Creek Road). Scouted the 069 and 062 roads and then travelled to the Dog Mountain Road to look back and see what the fire was doing. It was making a lateral run downhill. I discussed the need to burnout from FR 3940 to stop it the fire at the road. After two strips the approaching fire started spotting a 1/4 mile to a mile ahead of us so we pulled back and stopped the burnout. We moved from the road into Dry Valley and chased spots.

1104: Order for 4 crews has been filled and 2 orders are outstanding for type 1 crews.

1232: Greyback should be at fire at 1400. GFP 10B (hand crew) left dispatch and heading to the fire.

1338: Have one dozer boss dispatched and 2 orders are pending. IC asks to order an additional.

1418: Staging area moved to end of pavement on FR 4017.

1514: notified by air attack that spotting is occurring across FR 3940; Dog Mountain Lookout is notified to be on alert.

1515: Barry Shullinberger witnesses several spots across the 3940 road (Hay Creek).

1530 sent three engines and dozer with two air tankers to Dry Valley area and used these resources for direct attack on private lands within Dry Valley

1625: Dog Mountain lookout leaves tower

2159: Night Resources. A night shift was developed with Tom Gohcen as Div Supervisor. FS, 3 type 2 crews, and 3 type 3 engines. ODF, 2 type 6 engines and dozer and dozer boss. Night crew completed the black line on B Division to reduce the possibility of the fire moving to the south. A mobile attack crew with dozer and crew was sent to Dry Valley.

2217: test fire to start burnout.

2254: Harlin Dozer is at Dog Lake hut does not have a dozer boss with it. It stages at Dog Lake

2331: Burn out on Division B (south end of fire) has about a mile to go and everything is looking good.

0135: Burnout still looking good. Working the southeast section of line and will tie into FR 3940 in about a quarter mile.

0309: The burn out has brought fire from Barry Point to FR 3940. Will soon begin to carry fire to burnout along FR 3940 and begin burning to the north.

0348: Started burnout along FR 3940 heading north

0533: Completed burnout along FR 3940.

Fire Management

0837: BC20 begins ordering planes

0847: Barry Shullanberger transitions with Coley Neider becoming day operations. Informs dispatch that there are 3 divisions.

0950: Greg Funderbuck assigned as IC trainee for type 3 team.

1530: Discussion to order a type 2 team to manage the fire between Fred Way, Barry Shullanberger, and Bob Crumrine.

1535: Richard Bustamonte, day shift IC ordered the type two team.

1631: Completed the 209 with Greg Funderbuck. See attachment 4

1714: 8265 moves to the north end of the fire as instructed by 8202.

1838: Transitioned to type 3 team retaining the present organization.

2016: Day operations are transferred to night operations and all day resources are returning to fire camp.

August 8 being with Day Shift

Available Resources: See Incident Status Summary (ICS-209) for 09/08/2017 (Attachment: 5)

Fire growth behavior and growth

1729: Air attack report the fire is 1.5 to 2 miles from the lookout and is making a good push

Night time recoveries never happened on this fire. Weather was a factor in the erratic fire behavior.

Aviation

0707: Placed order for 3 heavies, a lead plane, and air attack with KIFC and for helicopters and crews.

0721: Helicopter 158 is available and will fly to Quartz Mountain Helispot at 0800.

0800: IC asked if SEATs were available the first thing this morning and they are not and the order for 3 heavies is still pending.

0829: SEATs, 4JE, and heavies T12 and T40 plus lead plane are dispatched to the fire. T142 is on day off and T66 needs repairs. Operations says there is an inversion over the fire and will not be able to use heavies yet this morning.

0854: Clean air is reported on Division A and request bucket work, helicopter 15S is available.

0920: Air Attack 3UV is 17 minutes from the fire, they are asked to report to the north end of the fire.

0930: 3UV arrived on the fire.

0938: Air attack orders a type 1 helicopter to Division A, and says to launch L65 and 2 heavies because fire is threatening state lands.

0945: Dry Valley sec 36/31 and 052 road, Dry Valley is being threatened; 1 hour with 2 tankers would be good for the day. Support for burnout on 012 road.

0949: Helicopter 15S is dispatched to Division A.

1012: Order placed for T66.

1015: air attack asks to launch 2 SEATs and would like second State (ODF) air tanker, T62 is available MFR.

1040: T66 took off and has to jettison load, still having problems.

1046: T847, T802, 4AW arrive in Lakeview, Ops asks to have SEATs held in Lakeview.

1027: Machado says he needs the air cleared 4AW can fly the fire for mapping it. Ops is on 4AW and requests to hold SEATs.

1058: T802 and T847 are loaded and returning to fire.

1108: Lead65 says to hold tankers and SEATs from Lakeview because it is too smoky.

1113: KIFC was unable to hold tankers.

1159: would like type 2 helicopter on Division A.

1214: Lockett transport is fixed and operational.

1237: Helicopter 3HT arrives at fire and goes to Dog Lake. lands at 12:44.

1239: HC92 and fuel truck arrive at Dog Lake.

1245: Ops says visibility OK and would like Air Attack to report to Division F on Dog Mountain.

1311: Air Attack takes off from Lakeview. Ops will wait for them to order more resources.

1416: LMT tanker base was wondering if T62 was needed, the reply was not at this time.

1438: Air Attack was wondering if there were reports of a fire near the California border south of Dog Mountain. This smoke was well into California. At 1500 air attack says the smoke is located near Clear Lake.

1447: Lead relief, LD64, is 20 minutes from fire.

1543: LD64 says for LD65 should go to LMT, but there is still no Jet A in LMT.

1611: Northwest wants to know the plans for the Klamath Tanker base use for the night while construction occurs on the Klamath Falls runway. Would like to know when they can start work. At 1618 Air Attack says when they are done with the tankers for the night.

1645: Air Attack sent a type 2 helicopter to Division A.

1652: Air attack would like to launch 2 heavies with lead and 2 SFATs out of Lakeview. T40 is down for mechanical problems and a second tanker is ordered from NW.

1652: another air tanker called was unavailable due to mechanical.

1721: T847 loads and returns to fire.

1726: T802 loads and returns to fire.

1729: Air Attack wants to know the condition of the Klamath Falls runway and if it is open so the tankers can land.

1734: Tanker Base in Klamath Falls confirms that tankers will not be able to land once the construction starts. Small planes will be able to land.

1742: NW would like LD65 and T12 to return to Redmond for night. T12 will get two loads from Medford.

1811: LD65, lead, needs relief at 1900. 2ZZ has 1.6 hours left of flight time for the day and can take lead at 1900.

1840: Last drop of the day so lead relief is not needed. T12 will be staying in LMT. LD65 returns to Redmond.

2002: All air resources are off the incident.

Airtankers had to go to Medford to refuel as the Klamath was repairing the airstrip

2 type three helicopters, two type two, and one type one were available for the day. Another type two was down for mechanical issues

Ground Suppression

0850 Eastern Oregon Task Force called dispatch informing them that engine P676 broke down and will be fixed and back on the road the next day. The rest of the task force is proceeding to the fire.

1129: A dozer transport has blown radiator hose and mechanic is requested.

1133: Dozer D 86 and chase arrive at fire and leaves at 1611 along with 8263.

0051: Night Ops says all people are in place and completing burnouts on division A, B, E, and Z.

Division A: The objective was to stop the fire spread to the north and west. Plans called for burning out of the indirect lines. This burnout, when completed, would stop the active spread of the fire to the west and north. Firing operations would be from FR 3940 to 012 using line made the previous day. Two Hand crews, one from helitac and the other Winema IBC (Hot Shots). There was concern about the narrowness of buzzard roost draw and that fire could easily jump it. A double dozer blade contingency line was constructed from the 012 to 3940 straight north to fall back to should the fire cross buzzard roost draw. Same fuel type dead and down receptive to firing operation.

The wind was in our favor. Burnout began between 930-1000 before the heat of the day. The Helitac crew worked from 3940/012 junction to the south. Winema worked from origin of fire along Division B to the North. The two crews eventually met in the middle near Squaw Flat.

Between 1200-1300 the Winema Hot Shots began burnout of Barry Point along a cut line to the 012 road. They worked north with a twenty person crew coming along behind the firing operation. We felt good after we hooked the corner. The burning moved slow because it was a fuel model ten. Nasty country for the most part. After the Winema Hot Shots got started we held up at Squaw Flat. There was not enough time to finish what we wanted to do so the night shift completed the line.

This firing operation stopped the spread of fire spread to the north.

Division Z brought resources up to junction of the 053 and 052 roads (the pond staging). Dog Lake dozer unloaded. Walked from the 052 road to the division break and constructed dozer line to the west into Dry Valley with dozer boss Brennan Hank. Engine task force supported the

dozer line in the morning by mopping up and made hose lays. An order was placed for hose and fittings.

1130 Harlan dozer, transport blew a radiator hose and became a concern for traffic coming in and out.

The fire pushed hard on the 052 road. We had trouble keeping fire west of the 052 road. The fire continued spotting and making uphill runs to the 053 road. Holding the fire was difficult because both the 052 and 053 roads are mid-slope roads on Dog Mountain but were the best options for holding the fire at that time.

Division F. Request was made for additional engines. The order was filled with the Bly heavy engine, Lakeview's heavy, and Paisley RD heavy. They arrived on the fire midmorning except the Lakeview heavy which arrived on the fire in midafternoon due to checking the original lightning fires found on the 6th.

Prineville IHC burned along the 052 road to the south to stay ahead of the main fires uphill runs.

Due to fire behavior the main fire crossed the 052 south of the Prineville crew before they could complete black line.

Prineville and the resources on Div E went up the main Dog Mountain road as a last chance to hold the fire on the westside of mountain. They prepped the main road (Dog Mountain Road) down to the 053 and dozer line was put in on the 019 road from Big Dog Spring down to the 053.

Dog Mountain Lookout was wrapped in preparation for the fire burning over it.

Fire Management

0910: all night crew resources are off the fire and arrived in camp.

See Day Plans, Attachment 6

Night Crew: The night crew burned what Prineville had started prepping on the Dog Mountain road from Big Dog Spring down to the 053 road. There was active fire at various distances from the road. The night crew did not burn out the portion of line Big Dog Spring down the 019 road that tied to the 053 road. On Division B the night crew also burned out from the Hay Creek 3940 road to the 053 road on Dog Mtn.

Lightning - Display Map: Bobs view



Legend		Lightning Summary	
+	Positive Lightning	Positive Strikes	117
-	Negative Lightning	Negative Strikes	4,472
—	States	Total Strikes	4,584
—	Countries	Period Covered	08/05/2012 08:00 PDT 08/06/2012 08:59 PDT
—	Major Roads and Highways		
—	Minor Roads (origin and labels)		
—	Towns		
—	BLM Boundaries		
□	Indian Reservations		
□	National Parks		
□	National Forests		
□	FWS Boundaries		
Western Land Ownership			

Appendix 7

National Interagency Coordination Center Incident Management Situation Report Tuesday, August 7, 2012 – 0530 MT National Preparedness Level 3

National Fire Activity

Initial attack activity:	Moderate (260 new fires)
New large fires:	16 (*)
Large fires contained:	17
Uncontained large fires: **	44
Area Command Teams committed:	0
NIMOs committed:	1
Type 1 IMTs committed:	1
Type 2 IMTs committed:	10

** Uncontained large fires include only fires being managed under a full suppression strategy.

[Link](#) to Geographic Area daily reports.

Four MAFFS C-130 aircraft and support personnel from the 146th Airlift Wing, Channel Islands (California Air National Guard), and the 302nd Airlift Wing, Colorado Springs (US Air Force Reserve) are supporting wildland fire suppression operations out of Boise, ID.

Eastern Great Basin Area (PL 3)

New fires:	40
New large fires:	7
Uncontained large fires:	10
NIMOs committed:	1
Type 2 IMTs committed:	2

Halstead, Salmon-Challis NF. NIMO (Houseman). Eighteen miles northwest of Stanley, ID. Timber. Active fire behavior with long-range spotting. Numerous structures threatened. Area closures in effect.

Trinity Ridge, Boise NF. IMT 2 (Suwyn). Seven miles northwest of Featherville, ID. Timber. Short crown runs with torching and spotting. Road and area closures in effect.

Mustang, Salmon-Challis NF. IMT 2 (Adell). Previously reported incident. Twenty-eight miles west of North Fork, ID. Timber. Group tree torching with short duration crown runs.

* **Cave Canyon, Sawtooth NF.** Fifteen miles southeast of Twin Falls, ID. Juniper and brush. Active fire behavior with torching and spotting.

* **Deer Hollow, Sawtooth NF.** Fifteen miles southeast of Malta, ID. Brush and grass. Running fire.

* **Springs, Boise NF.** Five miles west of Garden Valley, ID. Timber. Moderate fire activity with torching.

* **Flat Top 2, Twin Falls District, BLM.** Ten miles north of Kimama, ID. Brush and grass. Running fire.

West Mountain, Cedar City Field Office, BLM. Twenty-two miles northwest of St. George, UT. Hardwood slash and brush. Running fire with torching and spotting.

* **Shale Butte**, Twin Falls District, BLM. Ten miles north of Kimama, ID. Brush and grass. Fire burned into Flat Top 2 fire. No further information received.

Pine Canyon, Bear River Area, Utah DOF. Three miles east of Grouse Creek, UT. Timber. Creeping and smoldering.

* **Pinyon**, Northwest Area, Utah DOF. One mile northwest of Eagle Mountain, UT. Timber and grass. Numerous residences threatened. Evacuations in effect. No further information received.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Halstead	ID	SCF	30,285	8,975	1	10/16	394	17	8	14	3	0	2.5M	FS
Trinity Ridge	ID	BOF	1,250	510	0	UNK	272	133	9	5	0	0	675K	FS
Mustang	ID	SCF	750	---	N/A	N/A	95	---	1	11	0	0	110K	FS
* Cave Canyon	ID	STF	8,800	---	0	UNK	162	---	4	4	1	0	150K	FS
* Deer Hollow	ID	STF	1,000	---	0	UNK	22	---	0	4	0	0	50K	FS
* Springs	ID	BOF	320	---	30	8/8	158	---	6	5	3	0	50K	FS
* Flat Top 2	ID	TFD	7,000	---	50	UNK	85	---	0	9	1	0	50K	BLM
West Mountain	UT	CCD	2,458	1,958	50	8/10	106	6	2	8	2	0	250K	BLM
* Shale Butte	ID	TFD	1,900	---	50	UNK	NR	---	0	0	0	0	50K	BLM
Pine Canyon	UT	BRS	388	0	90	UNK	50	-7	2	2	0	0	178K	ST
* Pinyon	UT	NWS	2,257	---	0	8/9	95	---	2	6	1	7	200K	ST
* East Hollister	ID	TFD	568	---	100	---	9	---	0	2	0	0	80K	BLM
Pumpkin	UT	UWF	176	0	100	---	89	-30	3	0	1	0	480K	FS

UWF – Uinta/Wasatch-Cache NF

Northern Rockies Area (PI 3)

New fires: 6
 New large fires: 0
 Uncontained large fires: 9
 Type 2 IMTs committed: 3

Rosebud Creek Complex (4 fires), Eastern Land Office, Montana DNR. IMT 2 (Benes). Sixty miles southwest of Miles City, MT. Ponderosa pine, brush and grass. Active fire behavior with torching and spotting. Structures threatened.

Sarpy Hills Complex, Crow Agency, BIA. IMT 2 (Fry). Eighteen miles northwest of Crow Agency, MT. Timber. Minimal fire activity. Structures threatened.

Elbow Pass Complex (3 fires), Lewis & Clark NF. IMT 2 (Hall). Twenty-five miles southwest of Augusta, MT. Timber. Moderate fire activity with torching. Structures threatened.

Prisoner Lake, Flathead NF. Twenty-five miles east of Condon, MT. Timber. Creeping and smoldering with isolated torching. Trail closures in effect.

Western Great Basin Area (PL 3)

New fires: 23
 New large fires: 4
 Uncontained large fires: 7

Willow, Northern Region, Nevada DOF. Twenty-five miles north of Battle Mountain, NV. Hardwood slash, brush and grass. Running fire. Structures threatened.

* **Fraiser**, Battle Mountain District, BLM. Thirty miles northeast of Eureka, NV. Pinyon pine, juniper and brush. Running fire with torching and spotting. Major power lines threatened.

Del, Ely District, BLM. Twenty miles southeast of Alamo, NV. Juniper, brush and grass. Moderate fire activity. Power lines threatened.

Holloway, Winnemucca District Office, BLM. Twenty-five miles east of Denio, NV. Brush. Extreme fire behavior with long-range spotting.

Lutz, Humboldt-Toiyabe NF. Forty-five miles southwest of Wells, NV. Grass. Creeping and smoldering. Residences threatened and road closure in effect.

Hood, Northern Region, Nevada DOF. Twenty miles northwest of Battle Mountain, NV. Brush and grass. Minimal fire activity. Major power lines threatened.

* **Gilbert**, Battle Mountain District, BLM. Forty miles northwest of Austin, NV. Hardwood slash, brush and grass. Active fire behavior with long-range spotting. Residences and communication facility threatened.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Willow	NV	NNS	7,000	4,000	10	8/9	194	180	6	5	2	0	100K	ST
* Fraiser	NV	BMD	3,000	—	0	8/10	38	—	0	10	0	0	250K	BLM
Del	NV	ELD	23,680	16,680	30	8/9	193	80	6	3	4	0	300K	BLM
Holloway	NV	WID	55,000	52,000	0	8/11	142	84	5	4	2	0	900K	BLM
Lutz	NV	HTF	1,200	0	70	8/7	148	134	5	9	0	0	NR	FS
Hood	NV	NNS	782	0	98	8/7	4	-11	0	1	0	0	NR	ST
* Gilbert	NV	BMD	6,000	—	5	8/10	13	—	0	3	0	0	30K	BLM
Eleven	NV	WID	2,413	-2,587	100	—	3	-26	0	1	0	0	40K	BLM
Slumbering	NV	WID	1,500	500	100	—	0	-9	0	0	0	0	25K	BLM
* Four Tanks	NV	NNS	1,035	—	100	—	0	—	0	0	0	0	NR	ST
* Milligan	NV	NNS	554	—	100	—	0	—	0	0	0	0	NR	ST
Coyote 2	NV	WID	532	232	100	—	3	-20	0	1	0	0	25K	BLM
Coyote	NV	WID	478	178	100	—	5	-5	0	1	0	0	10K	BLM
Pumpnickel	NV	WID	366	-34	100	—	3	-1	0	1	0	0	20K	BLM
Spalding	NV	WID	365	0	100	—	0	-23	0	0	0	0	15K	BLM

Northwest Area (PL 3)

New fires: 26
New large fires: 2
Uncontained large fires: 3
Type 2 IMTs committed: 2

* Geneva Twelve, Ochoco NF. IMT 2 (Rapp). Nine miles west of Culver, OR. Juniper, brush and grass. Active fire behavior with running and torching. Numerous structures threatened. Evacuations in effect.

Antoine 2, Spokane District, BLM. IMT 2 (LaFave). Seven miles northeast of Chelan, WA. Timber. Active fire behavior with torching and spotting. Residences threatened.

Lava, Lakeview District, BLM. Fifteen miles northeast of Ft. Rock, OR. Juniper, brush and grass. No new information. Last report unless new information is received.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
* Geneva Twelve	OR	OCF	1,341	—	20	8/13	157	—	5	7	2	2	10K	FS
Antoine 2	WA	SPD	4,000	2,200	40	8/10	428	260	8	58	2	0	150K	BLM
Lava	OR	LAD	21,546	—	85	UNK	97	—	2	10	1	0	1.8M	BLM
* Cougar	OR	VAD	467	—	100	—	96	—	2	15	0	0	85K	BLM

VAD – Vale District, BLM

Southern Area (PL 1)

New fires: 57
New large fires: 1
Uncontained large fires: 6

Cushing, Oklahoma DOF. Six miles southeast of Cushing, OK. Timber and grass. Active fire behavior with spotting. Numerous structures and oil and gas facilities threatened.

Botone 3, Anadarko Agency, BIA. Three miles east of Carnegie, OK. Timber and grass. Creeping and smoldering. Structures threatened.

Lagoon Creek, Pawnee Agency, BIA. Five miles north of Yale, OK. Timber and grass. Creeping and smoldering. Residences threatened. Reduction in acreage due to more accurate mapping.

Norfolk Road, Oklahoma DOF. Four miles southeast of Cushing, OK. Timber and grass. Moderate fire activity. Numerous structures and oil and gas facilities threatened.

* WF Pig Farm, McFaddin NWR. Thirteen miles west of Sabine Pass, TX. Grass. No further information received.

McNac, Okmulgee Field Office, BIA. Ten miles north of Bristow, OK. Timber and grass. No new information.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Cushing	OK	OKS	6,493	1,493	40	UNK	24	-13	0	7	1	5	24K	ST
Botone 3	OK	ANA	3,000	250	75	UNK	14	6	0	5	0	0	16K	BIA
Lagoon Creek	OK	PAA	3,500	-2,500	70	8/7	7	-10	0	3	0	7	30K	BIA
Norfolk Road	OK	OKS	1,828	1,028	65	UNK	32	23	0	9	1	0	13K	ST
* WF Pig Farm	TX	MCR	600	---	50	UNK	15	---	0	4	0	0	5K	FWS
McNac	OK	OMA	58,232	---	40	8/10	42	---	1	8	1	50	200K	BIA
Lick Creek	OK	OKS	3,000	2,700	100	---	13	-8	0	6	0	3	2K	ST
Hess Knob	AR	OZF	1,438	0	100	---	19	-12	0	2	0	0	NR	FS
Bills Hill	FL	CAP	252	---	100	---	2	-17	0	1	0	0	70K	NPS

OZF – Ozark & St. Francis NF CAP – Canaveral National Seashore

Rocky Mountain Area (PL 3)

New fires: 16
 New large fires: 0
 Uncontained large fires: 3

Bear Mountain Complex (2 fires), Rawlins Field Office, BLM. Thirty-five miles north of Rawlins, WY. Timber, brush and grass. Moderate fire activity.

Wolf, White River Field Office, BLM. Five miles southeast of Elk Springs, CO. Pinyon pine, brush and grass. Minimal fire activity. Oil and gas facilities threatened.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Bear Mountain Complex	WY	RAD	12,645	0	67	8/10	176	-86	6	5	2	0	5.7M	BLM
Wolf	CO	WRD	6,100	0	75	8/9	167	-12	7	4	1	0	500K	BLM
Sleeper	SD	CRA	450	0	100	---	20	0	1	3	0	0	20K	BIA

CRA – Cheyenne River Agency, BIA

Southern California Area (PL 3)

New fires: 24
 New large fires: 0
 Uncontained large fires: 2
 Type 2 IMTs committed: 1

Piute Complex (2 fires), Sequoia NF. IMT 2 (Cooper). Twelve miles south of Lake Isabella, CA. Timber, brush and grass. Moderate fire activity.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Hel	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Piute Complex	CA	SQF	1,500	700	15	UNK	929	403	22	46	9	0	1.5M	FS

Other Fires

(As of August 3)

GACC	Fires	Cumulative Acres	Crews	Engines	Helicopters	Total Personnel
AK	13	126,503	0	0	0	0
NW	0	0	0	0	0	0
NO	1	24	0	0	0	0
SO	0	0	0	0	0	0
NR	1	150	0	3	0	15
EB	7	93,981	6	7	2	207
WB	0	0	0	0	0	0
SW	0	0	0	0	0	0
RM	1	213	0	0	0	0
EA	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	7	7,711	5	18	5	127
Total	30	228,582	11	28	7	349

This table does not include fires reported in the large fire section of this report. Updated weekly.

Predictive Services Discussion: High pressure will settle over the western states. Temperatures will warm rapidly across the West but isolated thunderstorms will still develop over the higher terrain in the afternoon. Cooler conditions will continue over the Great Lakes and mid-Mississippi valley but hot and humid weather will persist across the Southeast. Showers and thunderstorms will form over the mid-Atlantic and Southeast.

<http://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/outlooks.html>



Today's discussion is from the
Fireline Safety Category.

The 10 Standard Fire Orders

The orders are arranged according to their importance and grouped in logical sequence. Review and consider Standard Fire Orders as a part of every shift.

- Did you receive or request adequate weather briefing, current and predicted fire behavior, wind direction, predicted humidity, fuel moisture, local factor?
- Do you have map of the fire? Is topography, type of fuels, direction of the spread defined?
- Fire behavior group deals with what the firefighter will encounter - weather, fire status, fire behavior.
 1. Keep informed on fire weather conditions and forecasts.
 2. Know what your fire is doing at all times.
 3. Base all actions on current and expected behavior of the fire.
- Are you familiar with direction, distance, location, size of escape routes and safety zones?
- Discuss the need for lookout, such as extreme fire behavior, fire located out of line-of-sight.
- Discuss importance of the situational awareness.
- Fireline safety group emphasizes personal safety.
 4. Identify escape routes and safety zones and make them known.
 5. Post lookouts when there is possible danger.
 6. Be alert. Keep calm. Think clearly. Act decisively.
- Review importance and means of passing tactical decisions and resource movement.
- Review other factors influencing potential changes in tactics, which could affect control of your forces.
- Organizational Control group is centered around tactical decisions.
 7. Maintain prompt communications with your forces, your supervisor and adjoining forces.
 8. Give clear instructions and insure they are understood.
 9. Maintain control of your forces at all time.
- After you have considered, discussed and acted on the previous nine orders:
 10. Fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first.

References:
[Incident Response Pocket Guide](#) back cover

Have an idea? Have feedback? [Share it.](#)

[Online](#) | MAIL: 6 Minutes For Safety Task Group • 3833 S. Development Ave • Boise, ID 83705 | FAX: 208-387-5250
[6.Minutes.Home](#)

Fires and Acres Yesterday

AREA		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Northwest	FIRES		5				21	26
	ACRES		688				14	702
Northern California	FIRES	2	3		2	18	18	43
	ACRES	2	8,000		2	28	8	8,040
Southern California	FIRES	1	4			12	7	24
	ACRES	0	0			11	924	935
Northern Rockies	FIRES					2	4	6
	ACRES					0	312	312
Eastern Great Basin	FIRES	2	21			7	10	40
	ACRES	0	9,718			1,232	18,661	29,611
Western Great Basin	FIRES		18				5	23
	ACRES		78,217				90	78,307
Southwest	FIRES	11				1	6	18
	ACRES	15				0	0	15
Rocky Mountain	FIRES	2	5	1	1	6	1	16
	ACRES	451	0	0	0	60	2	513
Eastern Area	FIRES					7		7
	ACRES					4		4
Southern Area	FIRES			1	1	48	7	57
	ACRES			600	6	888	30	1,524
TOTAL	FIRES	18	56	2	4	101	79	260
	ACRES	468	96,623	600	8	2,223	20,041	119,963

Fires and Acres Year-to-Date

AREA		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska	FIRES	1	37	28	20	236	4	326
	ACRES	43	50,159	39,270	67,906	49,840	0	207,218
Northwest	FIRES	121	139	19	16	349	332	976
	ACRES	2,074	810,693	1,787	13	3,738	704	819,009
Northern California	FIRES	85	18	2	8	1,823	365	2,301
	ACRES	172	9,476	0	10	12,633	47,820	70,111
Southern California	FIRES	26	125	9	21	2,164	322	2,667
	ACRES	27	4,473	8	507	28,649	3,987	37,651
Northern Rockies	FIRES	897	171	18	12	382	414	1,894
	ACRES	337,075	257,642	10,327	652	79,638	52,742	738,076
Eastern Great Basin	FIRES	40	528		23	598	341	1,530
	ACRES	24,882	590,991		272	183,246	259,572	1,058,963
Western Great Basin	FIRES	4	331	1	14	149	73	572
	ACRES	1,200	200,074	0	37	14,251	13,806	229,368
Southwest	FIRES	673	170	12	34	426	804	2,119
	ACRES	30,251	4,510	187	4,327	31,219	448,754	519,248
Rocky Mountain	FIRES	1,036	461	23	25	1,158	546	3,249
	ACRES	66,628	41,380	1,300	832	286,888	247,559	644,587
Eastern Area	FIRES	676		45	16	7,653	510	8,900
	ACRES	1,631		4,755	401	71,574	9,801	88,162
Southern Area	FIRES	448		44	46	13,718	531	14,787
	ACRES	38,408		20,159	16,752	171,228	79,764	326,311
TOTAL	FIRES	4,007	1,980	201	235	28,656	4,242	39,321
	ACRES	502,391	1,969,398	77,793	91,709	932,904	1,164,509	4,738,704

Ten Year Average Fires	50,249
Ten Year Average Acres	4,525,083

*** Changes in some agency YTD acres reflect more accurate mapping or reporting adjustments. ***

Prescribed Fires and Acres Yesterday

AREA		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Northwest	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Northern California	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Southern California	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Northern Rockies	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Eastern Great Basin	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Western Great Basin	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Southwest	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Rocky Mountain	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Eastern Area	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Southern Area	FIRES			1		11	1	13
	ACRES			25		648	60	733
TOTAL	FIRES	0	0	1	0	11	1	13
	ACRES	0	0	25	0	648	60	733

Prescribed Fires and Acres Year-to-Date

AREA		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska	FIRES				2	10		12
	ACRES				18	13,314		13,332
Northwest	FIRES	8	59	15			157	239
	ACRES	3,502	7,000	1,305			31,956	43,763
Northern California	FIRES	3	13	22	21		153	212
	ACRES	108	203	22,621	151		13,082	36,165
Southern California	FIRES		6	5	5	6	159	181
	ACRES		1,521	381	946	1,831	4,120	8,799
Northern Rockies	FIRES	16	9	68	3	33	192	321
	ACRES	1,822	4,745	16,495	233	1,809	20,854	45,958
Eastern Great Basin	FIRES		11	2	4	20	42	79
	ACRES		898	188	230	324	18,824	20,464
Western Great Basin	FIRES		8	4		13	4	29
	ACRES		2,261	419		279	221	3,180
Southwest	FIRES	31	17	12	15		131	206
	ACRES	1,214	8,519	5,512	109		38,954	54,308
Rocky Mountain	FIRES	23	25	91	21	18	61	239
	ACRES	2,025	2,965	19,979	2,492	8,377	10,819	46,657
Eastern Area	FIRES	37		492	41	959	149	1,678
	ACRES	22,116		78,680	9,054	57,490	57,406	224,726
Southern Area	FIRES	23		139	53	8,358	834	9,407
	ACRES	4,783		57,615	37,634	474,106	812,486	1,386,624
TOTAL	FIRES	141	148	850	165	9,417	1,882	12,603
	ACRES	35,570	28,112	203,175	50,867	557,530	1,008,722	1,883,976

*** Changes in some agency YTD acres reflect more accurate mapping or reporting adjustments. ***

Additional wildfire information is available through the Geographic Areas at <http://gscc.nifc.gov/>.

Canada Fires and Hectares

PROVINCES	FIRES YESTERDAY	HECTARES YESTERDAY	FIRES YEAR-TO-DATE	HECTARES YEAR-TO-DATE
BRITISH COLUMBIA	0	0	681	6,719
YUKON TERRITORY	2	6	112	63,166
ALBERTA	12	12	1,109	339,262
NORTHWEST TERRITORY	1	14,062	235	250,477
SASKATCHEWAN	1	3,411	338	216,725
MANITOBA	2	18	423	192,015
ONTARIO	9	3	1,278	135,705
QUEBEC	9	0	698	70,174
NEWFOUNDLAND	3	1	181	137,441
NEW BRUNSWICK	3	0	305	356
NOVA SCOTIA	2	0	315	779
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND	0	0	5	9
NATIONAL PARKS	0	0	62	274,988
TOTALS	44	17,513	5,742	1,687,816

This report contains information derived from the National Fire and Aviation Management Web Applications (FAMWEB) system and other sources to provide relative information about emerging and ongoing incident activity. This information is considered operational in nature, is subject to correction, and therefore may not match official year to date agency records.

**** National Interagency Coordination Center ****

Appendix 8

National Interagency Coordination Center Incident Management Situation Report Wednesday, August 8, 2012 – 0530 MT National Preparedness Level 3

National Fire Activity

Initial attack activity:	Moderate (228 new fires)
New large fires:	15 (*)
Large fires contained:	8
Uncontained large fires: **	49
Area Command Teams committed:	0
NIMOs committed:	1
Type 1 IMTs committed:	3
Type 2 IMTs committed:	13

** Uncontained large fires include only fires being managed under a full suppression strategy.

[Link](#) to Geographic Area daily reports.

Four MAFFS C-130 aircraft and support personnel from the 146th Airlift Wing, Channel Islands (California Air National Guard), and the 302nd Airlift Wing, Colorado Springs (US Air Force Reserve) are supporting wildland fire suppression operations out of Boise, ID.

Eastern Great Basin Area (PL 4)

New fires:	17
New large fires:	4
Uncontained large fires:	11
NIMOs committed:	1
Type 1 IMTs committed:	2
Type 2 IMTs committed:	2

Springs, Boise NF. IMT 1 (Hahnenberg). Started on Bureau of Reclamation land five miles west of Garden Valley, ID. Timber. Moderate fire activity with running and torching. Structures threatened.

Cave Canyon, Sawtooth NF. IMT 1 (Lund). Fifteen miles southeast of Twin Falls, ID. Juniper and brush. Active fire behavior with torching and spotting.

Flat Top 2, Twin Falls District, BLM. Ten miles north of Kimama, ID. Brush and grass. Extreme fire behavior.

* **East Rock, Boise District, BLM.** Thirty miles south of Mountain Home, ID. Juniper, brush and grass. Active fire behavior.

Deer Hollow, Sawtooth NF. Fifteen miles southeast of Malta, ID. Brush and grass. Running fire with torching.

Halstead, Salmon-Challis NF. NIMO (Houseman). Eighteen miles northwest of Stanley, ID. Timber. Active fire behavior. Numerous structures threatened. Area closures in effect.

Trinity Ridge, Boise NF. IMT 2 (Suwyn). Seven miles northwest of Featherville, ID. Timber. Crown runs with torching and long-range spotting. Structures threatened. Area closures in effect.

Mustang, Salmon-Challis NF. IMT 2 (Adell). Twenty-eight miles west of North Fork, ID. Timber. Short duration crown runs with group tree torching.

Pinyon, Northwest Area, Utah DOF. One mile northwest of Eagle Mountain, UT. Timber and grass. Active fire behavior with single tree torching. Numerous residences and military structures threatened.

* **Faust**, Salt Lake Field Office, BLM. Nine miles northwest of Vernon, UT. Juniper, brush and grass. Extreme fire behavior.

West Mountain, Cedar City Field Office, BLM. Twenty-two miles northwest of St. George, UT. Hardwood slash and brush. Smoldering.

* **Hot Well**, Twin Falls District, BLM. Eight miles east of Burley, ID. Juniper, brush and grass. Running and spotting.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Springs	ID	BOF	2,000	1,680	5	UNK	199	41	7	5	4	0	150K	BOR
Cave Canyon	ID	STF	22,000	13,200	10	UNK	174	12	4	7	1	0	500K	FS
Flat Top 2	ID	TFD	80,000	83,000	5	UNK	89	4	0	10	1	0	200K	BLM
* East Rock	ID	BOD	2,300	—	30	UNK	30	—	0	2	2	0	6K	BLM
Deer Hollow	ID	STF	1,500	500	10	UNK	22	0	0	4	0	0	70K	FS
Halstead	ID	SCF	34,021	3,736	3	10/16	421	27	9	16	3	0	2.9M	FS
Trinity Ridge	ID	BOF	4,500	3,250	5	UNK	282	20	8	2	1	0	850K	FS
Mustang	ID	SCF	1,388	638	N/A	N/A	120	25	1	12	1	0	301K	FS
Pinyon	UT	NWS	2,959	702	40	8/9	159	64	3	15	1	7	261K	ST
* Faust	UT	SLD	5,000	—	10	8/12	130	—	4	5	3	0	250K	BLM
West Mountain	UT	CCD	2,458	0	75	8/9	97	-9	2	8	2	0	300K	BLM
* Hot Well	ID	TFD	1,500	—	50	UNK	20	—	0	3	0	0	200K	BLM
Shale Butte	ID	TFD	1,900	0	100	—	0	—	0	0	0	0	50K	BLM
* East Hollister	ID	TFD	568	—	100	—	0	—	0	0	0	0	80K	BLM
Pine Canyon	UT	BRS	388	0	100	—	4	-46	0	1	0	0	185K	ST

BRS – Bear River Area, Utah DOF

Northern California Area (PL 3)

New fires: 27
 New large fires: 1
 Uncontained large fires: 4
 Type 1 IMTs committed: 1
 Type 2 IMTs committed: 3

Chips, Plumas NF. IMT 1 (McGowan). Twenty miles northwest of Quincy, CA. Timber and brush. Active fire behavior with torching and short-range spotting. Structures, power lines and communications site threatened.

Reading, Lassen Volcanic NP. IMT 2 (Whitcome). Fourteen miles south of Old Station, CA. Timber. Active fire behavior with torching and long-range spotting. Road and trail closures in effect.

Lost, Northern California District, BLM. IMT 2 (Molhoek). Twenty miles southeast of Eagleville, CA. Juniper, brush and grass. Rapid rates of spread with torching. Power lines threatened.

* Goff, Klamath NF. IMT 2 (Walker). Ten miles northeast of Happy Camp, CA. Timber. Backing fire.

MDF Lake Complex, Modoc NF. Previously reported as the Lake Complex. Thirty miles northwest of Alturas, CA. Timber, brush and grass. Creeping with isolated torching. Structures threatened.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Chips	CA	PNF	16,787	3,100	10	8/21	1,002	237	19	51	8	0	6.4M	FS
Reading	CA	LNP	2,000	1,000	N/A	N/A	331	281	14	4	0	0	200K	NPS
Lost	CA	NOD	26,951	18,951	25	8/12	289	122	4	6	0	0	700K	BLM
* Goff	CA	KNF	10	---	0	UNK	40	---	2	0	0	0	150K	FS
MDF Lake Complex	CA	MDF	1,600	0	70	8/8	178	29	6	17	2	0	150K	FS
Dillon	CA	KNF	318	0	100	---	125	-168	4	1	0	0	1.6M	FS

Northern Rockies Area (PL 3)

New fires: 16
 New large fires: 1
 Uncontained large fires: 10
 Type 2 IMTs committed: 3

Rosebud Creek Complex (3 fires), Eastern Land Office, Montana DNR. IMT 2 (Benes). Sixty miles southwest of Miles City, MT. Ponderosa pine, brush and grass. Active fire behavior with torching. Structures threatened.

Sarpy Hills Complex, Crow Agency, BIA. IMT 2 (Fry). Eighteen miles northwest of Crow Agency, MT. Timber. Creeping.

Elbow Pass Complex (4 fires), Lewis & Clark NF. IMT 2 (Hall). Twenty-five miles southwest of Augusta, MT. Timber. Moderate fire activity with torching. Structures threatened.

Prisoner Lake, Flathead NF. Twenty-five miles east of Condon, MT. Timber. Torching and spotting. Trail closures in effect.

* Mull Draw, Miles City Field Office, BLM. Started on private land thirty miles south of Birney, MT. Timber, brush and grass. Active fire behavior.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Rosebud Creek Complex	MT	EAS	173,261	0	30	UNK	914	29	20	84	7	5	4.5M	ST
Sarpy Hills Complex	MT	CRA	82,000	0	85	8/9	439	-271	7	43	7	16	3.5M	BIA
Elbow Pass Complex	MT	LCF	15,830	0	0	9/12	114	0	2	0	5	0	2.6M	FS

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Prisoner Lake	MT	FNF	3,410	77	0	UNK	16	-6	0	0	0	0	85K	FS
* Mull Draw	MT	MCD	800	---	0	UNK	61	---	1	7	1	0	3K	PRI

Western Great Basin Area (PL 3)

New fires: 19
 New large fires: 0
 Uncontained large fires: 6
 Type 2 IMTs committed: 1

Holloway, Winnemucca District Office, BLM. IMT 2 (Ourada). Twenty-five miles east of Denio, NV. Brush. Extreme fire behavior with long-range spotting.

Willow, Northern Region, Nevada DOF. Twenty-five miles north of Battle Mountain, NV. Hardwood slash, brush and grass. Active fire behavior. Structures threatened.

Gilbert, Battle Mountain District, BLM. Forty miles northwest of Austin, NV. Hardwood slash, brush and grass. Extreme fire behavior. Residences and a communication facility threatened.

Fraiser, Battle Mountain District, BLM. Thirty miles northeast of Eureka, NV. Pinyon pine, juniper and brush. Running fire with torching and spotting. Major power lines threatened.

Del, Ely District, BLM. Twenty miles southeast of Alamo, NV. Juniper, brush and grass. Moderate fire activity.

Lutz, Humboldt-Toiyabe NF. Forty-five miles southwest of Wells, NV. Grass. Creeping and smoldering.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Holloway	NV	WID	72,000	17,000	5	8/11	145	3	5	5	3	0	1.2M	BLM
Willow	NV	NNS	16,000	9,000	30	8/9	298	104	8	20	5	3	250K	ST
Gilbert	NV	BMD	11,500	5,500	10	8/10	55	42	1	6	0	0	50K	BLM
Fraiser	NV	BMD	15,000	12,000	10	8/10	94	56	2	10	0	0	275K	BLM
Del	NV	ELD	23,680	0	70	8/9	193	0	6	3	4	0	400K	BLM
Lutz	NV	HTF	1,200	0	95	8/8	28	-120	0	6	0	0	120K	FS
Hood	NV	NNS	762	0	100	---	0	-4	0	0	0	0	35K	ST

Northwest Area (PL 3)

New fires: 14
New large fires: 2
Uncontained large fires: 4
Type 2 IMTs committed: 3

Geneva Twelve, Ochoco NF. IMT 2 (Rapp). Nine miles west of Culver, OR. Juniper, brush and grass. Smoldering. Numerous structures threatened.

Antoine 2, Spokane District, BLM. IMT 2 (LaFave). Seven miles northeast of Chelan, WA. Timber. Active fire behavior with torching and spotting. Residences threatened.

* Barry Point, Fremont-Winema NF. IMT 2 (Watts). Twenty-two miles southwest of Lakeview, OR. Timber, brush and grass. Active fire behavior with torching and spotting.

* Lytle, Vale District, BLM. Three miles south of Vale, OR. Brush and grass. Active fire behavior.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Geneva Twelve	OR	OCF	1,341	0	30	8/9	300	142	8	12	2	2	340K	FS
Antoine 2	WA	SPD	6,479	2,479	50	8/10	307	-121	6	27	0	0	750K	BLM
* Barry Point	OR	FWF	1,500	—	0	8/14	107	—	3	9	0	0	500K	FS
* Lytle	OR	VAD	5,357	—	70	8/8	42	—	1	6	0	0	45K	BLM

Southern Area (PL 2)

New fires: 41
New large fires: 4
Uncontained large fires: 7

Freedom Hill, Okmulgee Field Office, BIA. Previously reported as McNac. Started on private land ten miles north of Bristow, OK. Timber and grass. Minimal fire activity.

Cushing, Oklahoma DOF. Six miles southeast of Cushing, OK. Timber and grass. Minimal fire activity. Numerous structures and oil and gas facilities threatened.

Botone 3, Anadarko Agency, BIA. Three miles east of Carnegie, OK. Timber and grass. Creeping and smoldering. Structures threatened.

Lagoon Creek, Pawnee Agency, BIA. Five miles north of Yale, OK. Timber and grass. Creeping and smoldering. Residences, power lines, and oil and gas facilities threatened.

Norfolk Road, Oklahoma DOF. Four miles southeast of Cushing, OK. Timber and grass. Creeping and smoldering. Numerous structures and oil and gas facilities threatened.

* Love, Oklahoma DOF. Six miles northwest of McAlester, OK. Timber. No further information received.

* Nuyaka, Okmulgee Field Office, BIA. Eight miles west of Beggs, OK. Hardwood litter. Minimal fire activity.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Freedom Hill	OK	OKS	58,500	262	80	8/10	153	111	2	23	1	50	1.5M	PRI
Cushing	OK	OKS	6,493	0	75	UNK	8	-16	0	2	0	5	24K	ST
Botone 3	OK	ANA	3,000	0	85	UNK	4	-10	0	1	0	0	18K	BIA
Lagoon Creek	OK	PAA	3,500	0	80	UNK	23	16	0	7	0	12	30K	BIA
Norfolk Road	OK	OKS	1,628	0	75	UNK	2	-30	0	1	0	0	13K	ST
* Love	OK	OKS	1,000	---	95	UNK	3	---	0	2	0	0	1K	ST
* Nuyaka	OK	OMA	225	---	90	8/10	3	---	0	1	0	0	12K	BIA
WF Pig Farm	TX	MCR	1,800	1,200	100	---	15	0	0	4	0	0	7K	FWS
* Mt. Riante	AR	ARS	355	---	100	---	102	---	0	15	0	0	20K	ST
* Hobbs	AR	ARS	200	---	100	---	2	---	0	0	0	0	1K	ST

MCR – McFaddin NWR

ARS – Arkansas Forestry Commission

Southern California Area (PL 2)

New fires: 23
 New large fires: 1
 Uncontained large fires: 3
 Type 2 IMTs committed: 1

Piute Complex (2 fires), Sequoia NF. IMT 2 (Cooper). Twelve miles south of Lake Isabella, CA. Timber, brush and grass. Moderate fire activity. Structures threatened. Trail closures in effect.

* Bear, Sierra NF. Thirty-one miles west of Bishop, CA. Timber and chaparral. No further information received.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
Piute Complex	CA	SQF	1,799	299	35	UNK	1,083	154	30	46	0	0	2.5M	FS
* Bear	CA	SNF	350	---	5	UNK	NR	---	0	0	0	0	NR	FS

Rocky Mountain Area (PL 3)

New fires: 29
 New large fires: 1
 Uncontained large fires: 4

* Sheep Park, Wind River / Bighorn Basin District, BLM. Nine miles south of Jeffery City, WY. Moderate fire activity with tree torching. Timber, brush and grass. Structures threatened.

Bear Mountain Complex (2 fires), Rawlins Field Office, BLM. Thirty-five miles north of Rawlins, WY. Timber, brush and grass. Minimal fire activity.

Wolf, White River Field Office, BLM. Five miles southeast of Elk Springs, CO. Pinyon pine, brush and grass. Interior torching.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
* Sheep Park	WY	WBD	550	—	50	8/9	104	—	3	45	2	0	300K	BLM
Bear Mountain Complex	WY	RAD	12,645	0	75	8/9	152	-24	5	5	2	0	5.7M	BLM
Wolf	CO	WRD	6,100	0	90	8/8	102	-65	4	2	1	0	525K	BLM

Southwest Area (PL 2)

New fires: 31
 New large fires: 1
 Uncontained large fires: 0

* Cerro Del A, Taos Field Office, BLM. Twenty-seven miles northwest of Taos, NM. Timber. Backing fire. Last report unless significant activity occurs.

Incident Name	St	Unit	Size	Size Chge 24 Hrs	% Ctn	Est Ctn	Totl Pers	Pers Chge 24 Hrs	Crw	Eng	Heli	Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
* Cerro Del A	NM	TAD	104	—	N/A	N/A	15	—	0	2	0	0	40K	BLM

Other Fires

(As of August 3)

GACC	Fires	Cumulative Acres	Crews	Engines	Helicopters	Total Personnel
AK	13	126,503	0	0	0	0
NW	0	0	0	0	0	0
NO	1	24	0	0	0	0
SO	0	0	0	0	0	0
NR	1	150	0	3	0	15
EB	7	93,981	6	7	2	207
WB	0	0	0	0	0	0
SW	0	0	0	0	0	0
RM	1	213	0	0	0	0
EA	0	0	0	0	0	0
SA	7	7,711	5	18	5	127
Total	30	228,582	11	28	7	349

This table does not include fires reported in the large fire section of this report. Updated weekly.

Predictive Services Discussion: High pressure will remain over the West, producing very hot and dry conditions for the region. Isolated to widely scattered thunderstorms will form in the afternoon, mostly anchored to higher terrain. A stalled front over the northern Plains and the Ohio Valley region will produce showers and thunderstorms over the upper Mississippi and northern and central Plains. Hot weather will remain over the southern Plains. Thunderstorms will develop along the Southeast coast.

<http://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/outlooks.html>



Today's discussion is from the
Miscellaneous Category.

After Action Review part 2

The "Chainsaw" AAR

It's O'dark thirty. The crew has worked the fire for sixteen hours straight. No one has eaten a hot meal for days and oh yeah, you might as well be cold. No time for the After Action Review? – Think again!

It's time to bust out the ...CHAINSAW AAR. The idea behind the Chainsaw AAR is simple; **SPEED**. When you need to get an After Action Review done quickly try this simple format.

1. Have the team form a loose circle.
2. Start with a single team member and ask one of these questions:
 - What is one thing that went well on this shift?
 - What is one thing that went bad on this shift?
 - What is one thing you would do different next time?
 - What is one thing you learned today?
3. Continue around the circle until everyone has had a chance. It may be necessary to place a time limit on each individual (i.e. 30 seconds).
4. Avoid unnecessary discussion (dinner is waiting).
5. Note the comments for future discussion.

References:
[The Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program website](#) has multiple additional references on conducting effective AARs, many designed specifically for wildland firefighters and leaders.

Have an idea? Have feedback? Share it.

[ONLINE](#) | MAIL: 6 Minutes For Safety Task Group • 3833 S. Development Ave • Boise, ID 83705 | FAX: 208-387-5250
[6 Minutes Home](#)

Fires and Acres Yesterday

AREA		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska	FIRES						1	1
	ACRES						0	0
Northwest	FIRES		6			1	7	14
	ACRES		5,366			5	5	5,376
Northern California	FIRES				0	21	6	27
	ACRES				2,100	11	1,488	3,599
Southern California	FIRES					18	5	23
	ACRES					63	94	157
Northern Rockies	FIRES	2	3			3	8	16
	ACRES	180	440			6	69	695
Eastern Great Basin	FIRES		12			4	1	17
	ACRES		99,279			718	17,348	117,345
Western Great Basin	FIRES	1	9			2	7	19
	ACRES	0	38,010			572	74	38,656
Southwest	FIRES	8	4		1	4	14	31
	ACRES	12	28		0	160	11	211
Rocky Mountain	FIRES	11	7		2	3	6	29
	ACRES	53	677		0	43	17	790
Eastern Area	FIRES					10		10
	ACRES					2		2
Southern Area	FIRES					40	1	41
	ACRES					323	8	331
TOTAL	FIRES	22	41	0	3	106	56	228
	ACRES	245	143,800	0	2,100	1,903	19,114	167,162

Fires and Acres Year-to-Date

AREA		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska	FIRES	1	37	28	20	236	5	327
	ACRES	43	50,159	39,270	67,906	49,840	0	207,218
Northwest	FIRES	121	145	20	16	358	354	1,014
	ACRES	2,074	816,059	1,788	13	3,744	2,217	825,895
Northern California	FIRES	85	18	2	8	1,823	375	2,311
	ACRES	172	9,476	0	10	12,633	50,311	72,602
Southern California	FIRES	25	125	9	21	2,182	220	2,582
	ACRES	28	5,470	8	507	28,712	4,123	38,848
Northern Rockies	FIRES	899	174	18	12	386	423	1,912
	ACRES	337,255	258,082	10,327	652	79,644	52,214	738,174
Eastern Great Basin	FIRES	40	506		23	602	341	1,512
	ACRES	24,882	663,708		272	183,960	281,351	1,154,173
Western Great Basin	FIRES	5	343	1	14	151	79	593
	ACRES	1,200	238,084	0	37	14,823	13,879	268,023
Southwest	FIRES	683	174	12	34	430	813	2,146
	ACRES	30,264	4,459	187	4,327	31,280	448,768	519,285
Rocky Mountain	FIRES	1,047	468	23	27	1,162	557	3,284
	ACRES	66,681	42,057	1,300	832	286,956	247,594	645,420
Eastern Area	FIRES	676		45	16	7,663	510	8,910
	ACRES	1,631		4,755	401	71,598	9,801	88,186
Southern Area	FIRES	448		44	46	13,765	533	14,836
	ACRES	38,408		20,159	16,752	171,599	79,780	326,698
TOTAL	FIRES	4,030	1,990	202	237	28,758	4,210	39,427
	ACRES	502,638	2,087,554	77,794	91,709	934,789	1,190,038	4,884,522

Ten Year Average Fires	50,482
Ten Year Average Acres	4,613,708

*** Changes in some agency YTD acres reflect more accurate mapping or reporting adjustments. ***

Prescribed Fires and Acres Yesterday

AREA		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Northwest	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Northern California	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Southern California	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Northern Rockies	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Eastern Great Basin	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Western Great Basin	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Southwest	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Rocky Mountain	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Eastern Area	FIRES							0
	ACRES							0
Southern Area	FIRES					5		5
	ACRES					9		9
TOTAL	FIRES	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	9	0	9

Prescribed Fires and Acres Year-to-Date

AREA		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska	FIRES				2	10		12
	ACRES				18	13,314		13,332
Northwest	FIRES	8	59	15			157	239
	ACRES	3,502	7,000	1,305			31,956	43,763
Northern California	FIRES	3	13	22	21		153	212
	ACRES	108	203	22,621	151		13,082	36,165
Southern California	FIRES		6	5	5	6	159	181
	ACRES		1,521	381	946	1,831	4,120	8,799
Northern Rockies	FIRES	16	9	68	3	33	190	319
	ACRES	1,822	4,745	16,495	233	1,809	20,818	45,922
Eastern Great Basin	FIRES		11	2	4	20	42	79
	ACRES		898	188	230	324	18,824	20,464
Western Great Basin	FIRES		8	4		13	4	29
	ACRES		2,261	419		279	221	3,180
Southwest	FIRES	31	17	12	15		131	206
	ACRES	1,214	8,519	5,512	109		38,954	54,308
Rocky Mountain	FIRES	23	25	91	21	18	61	239
	ACRES	2,025	2,965	19,979	2,492	8,377	10,819	46,657
Eastern Area	FIRES	37		492	41	959	149	1,678
	ACRES	22,116		78,660	9,054	57,490	57,406	224,726
Southern Area	FIRES	23		139	53	8,363	834	9,412
	ACRES	4,783		57,615	37,634	474,115	812,486	1,386,633
TOTAL	FIRES	141	148	850	165	9,422	1,880	12,606
	ACRES	35,570	28,112	203,175	50,867	557,539	1,008,686	1,883,949

*** Changes in some agency YTD acres reflect more accurate mapping or reporting adjustments. ***

Additional wildfire information is available through the Geographic Areas at <http://gacc.nifc.gov/>.


Canada Fires and Hectares

Provinces	Fires Yesterday	Hectares Yesterday	Fires Year-To-Date	Hectares Year-To-Date
British Columbia	54	862	735	7,581
Yukon Territory	2	1	114	63,167
Alberta	37	0	1,146	339,263
Northwest Territory	2	4,500	237	254,977
Saskatchewan	3	2,431	341	219,157
Manitoba	2	92	425	192,107
Ontario	10	2	1,288	135,707
Quebec	2	0	700	70,170
Newfoundland	2	0	183	137,441
New Brunswick	0	0	305	356
Nova Scotia	5	25	320	804
Prince Edward Island	0	0	5	9
National Parks	0	0	62	274,988
Total	119	7,913	5,861	1,696,726

This report contains information derived from the National Fire and Aviation Management Web Applications (FAMWEB) system and other sources to provide relative information about emerging and ongoing incident activity. This information is considered operational in nature, is subject to correction, and therefore may not match official year to date agency records.

**** National Interagency Coordination Center ****

Appendix 9
Barry Point Fire Briefing Map



Appendix 10

Oregon IMT 4/Portland NIMO IMT After Action Review

After Action Review (AAR) Rollup Lessons Learned Center

Incident Name and Type: Barry Point / Wildland **Dates of Assignment:** 6/8-8/14/2012

Unit or Jurisdiction(s): Fremont-Winema and **Geographic Area:** OR-FWF-120680
Modoc National Forests

Report Submitted by: Oregon IMT 4, Portland NIMO IMT

Executive Summary

The following summarizes the After Action Review (AAR) that Oregon IMT 4 and the Portland National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) team completed for the Barry Point Fire. The transfer of Command schedule for this incident was particularly accelerated and time compressed. This document reflects the information that was submitted in the timeframes available.

The purpose of the AAR is to capture and share some of the successes, challenges and recommendations that can be incorporated into lessons learned. These lessons learned will also be posted on the Lessons Learned web site. The team has highlighted several of the lessons learned that we feel will help provide for continuous improvements in our business model of fire and land management. It is the team's hope that those who have the responsibility for fire management, land management or public safety review the comments and consider the appropriate actions.

Incident Commander

Most Notable Successes:

- Coordination and communication between the Team and the Agency Administrators for Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), Fremont-Winema National Forest (FWN) and the Modoc National Forest was excellent. The joint delegation worked well due to the support and engagement of all parties.
- Integration of NIMO and Oregon IMT 4 when fire complexity increased to Type 1 was seamless and extremely positive.
- Forming a landowner liaison group with representation from IMT4, ODF and FWF personnel to address landowner and permittee issues worked well to alleviate the anxiety of those stakeholders. This group met with them on both their own turf and in an open meeting format at a local school.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- We missed communicating with all affected landowners and permittees as the fire moved into new areas. This caused considerable angst, confusion, mixed messages and angry reactions.
- The Team lacked strategic focus as the fire progressed during the first two or three days. We were more tactical than strategic which caused us to react rather than anticipate and get ahead of events.
- Local fire management liaisons were directing requests through Line Operations the first two days, rather than through the Team's command structure.
- We had difficulty implementing the Deliberate Risk Assessment process to guide decision making on this incident.

Recommendations:

- Consider implementing a landowner liaison group on future incidents that have affected private property. Have a dialogue at the in-briefing to assess the need, recruit team members and implement in the first day or two of the incident.
- Insure that liaisons to the Team who represent the local unit work through the Team's command structure to allow Operations to focus on managing assigned resources.
- Contingency planning needs to occur from the first day of arrival on the incident. Utilize the Deliberate Risk assessment process to inform strategic decision making.

Liaison Officer

Most Notable Successes:

- Cooperation with the Lake County Sheriff Dept and the Modoc County Sheriff Dept. during numerous evacuations throughout the incident.
- Development of the evacuation plan signed by the Lake County Sheriff along with the coordination with Operations and the Sheriff in the development of the management action points.
- The cooperation with Modoc County Sheriff's Dept. during extreme fire movement.
- The assignment of a Liaison Trainee during complex fires.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Trying to keep out in front of the curve due to the fast moving fire with four different geographical areas of concern.
- Trying to keep ahead of the rumors. Local citizen would have information (true or not) almost immediately and were calling information with questions and their concerns.
- Communications between team members and cooperators.

Recommendations:

- Assign an individual to check frequently with operations so that real time information can be given to both: Public Information Officer and Liaison Officer.
- In complex fires, order at least one additional Liaison Officer.

Safety Officer

Most Notable Successes:

- Very minimal vehicle mishaps (1 minor), considering the number of person hours to date (66,120) and person years (7.55) worked on this incident. These numbers reflect Team 4's tour 8/09 to 8/13/12 only.
- Evacuations of Drew's Reservoir residences and the Westside of Goose Lake. Cooperation between Law Enforcement and Incident in planning ahead on voluntary evacuation and structure mitigation.
- Mitigation of fire/smoke hazards to the public and responders by electronic signing with Oregon DOT.
- Safety Officers were assigned to all Divisions and Groups.
- Ensured radio communications to fire personnel; Weather Alert on 8/13/12 (Roll calls required).
- Escorted Mike Cull (Fremont-Winema Safety Manager) for orientation of Incident operations.
- Escorted Mr. Billy Gattlin of Ruby Pipeline LLC. To survey incident operations and advised incident management of their high pressure gas pipeline and any associated hazards.

- Agency administrator's comments and challenge to our team, and his passion for our team to succeed, was the most difficult to hear, but the most noticeable success for our team.
- Angela ORDM, did an outstanding job, was by herself most of the time, was always cheerful and never gave up on UTT orders.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Getting accurate maps of Incident for operational personnel.
- Keeping situational awareness current due to the dynamic environment.
- Timely input into the planning process (two shifts vs. 24 hour plan took some time to get used to for everyone).
- Inconsistency of IAP input. It seemed to be a moving target at times. We can improve our communication in this area.
- Getting good night and swing shift sleeping areas established
- Resources, especially air were difficult at times to get, along with key overacad positions like DIVS, Heavy equipment loss (HFCQB) and TFLDs.

Recommendations:

- Continue to develop and expand the Risk Management Processes and Procedures within the Unit to other functional (wildlife, archeologists, Resource Advisors, etc) areas.
- Night shift operations resources should be rotated with day operations resources for fatigue issues.
- Move current ICP south to the California line, and leave a spike camp operation in Lakeview.

Safety – Risk Management Process/Assessment

Most Notable Successes:

- Cooperation with local law enforcement (sheriff's office) and Forest personnel.
- Comparison of Indirect and direct strategy as it pertains to firefighter exposure, based on expected fire behavior.
- The way our team responded to Fred Way's challenge!

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Mental model of what risk management is and what it is not, and how best to display that to the rest of the team.
- Establishing the Dutch Creek Protocol on fast moving emerging incident.

Recommendations:

- Continue to educate and use the Risk Management Process (modified 215A, Severity Table).
- Safety would like to try the Deputy facilitating the Deliberate Risk Management Process. This approach has seemed to work on other teams.

Fire Behavior Analyst/IMET

On August 5th, 2012 a complex of thunderstorms developed across portions of northern California and southern Oregon. Lightning data indicates that several strikes occurred on Barry Point near the identified ignition point at 1536 PDT on August 5, 2012. Fire was detected at this location the following day.

A general west to southwest flow developed across the area through August 9th in the wake of the upper shortwave trough that generated the thunderstorms on August 5th. The air mass over the region during this period was very warm, very dry and unstable.

From August 10th through the 14th, the combination of an upper level ridge and a surface thermal trough over northern California and southern Oregon maintained hot, dry and unstable conditions over the area of the fire. Daily high temperatures were generally in the lower 90s with minimum relative humidity values between 6 and 15 percent. Very poor overnight humidity recoveries occurred each of these nights with values generally between 25 and 40 percent. High level Haines values were a 5 through the period with the exception of August 12th when the Haines Index peaked at a 6 through the day operational period.

An indicator of this instability was visible through the pyro-cumulus clouds that developed over the smoke column on August 12th and 13th. The tops of these pyro-cumulus clouds, as measured by the National Weather Service Doppler Radar in Medford Oregon, reached 20,000 to 25,000 feet on August 12th and 35,000 to 40,000 feet on August 13th.

During the period from August 10th-14th, the fire experienced winds with directions varying from night to day. During night operational periods the wind direction was predominantly from the northeast to east while each afternoon the wind direction was generally southwest to west through August 13th and then northwest on the 14th. Sustained wind speeds over the fire through this period were generally less than 10 mph with gusts 15 mph or less.

Demobilization Unit Leader

Most Notable Successes:

- We were able to quickly develop a strong working relationship with Expedient Dispatch, having previously worked with these folks.
- Great being in close proximity to Resources and Finance to resolve database and resource issues.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Cleaning the ISUIFE database became a major priority before any accurate Section Reports or Tentative Release posters could be produced.
- Sections need to follow established protocols and procedures to better communicate and better utilize available time effectively.
- Vertical communication between C&G and Unit Leaders needs to be strengthened to improve clear, concise and consistent transfer of information.

- Emphasis needs to be placed on all Sections utilizing ICS 213 to document decisions/information (who, what, when, where and how) in a timely manner.
- Even though the Agency issued a delegation of authority, local program managers did not relinquish management of their resources.
- Demobilization Plan did not have Section Review and signoff, nor did Expanded get a chance to review (no air travel timeline or procedures included).

Recommendations:

- Have all Sections follow the procedures outlined within the signed Demobilization Plan, incorporate standard ICS protocols to improve communications vertically and horizontally.

Operations Section Chief

Most Notable Successes:

- Took care of firefighter
- Maintained proper span of control with resources ensuring safety
- Took advantage opportunities to burn off roads and barriers when and where appropriate
- Flexibility of suppression resources to use limited resources where needed
- Good integration with READs on line
- Integration with local resources and landowners helped to develop the right tactics in the right place.
- Resources focused on what could be done and moved resource forward as appropriate
- Good opportunities for trainees and high number of trainees given the opportunity
- Consistency of resources with positive attitude in spite challenging circumstances
- Flexibility of logistics to meet operation needs
- Night shift LAP separate from day

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Lack of maps to reflect rapid fire spread
- Lack of ability to obtain intermediate overhead to supervise resources resulting in understaffed divisions
- Smoke Inversion limiting use of air craft for suppression tactics
- Helicopter batch plant using Thermo-Gel in lieu of retardant
- Limited fireman maps
- Lack of changes in fuels types ahead of the fire limited control opportunities
- Extremely dry receptive fuels/coupled with extreme fire behavior during both day and night occasional shifts limited suppression opportunities
- Two planning cycles doubled meetings
- Lack of sufficient day sleeping areas
- Lack of type 1 crews

Recommendations:

- Maintain 2 person staff in planning ops as appropriate
- Think bigger box based on fire behavior
- Consider control strategies on based modeled fire spread
- Night Ops brief day ops from field via radio for 0530 operations meeting

Air Operations**Most Notable Successes:**

- The ability to establish helibase at the Lakeview Inter-Agency Air Base located on the Airport property was very successful. Having the local support and knowledge greatly benefited the entire operation; this includes the Forest Supervisor down through the entire staff.
- The Aircraft Dispatcher is very knowledgeable in her job and very helpful, and a great asset.
- Having the exclusive use helitack crews made operating simple and was able to fill in the middle staffing positions required until orders could be filled.
- Having the C1-215's and the available water source is a great asset.
- Having multiple water sources available for the helicopters made for short turn times and greatly assisted the needed support to the line.
- Radio communications was very good across the entire.
- Having a Helio available and operational made it possible to continue helicopter support when it was too smoky for Air Attack.

Most Difficult Challenges:

- Shortage of aircraft and personnel made it difficult to provide the necessary support to the line.
- Density Altitude limits the use of the C1-215's
- Smoke and inversions greatly hamper flight operations and line support.

Recommendations:

- Continue to look for staffing for the helibase so the local helitack can be made available for Initial Attack.
- Keep all resource orders open for aircraft and personnel. As they U/F re-order so that the needs can be met.
- Continue to look for a location where the second Thermo-Gel plant can be set. One possibility is located at the Albertson Reservoir approximately three miles west of Division CC. Branch is working on a land use agreement with the land owner.
- Look for Helibase locations to the South as the fire progresses and with the anticipated move of ICP.

Finance Section Chief

Most Notable Successes

COST

- Cost Share Agreement was entered with Oregon Department of Forestry and Fremont National Forest.
- Successfully tracked costs as agreed upon utilizing the Isuite application.

PERSONNEL TIME

- Deanna Drinkwater, ODI, was integrated into our finance organization. She was a very valuable resource who had many contacts.
- Worked with Douglas County Parole and Probation/Douglas Forest Protective Association and Warner Creek Correction Facilities to ensure correct time keeping procedures.
- Fire Time Reports were successfully fixed utilizing Efax.

EQUIPMENT TIME

- The contractors were very prepared and provided the information we needed.
- Of the 3 FQTRs, 1 was a trainee and 1 was TIML qualified. It was a good mix and we were able to keep the posting current.
- Leif Shjeflo was the PROC. He was able to resolve any issues we had. His help was greatly appreciated.

CONTRACT INSPECTION

- The contract Resources assigned to the Barry Point incident were the following:
 - 43 contract engines
 - 28 contract water tenders
 - 4 contract feller modules
 - 23 contract crews
 - 2 hand washing stations
 - 4 skidders
 - 3 feller bunchers
 - 1 weed washing station
 - 1 water truck
 - 1 refer trailer
 - 1 bus
 - 1 communication trailer
 - 1 office trailer
 - 1 gray water tender
 - 1 medical unit

- Leo Robb and Bill Helphinstine were assigned as ICPI for this incident and performed pre-use inspections for the engines, tenders, fallers, crews and other equipment
- Olga Casarez was assigned ICPI (t).
- Local BLM employee, Berry Phelps (assigned to expanded dispatch) was given the opportunity to inspect several pieces of equipment when his schedule allowed.
- Having an extra ICPI available allowed for one ICPI to spend more time in the cache to prevent contractors from checking out durable property.
- The 3 ICPIs reduced in-camp waiting time for inspections of resources.

COMP/CLAIMS

- We appreciated that Patty Westgate and Nina Hardin provided resources for late arrival of COMP for Oregon Team 4.

Most Difficult Challenges

PERSONNEL TIME

- Getting the Efax set up was challenging but rewarding.

EQUIPMENT

- The location and setup of the office was good but extremely hot.

Recommendations

PERSONNEL

- Continue to use Efax when possible.
- Have a dedicated fax line for that procedure and fax during non-peak hours.

Appendix 11

After Incident Report Lessons Learned Center

Incident Name: Barry Point	Dates of Assignment: 08/15-24/12
Unit or Jurisdiction(s): Fremont-Winema NF, Modoc NF, ODF	Geographic Area: PNW, R5 North Ops
Report Submitted by: Mike Morcom	Phone Number: 208-631-1621

1. What was the most notable success at the incident that others may learn from?

Social Media

PNW2 implemented several new approaches to information dissemination and public outreach based on social media platforms. In addition to our web site, www.pnw2.com, which provides a backup to IncWeb for incident information, Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, and a Wordpress blog were accessed by public and media interested in the fire. Facebook and the blog were the most frequently used, with 885 Likes and over 50,000 unique views on Facebook and an average of 2,000 unique views per day on the blog. The Social Media effort had a direct effect on telephone calls, which totaled 127 during PNW2's time on the fire. In contrast to past incidents, the percentage of general public that called the information center was significantly lower, with the majority of calls coming from media and incident or agency personnel.

The use of social media depended on a PIO with exceptional social media skills and a Volunteer Operators Support Team (VOST), which provided additional support while monitoring all platforms and alerting PNW2 to any issues that might need to be addressed by the team. This was the first time that we are aware of that a VOST was fully utilized on a Type I incident. The VOST concept was also submitted by PNW2 after the Arapaho Fire earlier this season.

Additionally, PNW2 used Ustream to stream the day and night shift briefings to the Modoc National Forest in Alturas, CA as well as several cooperators from the CA side of the fire. The streaming made the hour-long drive from Alturas to Lakeview, OR unnecessary and lessened the incident exposure to driving risk. The briefing streams were also recorded on Ustream so agency personnel and cooperators could watch at any time.

New Format for Public Meetings

PNW2 implemented a new strategy for public meetings on the Barry Point Fire. The agenda focused on a briefing by the Incident Commander, Operations, and the Meteorologist and then the meeting broke up so that the audience could go to several staffed stations to have individual questions answered. Stations included local forest practices, local law enforcement information on evacuations, general information, state forestry, and fire information. This alleviated the need to have an extended presentation from numerous partners and cooperators. For the general briefing, there were no questions taken from the audience, thus prohibiting grandstanding or angry comments.

Expanded Dispatch

Expanded dispatch for the Barry Point Incident was outstanding. The entire group was knowledgeable, courteous, and professional. Their outstanding support was critical in the success of PNW2. Their efforts translate directly to efficiency, comfort, and safety of the firefighter. Juanita Johnson was a delight to work with. Her leadership and knowledge is apparent. This is one of the best expanded dispatch organizations this team has worked with in a long time.

Communications with Agency Administrators.

Agency Administrators provided leaders intent, attended briefings, and communicated concerns well to ensure that a clear understanding of expectations was provided to the DMT Operations Section. The role of the Operations Liaison with local knowledge was invaluable to the Section. We recommend that this position be utilized on all incidents. Having experienced Agency Administrators to provide mentoring and coaching to lesser experienced Agency Administrators was very positive and allowed them to have a role in incident decision making without the normal overload associated with a Type 1 complexity fire.

2. What were some of the most difficult challenges faced and how were they overcome.

Dutch Creek Protocols

PNW Team 2 protocol for implementing the NWCG Dutch Creek direction is to collect ground locations of proposed medivac sites from line personnel on day 1, then verify those that will be used as helicopter landing spots on day 2. By day 3, and thereafter, we have a pre-planned medivac map in the Incident Action Plan, along with the emergency procedures listed in Block 8 of the Incident Medical Plan. On the Barry Point Fire, we found it difficult to meet this protocol timeline with ground verified information during the first 2 days of our assignment for a variety of reasons. Our GIS staff assisted by using Google Earth to pin down accurate GPS coordinates and estimating drive times and flight times to medical facilities. We used the Google Earth information until we were able to verify the information by ground and air. It is our belief that Google Earth information could be used at the end of day 1 to have a preliminary pre-planned medivac

3. What changes, additions or deletions are recommended to various training curriculums?

Recommending ICPI Taskbook

The Incident Contract Project Inspector (ICPI) is a new position in the Incident Command System. There is no Task Book and resources are currently utilizing the 2005 PNW Wildfire Coordinating Group Contract Representative Northwest (CRNW) Task Book. The CRNW Task Book's specific tasks do not reflect the expectations to perform the position. A Task Book needs to be created for the ICPI with accurate tasks to reflect the position.

Recommending change or additional support to the FOBS Taskbook

The Field Observer (FOBS) and Fire Effects Monitor (FEMO) taskbook contains some tasks that do not appear appropriate or consistent with the typical duties of a field observer resource. These tasks are numbered 10-13, 15, 19 and are all aimed at fire effects monitoring duties. Most of these are not commonly accomplished by FOBS personnel on wildland fire assignments. Additionally, many existing qualified FOBS are not familiar with the duties of a FEMO, and not comfortable with their ability to evaluate trainees in those tasks. Many of these tasks would be better evaluated on a prescribed fire by an individual with FEMO skills. Other options are to revise the task book or conversely to allow these items to be evaluated by a simulation of a wildland fire incident and provide a guide for the FOBS trainers to insure the trainee has an effective training/experience in completing the task.

4. What issues were not resolved to your satisfaction and need further review?
Based on what was learned, what is your recommendation for resolution?

Coordinating with Landowners and Permittees

Based on the number of affected permittees and landowners, closer coordination would have benefited the team and agency administrators. Local permittees and landowners can aid in firefighting efforts by providing valuable information, such as additional people in the area, lay of the land, access roads, road conditions, structures, livestock locations, fences, water sources and other information. Lack of coordination can lead to independent actions by permittees and landowners potentially creating difficult and unsafe situations for them and responding fire resources.

Resource advisors or other agency representatives are normally assigned to wildfires but work for the agency administrators. These individuals work closely with affected landowners but may or may not be closely tied in with team operations, planning and safety. They work to keep landowners and permittees informed on fire location, threats, and options for moving livestock.

map available to ground resources earlier, with verification occurring on days 2 and 3, thus shortening the time in which protocols are in place.

Cost Share Agreement

Challenge:

- The original Cost Share Agreement contained language that was not possible for an IMT to implement.

Notable Successes:

- We overcame the challenge by convening the Agency Administrators, Agency Representatives and Incident Business personnel to discuss the intent and mechanisms for tracking.
- After revision, data was tracked to comply with the intent of the Cost Share in a format that could be audited by the Oregon Emergency Service Department.
- ODF provided Agency personnel to review and audit Cost Share data on a regular basis. This clearly identified issues or errors that could be corrected while Operations and Air resources were still present and memory of events was clear.

Recommendation:

- For future Cost Share needs, we encourage the inclusion of Incident Business personnel from the respective agencies be included in the negotiations, or at a minimum, review the draft product prior to signature.

Local Resources

Notable Successes:

- Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) embedded a financial assistant in the Finance Section of the IMT. This provided cross agency expertise which significantly reduced the amount of time and research into individual issues.
- Local resources were utilized in the Finance Section. This provided local knowledge as well as flexibility in work schedules. Where support was not needed full time, cost savings occurred.

PNW2 Liaison Officers on the Bary Point Fire worked closely with local, county and state officials. Meetings were held on a regular basis and information exchanged regarding any issues or concerns. For future assignments PNW2 should strongly consider establishing a local landowner liaison position to provide the same services extended to local government. This position should be assigned to the team and work directly for the Incident Commander. This position could be filled locally by a person that possesses knowledge of the community and landowners.

iPad Use on Incidents

PNW2 was able to test one iPad on the Bary Point Fire. Information and Operations used the iPad at different times and both units are excited about the possibilities of the technology on future incidents. However, to meet the potential, the iPad must be configured properly. The primary concern is that there are no applications specifically for incidents. Using existing applications and trying to fit them to incident needs is not efficient. It takes a prior knowledge of available apps, some of which are not free. It would be beneficial to I/M's if incident and wildfire apps were developed, with a focus on Operations and Information to start. While those apps are being developed, a suite of existing apps should be identified, along with instructions on how best to apply them to incident use.